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ABSTRACT 
Incident response (IR) is an integral part of today’s computer security infrastructure 
both at the public and private sectors. The process involves identification of the critical 
resources, proposing plans for responding to potential breaches and executing effective 
containment and recovery procedures. The current practices emphasize establishing careful 
response plans, building technical capabilities and following disciplined procedures for 
plan execution. This research builds on the above by adding another dimension to the 
process, namely performance evaluation.   
Proposing a framework for the performance analysis of computer security incident 
response (CSIR) capabilities is the main focus of this research. The various design 
considerations and challenges to performance analysis of CSIR are investigated. A 
multidisciplinary survey is conducted to derive lessons learnt and best practices for the 
design of performance systems. The outcomes of the survey are integrated to the CSIR 
discipline to produce a development process for constructing performance evaluation 
models. For each development step, the various design possibilities are investigated to 
ensure flexibility and applicability to the wide spectrum of CSIR environments.  
Expert feedback is used as a method of design validation to ensure conformance to 
current CSIR best practices. Issues pertaining to how performance evaluation could be 
incorporated into the current industry practices are also explored. As a notable contribution, 
the study produces the definition and design considerations for fifty performance indicators 
that cover the diverse performance aspects of computer security incident response systems.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Computer Security Incident Response (CSIR)  
Computer Security Incident response (CSIR) is an integral part of today’s computer 
security infrastructure, both at the public and private sectors. The term CSIR refers to the 
collection of organized activities that address the aftermath of computer security incidents. 
The CSIR process involves identification of the critical resources that are vulnerable, 
implementing plans for responding to potential breaches, and executing effective 
containment and recovery procedures.  
The rapid increase of security breaches, the complexity of attacking techniques, the 
large scope of classified data and critical resources, and the high impact of security 
incidents on the operational and fiscal resources of business organizations and government 
units, are examples of factors that contributed to the development of CSIR. These factors 
triggered the need for systemized and effective methods of handling computer security 
incident. The computer security community collaboratively developed the incident 
handling procedures that are known today by CSIR. These procedures were later matured 
into the form of incident response planning.  
There are three main objectives for introducing a CSIR capability to an 
organization. The first is to quickly detect and properly diagnose a security incident. 
Second, a CSIR capability helps in minimizing the associated damage of incidents through 
containment and mitigation procedures. And third,  CSIR brings forward effective 
eradication and recovery procedures from cyber incidents.  
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Although incident response capabilities vary in their approaches, strategies and 
policies, five major components could be identified as common between all of them [1] [2] 
[3]. The five components are: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication and 
Review.  
The Preparation phase defines the goals, identifies what needs to be protected, and 
sets up policies and procedures of how to handle an incident from the moment it is detected 
to the moment of full recovery. A notable activity in this step is forming the incident 
response teams and defining their roles. The objective of this step is to ensure that when an 
incident erupts, all parties are engaged in handling it, not in figuring out what needs to be 
done.  
The Identification phase refers to the set of mechanisms and procedures to follow 
for detecting an incident, determining its severity and declaring it.  
The Containment phase is concerned with isolating the incident by preventing it 
from spreading outside its scope, ensuring that the incident doesn’t escalate and minimizing 
the associated damage.  
The Eradication phase involves technical procedures to remove the threat from the 
environment, provide remedies for the caused damage and recover the environment to its 
normal state.  
The final phase: Review identifies potential areas of improvement for future 
incidents in the forms of best practices and lessons learned.   
To demonstrate the disadvantage of not having a CSIR capability, a recent global 
survey sponsored by IBM [4] found that the longer it took to detect and respond to 
computer security incidents the higher the loss endured. It was also recorded that having a 
 3 
 
CSIR capability decreased the loss of data breach from $158 to $142, i.e. $16 per record. 
Taking the statistics that the US health sector alone was targeted by cybersecurity incidents 
against over 112 million record in 2015 [5]; the use of CSIR would have saved 1.792 billion 
dollars for the health industry alone. Specific incidents can even cost much higher loss, for 
example the 2013 Target credit card breach is estimated to have cost $200 million [6].  
The current CSIR practices emphasize careful design, technical capabilities, and 
successful execution of incident response plans. This research builds on the work that has 
been done in the CSIR literature by adding a fifth essential element to the process, namely 
performance evaluation.  Performance evaluation refers to the collection of methods and 
tools used to measure how good a specific activity contributed to achieving a goal. Within 
the context of CSIR, performance evaluation focuses on measuring the effectiveness of 
designing and implementing a CSIR plan (CSIRP).  
This project analyzes the concept of CSIR performance evaluation by inspecting 
why such evaluation is needed and how it could be achieved. A framework for assessing 
the effectiveness of a CSIR capability is presented. The framework constitutes of design 
parameters, development processes, measurement tools, analysis techniques and modeling 
of various aspects of CSIR performance.  
This dissertation is structured in seven chapters. The first chapter provides an 
introduction to the topic by investigating the need for evaluating CSIR, outlining the 
research methodology and defining the major terms. The second chapter surveys the 
relevant publications and is remarked by the multi-disciplinary approach of synthesizing 
findings of other incident response disciplines into CSIR.  
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Chapters three to five are centered around the development of the performance 
evaluation framework. Chapter three provides detailed description of the framework 
components and parameters. It also highlights the process of building a performance 
evaluation model for various environments. The main measurement tools used in the 
evaluation process, called performance indicators, are discussed in chapter four. While 
chapter five presents five performance evaluation sub-models that can be viewed as 
extensions to the performance framework presented in chapter three.  
The sixth chapter analyzes the proposed PE framework through scenario analysis 
and expert feedback. Finally, the seventh chapter summarizes the main findings and 
outlines directions for future research.    
1.2 The Need for Studying CSIR Performance Evaluation 
 
In the past fifteen years, the area of computer security incident response (CSIRP) 
has received substantial attention from the academic and industrial fronts. In academia, 
researchers in the area of computer security focused on two major areas; the development 
of incident response models and mechanisms, and proposing technical solutions for the 
identification and containment of various cyber security attacks. On the industrial front, 
the attention of security professionals was directed towards three main aspects. The first is 
drafting and writing computer security incident response plans (CSIRPs) that coordinate 
incident management between various technical and non-technical teams involved in the 
process of incident handling.  The second is developing industry standards for handling the 
response to computer security incidents. And finally proposing technical advisories and 
procedures on handling security incidents within specific environment constraints, or 
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vendor specific configurations. This technical information is normally shared in the form 
of blog posts and technical reports,  normally labeled by the term white papers.  
The study and implementation of performance evaluation measures within the 
context of CSIRP is expected to have contributions to both the academic and professional 
sectors. It mainly builds on the previous contributions and push towards more scientifically 
sound and cost effective handling of computer security incidents. The following 
subsections provide insights on how the focus of this dissertation on performance 
evaluation could enhance the understanding and handling of CSIR.  
1.2.1 Academic Need 
The vast majority of publications in the area of Computer Security Incident 
Response (CSIR), have no detailed or technical description of the issue of performance 
evaluation.. It is only the past decade that the issue of CSIR performance started to get 
more attention. Nevertheless, there is a distinguishable need for systemized and detailed 
approaches towards how to conduct such performance evaluation and which measurement 
methods should be used. In addition, discussing performance is normally presented under 
the generalities of conducting a post-incident lessons learnt analysis.  
The framework proposed in this dissertation aims at providing depth to the aspect 
of performance evaluation in the context of computer security incident response, that 
transcends the generalities proposed by previous works. This project will address design 
considerations, development processes, performance indicators and a variety of 
implementation considerations pertaining to CSIR.  
There are three possible reasons for why the study of performance evaluation in the 
area of CSIR did not get much academic attention.  
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First, the study of computer incident response, in its current developed form of 
being systemized and on the scope of large organizations,  is a relatively a new area of 
study. The previous studies focused on designing models of handling responses, 
articulating the specifics of each phase, and developing technical solutions to the common 
cyber-attacks. Since this dedication has produced works that build the foundations within 
the area of study, it is natural to evolve into studying methods of enhancement. It could be 
noticed that performance evaluation is perceived as enhancement activity instead of a core 
activity. Therefore, based on the maturity of the field, discussion of performance evaluation 
could have been only possible when the field has stabilized in terms of its procedures and 
processes.  
Second, there is an overall wide gap between the contributions of academia and the 
industry, as the latter is ahead in its complexity and depth of study. This is not surprising 
as the operational nature of the field dictates that sometimes pseudo solutions or imperfect 
but working solutions, which might not be accepted by the academic terms, be proposed 
by the industry for immediate countering to the breaches. However, this has led to an 
unfortunate outcome of the results being mainly preserved within the classified business 
documents, which are not normally circulated to academia or shared with the public. There 
is reasonable reckoning that the industry might have already developed some of its 
performance evaluation methods, but the locality of these documents remains an obstacle 
to the growth of the field. However, as stated by a CSIR responder [7], current evaluation 
methods used in the industry are: “semi-formal, ad hoc and conducted by smart people”.  
Third, as will be recorded in the literature review, the study of performance 
evaluation of incident response is a complex process that depends on a vast number of 
 7 
 
variables and is usually difficult to normalize. This is a lesson learnt from studying the 
findings of other disciplines that focus on incident response, like medical emergency. 
Although, the reasons for reaching such conclusion is different from one field to another, 
there are several shared challenges across the fields that extend to the area of computer 
security.  
Observing that there is an academic gap between acknowledging the need for 
conducting performance evaluation and the lack of models analysis was one of the 
motivations of this dissertation. The study aims at proposing a comprehensive framework 
that acts as a foundation for the study of performance evaluation the area of computer 
security incident response. The framework builds on the previous findings in the field, and 
has the flexibility and extendibility to capture the advancements in the field.  
Finally, the multidisciplinary nature of the study is another factor that brings academic 
significance to the proposed work. The survey of main findings and good practices across 
fields should be of interest to both security professional who do not need to re-invent the 
wheel, and to researchers who either study performance evaluation or study incident 
response across disciplines.  
1.2.2 Business Need and Impact 
A 2014 survey by SANS found that a quarter of practitioners feel that their 
organization’s CSIR capability is ineffective and only 9% reported that they felt it was very 
effective [8]. This perception of ineffectiveness captured by the CSIR technical 
practitioners is coupled by several concerns highlighted by business owners and 
administrators [9] that confirm the need for investigating the effectiveness of CSIR. 
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As shall be demonstrated in Chapter two, the need for measuring performance for 
incident response is acknowledged across various disciplines. Performance measurement 
triggers change in performance, or as summarized by [10] [11] it helps to control, budget, 
motivate, promote, learn and improve the response system  
The following points summarize the need for incorporating performance evaluation 
into incident response handling, from the business standpoint: 
[1] Need for reducing costs: the cost of handling security incidents is on the rise 
and the industry is dedicating millions of dollars for handling and containing computer 
breaches. Despite the observation that the financial implications of not securing the systems 
of an organization are far more than the cost of imposing security measures [12], it is still 
crucial for an organization to ensure that the security plans it adopts and implements are 
cost effective. With the use of performance metrics, an organization can measure the cost 
effectiveness of its plans and identify areas where cost could be reduced without 
jeopardizing the security of the system. 
[2] Need for faster responses: with the high dynamicity of today’s IT environments, 
the time factor plays an important role in responding to security threats. It is common to 
see threats escalate or even reach an uncontrollable state due to slowness or ineffectiveness 
of handling the incident. Performance evaluation will enable responders to identify areas 
where they could improve the effectiveness of the response and propose enhancements 
based on results of systemized and validated analysis techniques. It is true that performance 
collection, measurement and analysis occupies time; however, it “ends up saving more time 
than it consumes” [13]. 
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[3] Enhancing Decision Making: findings of performance evaluation provide 
incident responders and executives with data that empowers them to make effective and 
accurate decisions [9]. Without using data produced by well-designed performance 
metrics, most recommendations and reviews are based on speculations and not scientific 
approaches which might lead to counter effects. 
[4] Need for information sharing: using performance metrics will enable 
organizations to build a common language between security professionals and business 
administrators. At the same time, it helps an organization evaluate its performance 
compared to other organizations through benchmarking.    
[5] Liability Needs: Another aspect of industrial needs comes from the trending 
demand for providing insurance and liability over information security [14] [15]. Insurance 
companies are demanding objective assessment and quantifiable metrics for enforced 
security policies and procedures. Having systemized approaches to the evaluation of  CSIR 
capabilities is viewed as an essential component of the liability and insurance processes 
[7].  
[6] Compliance: The NIST document [1] considers performance evaluation as one 
of eight policies that need to be considered when designing and preparing  incident 
response plans. Similarly, the CERT document  [2] discusses under the section of quality 
assurance the need for “checks: measurement of quality parameters”. However, both 
documents do not provide outlines of how to design and implement the measurement 
process. This calls for a systemized and formalized approach of conducting performance 
measurement and analysis in order to demonstrate compliance with the above two industry 
standards.  
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As this project is finalized, the Forum for Incident Response Security Teams 
(FIRST)  [16] announced its establishment of a special interest group (SIG) for developing 
metrics for computer security incident response. This demonstrates that not only the 
industry approves the need for performance evaluation, but also that the industry is taking 
actual actions towards that direction.  
1.3 Problem Description and Methodology 
1.3.1 Problem Description and Research Objectives 
The research problem of this project is centered around the theme of evaluating the 
performance of computer security incident response capabilities. More specifically, the 
project will investigate how to build performance evaluation models for CSIR and how 
these models could be implemented. This is achieved through presenting a framework for 
developing CSIR performance evaluation models which is equipped with a variety of 
performance evaluation analysis and measurement methods adapted from current industry 
practices and from lessons learnt from other incident response disciplines.  
The problem could be more formally described as: “given a computer security 
incident response (CSIR) capability, how could an organization construct and apply a 
mechanism for assessing the performance effectiveness of the capability.”  
To address the above research problem, this dissertations attempts to achieve the 
following objectives: 
1. Demonstrate the importance of incorporating performance evaluation in computer 
security incident response planning and explain how that fits within the CSIR life 
cycle. 
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2. Conduct a multi-disciplinary survey of the good practices and major findings in 
the area of incident response. The results are to be analyzed in reference to 
computer security incident response for relevance and potential customization. 
3. Design a framework for the performance evaluation of incident response 
capabilities. The framework will provide guidance on identifying what needs to 
be measured, how to obtain those measurements, and how to analyze the 
obtained results. The framework will be having the following four features: 
a. Comprehensive: The framework captures the performance of the major 
activities in the CSIR life cycle and provides end-to-end development 
process.  
b. Flexible: The framework is applicable to various environments and can 
be used under different incident conditions 
c. Compatible: The framework is consistent with current industry 
practices of incident handling 
d. Multidisciplinary: the framework incorporates lessons learnt from other 
IR disciplines.  
4. Identify the measurement tools of performance evaluation in the form of 
performance indicators 
5. Provide operational guidelines for how performance evaluation models could be 
implemented in CSIR environments.  
1.3.2 Research Methodology  
This project uses four main research methodologies for the design and validation 
of the proposed performance evaluation framework. The four methods are: 
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multidisciplinary analysis, system analysis, industry-driven design and expert feedback. 
These methods were selected to suit the nature of the research problem and to match the 
approaches used by other researchers who produced publications tackling research 
problems that resemble the problem statement of this project. A description of the four 
methodologies is provided below: 
Multidisciplinary Analysis: A multidisciplinary survey of incident response in 
other disciplines, like medical emergency and homeland security, is conducted. The 
motivation of conducting this survey is to inspect how the other disciplines designed 
performance platforms for their incident response system. The main findings and best 
practices suggested by these disciplines are analyzed for their compatibility with the field 
of CSIR. Next, the relevant findings are integrated as design tools in the construction of a 
framework for evaluating the performance of CSIR. 
System Analysis: The major processes and procedures of computer security 
incident response system are analyzed. The objective of the analysis is to deconstruct the 
CSIR system into components and parameters from the performance evaluation 
perspective. The expected output is identifying which aspects/components of the CSIR 
system should be subject to performance evaluation and specify which measurement tools 
should be used for each component.    
Industry-Driven Design: The design of the performance framework is to be 
developed within the context of the best practices of the CSIR processes and procedures. 
This is achieved by ensuring that all components of the performance framework are in 
compliance with the two most common and acknowledged documentations of CSIR, 
namely the NIST publication “Computer Security Incident Handing Guide” (August 2012) 
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[1] and the CERT publication: “Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (CSIRTs) (April 2003) [2].  
Expert Feedback: A group of computer security incident response and cyber 
security experts are consulted for their intake into the design considerations and for their 
feedback on the proposed framework. The feedback, which is obtained through personal 
interviews, are integrated into the design of the framework or recorded for potential 
enhancements.  
The above research methodology can be summarized as argumentative design 
supported by expert feedback. Argumentative design refers to proposing various 
components of the framework associated with supported arguments. In the case of this 
project, the argument comes from the multidisciplinary survey results, system analysis of 
the CSIR or expert opinion.  
It is noticed that the above research method does not follow the conventional 
computer science research approach of proposing a model and verifying it through 
mathematical proofs, algorithms design, software simulation or empirical data. Instead, a 
reverse approach is used in which system and multidisciplinary analysis is conducted 
beforehand to derive the design of the framework. This explains the length of the second 
and third chapter of this dissertation due to the extensive consultation with the literature. 
However, To ensure the effectiveness of the proposed design, the proposed design is further 
verified through expert feedback and hypothetical scenario analysis.  
Several works in CSIR and related disciplines follow research methodologies 
similar to the ones adopted in this project. For instance, a collaborative incident response 
framework is proposed in [17]. The authors designed the framework by analyzing the needs 
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and lessons learnt and is verified through scenario analysis to demonstrate enhancements 
resulting from using the framework. A similar methodology is also used in [18] which 
proposed a framework for incident information management. Another publication by 
CERT [19]  proposed a mission-risk diagnostic platform through conducting a 
multidisciplinary survey to derive best practices that drive the platform design. Other works 
include [20] that uses interviews and literature survey for development of performance 
systems, [21] that uses hypothetical scenario analysis for analyzing performance 
frameworks, and [22] [23] that use expert feedback as an assessment for incident response 
performance evaluation systems.   
1.3.3 Assessment Methods 
The proposed performance framework will be evaluated through three main 
methods: 
Scenario Analysis: hypothetical scenarios will be used to demonstrate the 
functionality and impact of using the proposed performance framework. The scenarios are 
designed to cover various aspects of the framework applied to a variety of performance 
issues.    
Expert Feedback: Besides expert feedback being integrated into the design and 
implementation of the proposed framework, expert opinion on various components of the 
framework will be recorded and discussed.  
Framework Feature Evaluation: The four features of the framework, i.e. 
comprehensiveness, flexibility, compatibility and multidisciplinary feedback, will be 
evaluated. A demonstration of how the framework satisfies the above features will be 
presented.    
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1.4 Definitions 
A summary of the definitions of the main terms used in this project is provided in 
Table 1.  
Term Definition 
Incident 
“an occurrence of a major event or several events, that demonstrates 
actual or potential compromise of the system or data, and 
demonstrates high impact on the organization operations and 
resources, or the need for an organized response” 
Computer 
Security Incident 
Response 
“the capability to provide end-to-end, cross enterprise management 
of incidents that affect information and technology assets within an 
organization” 
Computer 
Security Incident 
Response Plan 
“the documentation of a predetermined set of instructions or 
procedures to detect, respond to, and limit consequences of a 
malicious cyber-attacks against an organization’s information 
system(s).” 
Computer 
Security Incident 
Response Team 
“Group of individuals usually consisting of Security Analysts 
organized to develop, recommend, and coordinate immediate 
mitigation actions for containment, eradication, and recovery 
resulting from computer security incidents.” 
CSIR 
Performance 
Evaluation 
“All activities associated with assessing how well a CSIRT executes 
CSIR activities as outlined in the CSIRP to achieve the outlined 
goals” 
Performance 
Framework 
“a generic conceptual setting that encompasses several perspectives 
and methods for the evaluation of computer security incident 
response capability” 
Performance 
Indicator 
“a system quality that reflects some performance behavior” 
Performance 
Metric 
‘a measurement tool used for characterizing or quantifying a quality 
of CSIR performance’. OR “a tool used for measuring a single or 
multiple performance indicators’ 
CSIR 
Effectiveness 
“the extent to which CSIR goals are achieved and harm is reduced 
through efficient use of resources” 
Table 1: Summary of Definitions 
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The basis of the provided definitions comes from the glossary prepared by the 
Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) [24]. The subsequent discussion expands 
on the various available definitions and the rationale for adopting the selected definitions. 
1.4.1 Computer Security Incident Response Terms 
Events and Incidents 
In order to provide organizational support that is both effective and budget-
sensitive, the CSIR capability is not expected to respond to all security alerts. For instance, 
an anti-virus alert or an intrusion detection system (IDS) flag are considered simple 
activities that do not necessary require the response of a CSIRT. These simple activities 
are referred to in the literature as events. The formal definition is: “any observable 
occurrence in a network or system” [24]. However, in order to eliminate positive or 
expected events, like high access to a commercial website during a promotion period, the 
CSIR field narrows down the term into events with adverse nature, i.e. might result in some 
negative consequences [1].  
There seems to be an agreement in the security community that incidents are 
distinguished from events, where incidents are higher than events, such that an incident 
constitutes several events or some major event. However, it remains vague about when an 
incident can be actually identified, leading to various understandings for the term. Several 
works have provided definitions for the term, like: [24] [1] [25] .Other works like the CERT 
document [2] has left it to each CSIRT to provide its own definition that fits its operating 
environment.  
The ISO 17799 defines an incident as: “an occurrence that compromises 
information security” [25]. To provide more precise context for the term “information 
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security”, The NIST [9] standard expands the definition to “is a violation or imminent 
threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard 
security practices”.  The CNSS [24] expands further as “An occurrence that results in actual 
or potential jeopardy to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information 
system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits or that constitutes a 
violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or 
acceptable use policies. “.  
The common theme in the above definitions is the highlighting of the “security” 
nature of the incident, perhaps to draw distinction from the term: “computer incident” 
which is more generic [26]. For example, database inconsistency resulting from sever 
migration is a major computer incident that disrupts the operation of an organization, but 
it is not of security nature.  
I suggest amending the definition of an incident to reflect that complexity nature of 
security incidents. There are many incidents that satisfy the above definition but are simple 
to fix and do not require the execution of a CSIRP or the full potential response of a CSIRT. 
Although this is not explicitly mentioned in the above definitions, it is implied when the 
above references talk about the organized nature of the CSIRT activities. In that direction, 
a distinction is to be drawn between simple incidents and major incidents. A major incident 
is one that either require a coordinated response between various parties, or one that have 
or potentially have high impact on the organization’s operations or its resources, e.g. 
budget.    
Based on the above discussion, the following definition is proposed for the context 
of this project: an incident is: “an occurrence of a major event or several events, that 
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demonstrates actual or potential compromise of the system or data, and demonstrates high 
impact on the organization operations and resources, or the need for an organized 
response”. Thus, just as computer incidents are not considered of interest to CSIR, minor 
incidents are excluded too.  
Computer and Security Incidents 
There are four common terms used to describe organized responses to computer 
security incidents:  
 Computer Security Incident Response, 
 Computer Incident Response 
 Cyber Security Incident Response 
 Cyber Incident Response.   
  The difference is in choosing between: “cyber” or “computer” and whether the term 
“security” needs to be added.  
The above choice of terms is influenced by how various researchers and 
practitioners understand and use the terms: “computer security”, “cybersecurity” and 
“information security”. Some argue for cybersecurity being more generic than computer 
and information security [27] [28], while other publications use the terms interchangeably 
[24]. It is also noted in [29] that although the term cybersecurity is used in government 
agencies to refer to state-sponsored attacks on critical infrastructure or those that reflect 
serious organized crime, the media and many industry practitioners still use it as a synonym 
to computer security.  
In the major publications in CSIR [2] [1] [30]  , the term “computer security” seems 
to be more preferred over “cybersecurity”. For the sake of consistency, this preference will 
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be maintained for the purposes of this project. In addition, the term “computer security 
incident” will be used over “computer incident” to emphasize the security nature of the 
handling process.  
Based on the above selection, a response plan will be referred to as: “Computer 
Security Incident Response Plan (CSIRP), compared to “Cyber Security Incident Response 
Plan” and “Computer Incident Response Plan (CIRP)”. Similarly, the term Computer 
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) will be used to describe the team tasked with 
CSIR responsibilities.  
Computer Security Incident Response 
The available definitions for computer security incident response (CSIR) are very 
similar, and slightly differ by the level of details in the wording of the definition. In this 
project, a definition adapted from [31] will be used in which CSIR is defined as: “the 
capability to provide end-to-end, cross enterprise management of incidents that affect 
information and technology assets within an organization”. Note that, incident 
management and incident handling are used interchangeably.   
The definition of a computer incident response team (CSIRT) introduced by [24] 
and adopted by NIST [9]  is: “Group of individuals usually consisting of Security Analysts 
organized to develop, recommend, and coordinate immediate mitigation actions for 
containment, eradication, and recovery resulting from computer security incidents.”. 
Although, the terms CSIRT and CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) refers to 
the same capability, the latter term is currently labeled to entities that act as a single point 
of contact and focus on coordination responsibilities. Since the focus of this project is 
incident handling, the term CSIRT is selected.  
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The definition provided  by CNSS [24] for an incident response plan (CSIRP) is 
adopted in this project, which states: “the documentation of a predetermined set of 
instructions or procedures to detect, respond to, and limit consequences of a malicious 
cyber-attacks against an organization’s information system(s).” The focus in this project is 
on the documentation of how an incident is handled, i.e. actions and procedures, compared 
to strategic design, business models and security policies. Also, in many organizations a 
CSIRP is broken into several documents and appendices, For simplification purposes, it is 
assumed that all incident handling procedures are gathered in a single document.  
1.4.2 Performance Evaluation Terms 
Performance Framework 
The term ‘framework’ is used in this project to refer to the generic conceptual 
setting that encompasses several perspectives and methods for the investigation of a 
research problem. This definition is derived from how the term is commonly used in works 
of computer security that exemplify some resemblance to this project [32] [33] [34] [35]. 
Based on this, ‘performance framework’ is understood as: ‘a generic conceptual setting 
that encompasses several perspectives and methods for the evaluation of computer security 
incident response capability”.  Compared to a model which is specific and involves some 
process, a framework is more abstract and generic. In addition, models are normally 
developed within a framework.  
Performance Evaluation and Quality Management 
There is a diverse range of how the following terminologies pertaining to 
performance are used by various researchers: performance evaluation, performance 
measurement, performance management and performance appraisal. These terms are also 
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sometimes used interchangeably with quality terms like: quality management, quality 
control, quality enhancement and quality. The following paragraphs will elaborate on how 
these terms are defined for the purposes of this project. Further discussions will appear in 
the survey of articles in this chapter or whenever a term is used for the first time in this 
document.  
The simplest definition of performance is: “how well a person, machine, etc. does 
a piece of work or an activity” [36]. Based on this definition, CSIR performance can be 
defined in simple terms as “how well the CSIRT executed the CSIR activities”.  
Since measuring “how well” an activity is done can be a subjective matter, different 
fields view performance in terms of measurements against specific thresholds or standards. 
For example, the Business Dictionary defines performance as: “The accomplishment of a 
given task measured against present known standards of accuracy, completeness, cost and 
speed” [37]. Refining the definition of performance in the context of CSIR, the definition 
would be “how well the CSIRT executed CSIR activities as outlined in the CSIRP to 
achieve the outlined goals”.  
Although performance measurement is the main performance activity, the term 
‘performance evaluation’ is used here as a higher level term that encompasses: 
performance planning, performance management, performance measurement, 
performance analysis, performance monitoring and continuous enhancement. Thus, 
‘performance evaluation’ and ‘performance evaluation system’ are used as synonyms.   
 Based on the above, CSIR Performance Evaluation is defined as: “All activities 
associated with assessing how well a CSIRT executes CSIR activities as outlined in the 
CSIRP to achieve the outlined goals”. Note that this definition presumes the existence of a 
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CSIRP and the predefinition of goals. Therefore, it is out of the scope of this project to 
evaluate CSIRTs acting with no prior planning.  
 In several contexts, the term ‘performance appraisal’ is used interchangeably with 
the term ‘performance evaluation’. Performance appraisal is “ a formal management 
system that provides for the evaluation of the quality of an individual’s performance in an 
organization” [38]. From the perspective of CSIR, performance evaluation is not a form of 
performance appraisal, because it is focused on the overall system performance compared 
to staff performance, and it targets the collective outcomes of the CSIR team not the 
individual performance of each member.   
 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Performance and Quality Terminologies used in the project 
From an organizational perspective, activities relating to ‘quality management’ and 
‘performance management’ are very similar in their aims of leading the organization to 
better productivity and profitability [39]. In this project, quality is viewed as a broader 
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organizational activity that encompasses performance evaluation of the CSIR capability. 
For instance, CSIR performance planning is one of the activities, but not limited to, that 
quality planning is concerned with. In Figure 1, a chart that depicts the hierarchy and 
relationship between the various terms pertaining to quality and performance are presented, 
as understood for the purposes of this project.   
Finally, the terms: ‘performance management’ and ‘performance control’ will used 
interchangeably.  
Performance Indicator 
Performance measurement is the process of “quantifying the efficiency and 
effectiveness of an action” [40]. This measurement is done through what is known as 
performance indicators (PIs) and performance metrics (PMs). Again, there is a diversity of 
definitions and usages for the two terms. It is assumed in this project that performance 
indicators are in higher order than performance metrics, following the GQIM model 
presented in [41]. Thus, for each performance indicator, there is one or more performance 
metrics to be used to measure it.  
The CSIR system has various qualities and properties that can be subject to 
measurement. The term ‘performance indicator’ is given to a system quality that reflects 
some performance behavior, positive or negative. Examples include: response time, 
response stability, containment effectiveness, recovery cost and detection accuracy. Each 
of these indicators can reflect a desirable (e.g. short response time, high response stability, 
low recovery cost …etc) or undesirable (e.g. long response time, low response stability, 
high recovery cost …etc) system feature that reflect performance. Also, each indicator can 
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be measured in various ways and through various tools. These tools can be quantitative or 
qualitative, and the number of tools can be singular or multiple.   
Performance Metric 
The proposed definition of ‘performance metric’ is: ‘a measurement tool used for 
characterizing or quantifying a quality of CSIR performance’. It could also be defined as: 
“a tool used for measuring a single or multiple performance indicators’. This definition is 
aligned with the definition borrowed from measurement theory [42], as both assert the 
quantitative nature. An example of a performance metric used to measure the detection 
effectiveness is the difference of the incident severity scale identified during the detection 
phase and the actual severity scale as approved in the analysis phase. This metric can also 
be used in the measurement of other performance metrics like incident handling accuracy. 
Also, this metric is not the only possible tool to measure detection effectiveness. The length 
of the time period between the first reporting of the incident until the incident declaration 
can be another metric to measure detection effectiveness.  
Effectiveness and Efficiency 
Finally, the terms “effectiveness” and “efficiency” continually appear in the 
definitions of performance activities. Effectiveness is “the extent to which planned 
activities are realized and planned results are achieved”, and efficiency is: “relationship 
between the result achieved and the resources used” [43]. Using the aforementioned 
definition, effectiveness and efficiency can be classified as higher-level performance 
indicators. It is debatable whether all performance indicators should be mapped to 
effectiveness and efficiency. Innovation and traceability are examples of system qualities 
that are not straightforward to be mapped to effectiveness and efficiency.  
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In some fields like supply chain management (SCM) and engineering systems, it is 
easy to distinguish between issues related to effectiveness from those relevant to efficiency. 
However, in the field of incident response, the two aspects are strongly related. Therefore, 
in this project, a definition of effectiveness that encompasses efficiency will be adopted. 
For the context of CSIR, performance effectiveness is defined as: “the extent to which 
CSIR goals are achieved and harm is reduced through efficient use of resources”.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The research topic of this dissertation can be linked to two general areas of 
literature; the first is computer security and the second is performance evaluation. Both of 
these fields are too vast to be surveyed. Therefore, this literature review will be narrowed 
down to the following two sub-areas: (1) computer security incident response and (2) 
performance evaluation of incident response. The common term between these two sub-
areas is: ‘incident response’.  
This chapter has three sections in which the first two correspond to surveys of major 
works of the above two sub-areas, and the third provides a summary of main findings along 
with discussion.   
In the first section, an overview of the area of computer security incident response 
is presented focusing on its development and the current models and standard planning 
procedures. This is followed by a discussion of performance evaluation within the general 
context of computer security and within the specific domain of computer security incident 
response. Finally, an overview of security metrics is presented as a background for the 
discussion on performance metrics of computer security response. 
The second section provides a literature review of how other disciplines, like 
medical emergency and engineering critical systems, handle the issue of performance 
evaluation of incident response. As the area of Computer Security Incident Response 
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(CSIR) is relatively new compared to the other disciplines, this survey aims at borrowing 
best practices from these fields to the area of CSIR.  
The last section provides a summary of the current state of the art in performance 
evaluation in CSIR, and lessons learnt from other disciplines. The proposed framework, 
outlined in Chapter 3, will make frequent references to these findings which act as a 
foundation for the designing and modeling of the framework.  
2.1 Computer Security Incident Response (CSIR) Literature Review 
2.1.1 History 
It is a matter of agreement among computer science historians that issues pertaining 
to security started to emerge as soon as computers were invented in the 1960s. Some even 
argue for ancient roots found in cryptology and events associated with phone wiretapping 
that happened in the late period of 1800s. This rich history was subject to various studies 
from various perspectives.  For example, history of cryptology can be found in [44], history 
of information security in [45], history of hacking in [46], history of viruses and malware 
in [47], history of computer crime in [48] [49], and the contemporary rise of Cyber-warfare 
can be found in [50].  
Although some glimpses on the history of computer security incident response 
(CSIR) can be found in some works like [51] [52], there is no dedicated work that fully 
trace the history of computer security incident response. However, since issues pertaining 
to computer security are interconnected, it is difficult to extract a well-identified history 
for CSIR that is independent of the other sub-fields of computer security. For every 
computer security incident, dated or contemporary, there are two parties involved: one 
party that exploit, attack or hack and one party that responds with a counter measure. In 
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such view, it could be argued that CSIR was born on the same day the first incident 
occurred, which is a matter of debate among historians. Nevertheless, I will attempt to 
identify some milestones that significantly contributed to the development of CSIR as it is 
understood today. In that direction, focus will be on activities and incidents that triggered 
organized or coordinated response in a manner that is similar to how CSIR teams operate 
today. In my view, the following activities and incidents stand as the major milestones in 
CSIR development: 
The Morris Worm and Creation of CERT (1988): In November 2, 1988 Tappan 
Morris, a graduate student at Cornell University, released into the internet one of the 
earliest distributed worms that will have a significant impact on shaping the current 
understanding of computer security. The worm was designed to be undetectable, and was 
launched from an MIT computer as a camouflage of the worm origin. The worm exploited 
some vulnerabilities in the UNIX system, more specifically some versions of the Berkeley 
Software Distribution (BSD) system, and had the capability to replicate itself to other 
machines once it has infected a specific machine.  
The worm creator claims that the worm was not designed to cause harm, and hence 
the actual intent remains a speculation. The outcomes of the worm release were 
unexpected, both to the public and to its own creator, as the scope and magnitude of the 
worm spread was outstanding. Although the worm did not cause actual loss of data, it 
caused an economic loss in millions of dollars resulting from thousands of machines being 
down. It could be considered the earliest distributed denial of service attack, and is 
sometimes referred to as: the Great Worm. In terms of CSIR, it was the most influential 
incident that sparked public and official discussion on the need for “collective” and 
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“organized” response to computer security incidents. The incident triggered the 
establishment of the first Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and resulted in 
the first prosecution under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.  For further 
information on the technical details and the impact of the Morris worm, consult the 
following two works: [53] and [54].  
After two weeks of the Morris Worm release, the Computer Emergency Response 
Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) was created. The center is a US federally funded 
project, mainly funded through the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
(DARPA), and is positioned within the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon 
University. The center was designed to act as a single point of contact for Internet security 
problems, and as a platform for sharing response information with the government, private 
sector and public at large. The early documents of CERT draws the analogy to a fire 
department, as the public can call for assistance to any computer security incident. The 
concept of Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) was developed, and 
CERT can be considered the first CSIRT. In the next decade, hundreds of CSIRTs were 
formed across the US. Today, most of these CSIRTs are members of one umbrella, the 
Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). For further information on the 
history of CERT and its current activities, consult: [55] and [1].  
The Wank Worm and Creation of FIRST (1990): The Forum of Incident Response 
and Security Teams was established in 1989, and started operating in 1990. It was triggered 
by the WANK worm, which revealed the need for coordination between various CSIR 
teams across the US. The Wank worm targeted The US Department of Energy and NASA. 
It is believed that the worm originated from Australia, and it constitutes the first computer 
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breach with a political message, as it displayed an anti-nuclear message. The main 
objective of FIRST is to coordinate sharing of information and collaboration between 
various CSIRTs across the world. The mission statement states: “Membership in FIRST 
enables incident response teams to more effectively respond to security incidents by 
providing access to best practices, tools, and trusted communication with member teams.” 
As of the end of 2016, the FIRST website displays membership of 370 teams across 79 
countries. For more information on FIRST’s history and activities, consult the following 
resources: [16].  
Using the public data available at the FIRST website, I performed some analysis to 
see the rate and pattern of membership. Currently, the vast majority of governments and 
large corporates have membership with FIRST, which could be treated as a reasonable 
representation of the international appreciation for the need of CSIR. Out of the 370 
member CERTs, it was possible to trace the start date of 242 CSIRTs, which is 65.4% of 
the total number of members; while there were no available data pertaining to the start date 
for the remaining members. This sample, however, covers the 79 countries which is 100% 
of the countries that have membership with FIRST. For each member, there is a date of 
establishment and a date for joining FIRST which is normally later than the former. The 
earlier date, i.e. the date of establishment, is of more interest because it represents the actual 
systemized action to implement CSIR.  
A chart that represents the number of new members that join FIRST each year, and 
the number of countries that they originate from is provided in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Number of CSIRTs worldwide  in the period of 1990-2016 
It is noticed that the year 2011 demonstrates the peak of participation, as there were 
20 new CSIRTs created in 16 different countries. The second highest year is 2004 with 18 
new CSIRTs in 13 countries. I speculate that there was no specific single incident that 
triggered such high participation in these years. It is mainly due to the nature of security 
threats on the national level that created undisputable need for creating CERTs to 
coordinate response at an organized large scale. It also could be credited to the availability 
of the series of publications from the pioneering CERT at Carnegie Mellon University, 
which proposed a structure and procedure for creating and executing CSIRTs.  
Documentation and Standardization of CSIR: It could be argued that the 
publication of three main comprehensive documents had a great impact on the development 
of the CSIR field. The first is the Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (CSIRTs) [2] by the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute. 
There were two versions released, the first in 1998 and the second in April 2003 which is 
the one widely used up to this date.  
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Figure 3: The three main CSIR publications 
The second documentation is the “Computer Security Incident Handling Guide” 
published in August 2012 by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST). Concurrently, the SANS Institute was developing its own documentation, which 
appeared in December 2011 by the title: “The Incident Handlers Handbook” [30]. These 
three publications are the three main references used today by the industry for 
implementing a CSIRT.    
Stuxnet and start of Cyberwar (2010): The Stuxnet malware is considered the first 
digital weapon with substantial destructive power. The malware hit the Iranian Natanz 
Uranium enrichment facility in  early 2010, causing damage to controllers of centrifuges 
at the nuclear power plant. Up to this date, no entity had officially called responsibility for 
the implant of the malware, although several journalists and scientists speculate that it was 
initiated by a US-Israeli operation to hurdle progress to the Iranian Nuclear Weapon.   
From the technical side, the Stuxnet malware targeted specific programmable logic 
controllers (PLC) such that the malware would only be executed if specific configurations 
were found on the destination host. The malware is believed to have been transferred 
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through an infected USB exploring its way through worm-like techniques into the intranet 
of the Nuclear plant. The malware exploited several zero-day flaws, a term given to 
vulnerabilities exploited by hackers without prior knowledge from vendors about its 
presence [56].  For further information on the Stuxtnet, the investigative book of the 
journalist Kim Zitter is an important resource [57].  
In my view, Stuxnet and its aftermath are critical to the development of the CSIR 
field. Although there are several noteworthy state-level cyber incidents prior to Stuxnet 
[58], the scope and impact of Stuxnet is unprecedented. It takes computer security response 
into a very sophisticated and advanced stage that is beyond the capacity of CSIRTs as 
defined by the industry. It is analogous to local police responders tasked to respond to a 
large scale terrorist attack which require highly trained special forces and the coordination 
of several federal agencies. It could be argued that two types of CSIR exist today, one on 
the national level with military like techniques and one on the business level which 
operated in confined environment and limited budgets. This a divergence from the 
traditional CERT model in which responding to security threats appear as joint process 
from the public and private sectors.  
Furthermore, with Stuxnet targeting industrial PLCs and being used as an offensive 
weapon, it adds levels of complexity to the response. The CSIRTs would need to consider 
lower-level security breaches in the hardware and industrial systems which is not currently 
of high priority.  Also, responding to a backlash of an offensive security breach or dealing 
with unexpected consequences of an offensive breach would require different techniques 
than the defensive ones currently used by CSIRTs.  
 34 
 
In Figure 4, a summary of the timeline for the above activities that contributed to 
the development of CSIR is presented.    
  
Figure 4: Timeline of Computer Security Incident Response (CSIRT) development 
As this study focuses on performance evaluation in CSIR, it is also interested in 
identifying the phase at which the field started deliberating the need for integrating 
performance evaluation in the CSIR process. The conducted survey of the published works 
reveals that the need for using performance evaluation in computer security incident 
responses was not acknowledged until a later stage of the field’s development. Most of the 
early CSIR studies focused on developing models and procedures for handling computer 
incidents. In these publications, the issue of performance evaluation was not considered a 
core functionality of the process and hence received minimal or no attention. For example, 
the remarkable 2003 CERT publication of “Handbook for Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams (CSIRTs)” lacked any reference to the issue. Another comprehensive IR 
planning book [3] provides only an indirect reference to performance evaluation in the 
context of highlighting the importance of performing performance measurements when 
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designing business processes. A similar short indirect reference is found in SANS’s 
Incident Handler’s Handbook [30]. The recent publication dates of the latter two works, 
August 2012 and December 2011 consecutively, suggest that not only the issue of 
performance evaluation is overlooked in the early works, but it also continue to be 
overlooked in some major publications in the field.   
I found an early reference to “measuring the effectiveness of computer security 
incident response capability (CSIRC)” in one of the early publications of NIST [59] dated 
in 1991. However, the term was used to refer to how using incident response would 
contribute positively to an organization’s performance. In other words, the term was used 
in the context of the effectiveness of introducing a CSIR into an organization, which is now 
a well-established need, compared to measuring the effectiveness of the response team, 
which is the interest of this dissertation.  
The earliest direct reference to performance evaluation that I was able to trace was 
in the CERT publication of 2008 [60]. However, the more substantive references [1] [61] 
[41] had to wait until 2012 to appear. It could be argued that some studies earlier than 2008 
made references to performance evaluation in the context of computer security. However, 
these were made in other areas of computer security like: vulnerability assessment [62] 
(2007), IT service level agreements [23] [63] (2006) and intrusion detection [64] (2001). 
A discussion of these references will be presented in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.6.  
2.1.2 CSIR Models and Processes 
Incident Response Life Cycle Models 
There are several models for expressing the main activities performed by incident 
responders. In Figure 5, a depiction of four common models to represent the incident 
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response life cycle is presented. The four models come from NIST [1], US CERT [65] [31], 
SANS [56] and a hybrid model adopted by some professional experts in the field [66].  
The four models express the same methodology and only differ in naming, 
categorization of activities, and emphasizing some interaction between phases of the life 
cycle. For example, the term “identification”, used by SANS and the hybrid model, and the 
term “detection” used by NIST and US CERT, are used to describe the same activities 
performed at the initial stages of the incident. In the US CERT model, “prepare” and 
“protect” are highlighted as separate activities with strong interaction in order to stress the 
need to perform both prior to any incident handling. On the other hand, the other models 
consider “protect” as part of the “prepare” phase. The same could be said about whether 
“containment” and “eradication” should be considered two separate phases, or one phase. 
Based on this discussion, choosing which model to adopt is a matter of preference that has 
little impact on conceptualizing the main IR activities.  
In this work, and for the sake of consistency and without loss of generality, the 
hybrid model will be used. The hybrid model captures the processes of both the NIST and 
SANS models in a reasonable number of phases, and resembles other industry-based 
models like: [29] [67]. Compared to the US CERT model that stresses inputs and 
interaction, the hybrid model stresses the actions, which is a simpler way to describe the 
IR handling. As there is no statistics on the industry’s usage of these models, at least it is 
confirmed from a CSIR practitioner [66] that this model is currently being used in some 
large corporates which guarantees that the model is practically used. It also demonstrates 
high resemblance to other practically used models like the one in [68]. In Table 2, the major 
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activities in the five phases of the IR life cycle as presented in the hybrid model are 
provided.  
 
Figure 5: Models for Incident Response Life Cycle 
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preparing for incidents, while it is reactive because of its main objective which is to respond 
to incidents once they arise.  
# Phase Activities 
1 Preparation 
 Review of policies and security processes 
 Prepare and write an incident response plan (CSIRP) 
 Training and testing the CSIRP 
 Prepare hardware and software needed for IR 
 Approve the CSIRP and raise awareness 
2 
Identification/ 
Analysis 
 Analyze “alerts” and “indicators” for possible incident 
 Perform initial assessment and validation 
 Review available evidence and collect further information 
 Classify and prioritize an incident 
 Declare an incident and initiate executing the CSIRP 
 Document and notify management 
3 Containment 
 Perform basic triage as outlined in the CSIRP 
 Isolate “infected” system to ensure minimum loss 
 Protect critical resources and data 
 Identify attacking hosts and interrupt any ongoing breach 
 Collect evidence and document incident timeline 
4 
Eradication/ 
Recovery 
 Gradually eliminate components of the breach 
 Restore basic operations of the organization 
 Identify and mitigate exploited vulnerabilities 
 Restore to normal operations 
5 
Lessons 
Learnt 
 Analyze main causes of the incident 
 Analyze the response compliance with the CSIRP 
 Analyze response actions for potential improvement 
 Recommend protection mechanisms and policy updates 
 Update CSIRP based on lessons learnt 
 Provide full technical and non-technical documentation 
Table 2: Main activities in the IR life cycle of the Hybrid Model 
The proactive side can be further divided into two major activities: planning, i.e. 
planning for incident handling, and security, i.e. ensuring that the environment is secure 
against breaches. As the field had grown, the second activity pertaining to security 
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assurance and enforcement is delegated to designated security teams, which might or might 
not be part of the CSIRT. In small size organizations, the whole security team is part of the 
CSIRT and is tasked with planning, security and incident handling.  
Incident Identification Mechanisms 
One of the earliest works on CSIRT [69] outlines five general techniques for the 
identification phase of the IR life cycle. The first is called differencing, which is comparing 
the current state of the system (post-attack) with one that is previously stored (pre-attack) 
and highlighting the differences to understand the sequence of actions taken by the attacker. 
The second technique is finding, which investigates a specific part of the system during a 
specific time frame looking for flags and unusual behavior. The third is snooping, which 
is to place some monitors on the system to observe future steps by the attackers. The fourth 
is tracking which relies on the use of logs and audits to backtrack the steps of the attack. 
And finally, psychology which relies on using social engineering techniques and sending 
specific messages to stimulate the attacker to behave in a specific way.  
As the CSIR field had grown and became more sophisticated, more refined 
technical steps were developed for the identification phase. However, the above five 
general mechanisms would still apply. In Figure 6, a list of major activities performed in 
the identification phase is presented. The list is compiled to reflect those outlined in [3].   
Note that these activities should be performed before any briefing to the management and 
after identifying the portion of the system potentially compromised within a time frame. 
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Figure 6: Main activities in the Identification Phase of the IR cycle 
Incident Classification Techniques 
There are various classification techniques applied at the early stages of incident 
handling which work to determine the nature of the incident and guide for a proper 
response. The classification techniques differ on factors used for categorizing incidents, 
like: incident source, security target, severity level and expected engagement level. 
Classifying incidents based on their source are normally used by CSIRTs operating 
at the national level or by teams that work closely with prosecutors. Under this 
classification technique, the technical method for exploitation are irrelevant. For example, 
state-sponsored or organized hacking will be classified under one category compared to 
incidents that demonstrate minor crimes conducted by individuals, even if both use the 
same hacking method. An example of studies that discuss this method can be found in [29]. 
It could be argued that this classification is not recommended as the main assessment 
method during the initial stages of the incident handling for CSIRTs not operating at the 
national level. This is due to the fact that it is practically common that the actual source 
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and motivation are only confirmed at the later stages of the incident handling or deduced 
through post-incident analysis.  
Another classification method is functional [3] and inspects the level of engagement 
of various parties in executing the plan. Under this method, there are only two levels: 
Priority 1 and Priority 2 incidents. Incidents classified under Priority 1 are those that require 
the full support of the CSIRT, full execution of CSIRP and approval of senior management 
before execution; while Priority 2 incidents require partial execution of the plan and does 
not need the engagement of all parties. In order to determine which category to classify an 
incident, the potential harm of the incident would be investigated. For example, incidents 
that might impact the organization major services or might cause major financial damage 
would be classified as Priority 1, while incidents that do not impose external interaction as 
with law enforcement and media can be classified as Priority 2 incidents.  
The classification method suggested by NIST [1] is more comprehensive and 
considers three aspects of the incident: functional impact, information impact and 
recoverability effort. The functional impacts investigates the incident’s impact on the 
business operations and services offered by the organization. The information impact 
inspects actual and potential harm over the organization’s information through the CIA 
model (confidentiality, integrity and availability). The recoverability estimates the time and 
resources needed to recover from the incident. A summary of these elements is presented 
in Table 3. Note that an incident can be classified higher according to one factor but low 
according to another. It is a decision to be made by the CSIRT to take proper actions based 
on its investigation of all of the three factors.  
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 Functional Impact Information Impact Recoverability Effort 
Level 1 
None 
No impact on ability 
to provide services 
None 
no information 
compromised 
Regular 
Predictable time with 
existing resources 
Level 2 
Low 
Offer services but lost 
efficiency 
Privacy Breach 
sensitive PII was 
accessed or exfiltrated 
Supplemented 
Predictable time with 
additional resources 
Level 3 
Medium 
unable to provide 
some critical service  
Proprietary Breach 
Compromised 
unclassified or 
protected data 
Extended 
Unpredictable recovery 
time, external help & 
additional resources 
Level 4 
High 
unable to provide 
some critical services 
Integrity Loss 
Lost Sensitive or 
proprietary data  
Not Recoverable 
Recovery not possible, 
launch investigation 
Table 3: Incident Classification Mechanism proposed by the NIST document 
2.1.3 Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) 
Types of CSIRTs: 
The NIST document outlines three models for structuring a CSIRT [1]: centralized, 
distributed and coordinating. The centralized CSIRT is the most commonly used model 
and constitutes of a single team that handle incidents across the organization. The 
distributed team model is structured in several CSIRTs, each handling a specific 
geographical segment of the organization or a group of resources. To avoid conflicts, a 
mechanism for coordination and collaboration is outlined. The Coordinating Team model 
is structured as a central main CSIRT which provides consultation, with no executive 
power, to several CSIRTs tasked with incident handling, or part of its operations.  
Another method to classify CSIRTs is relative to their association with the 
constituencies. A CSIRT can be internal or external [70]. An internal CSIRT has all of its 
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members as members of the organization being served, while an external CSIRT is formed 
with nonmember staff responsible for incident handling through some form of contractual 
relationship. Note that the meaning of “external members” here is different than “external 
members” outlined in a CSIRP which refers to external entities, like law enforcement, 
media and lawyers that collaborate with the core CSIRT team during the response process. 
The categorization of internal and external is based on the relationship of those tasked with 
the core CSIR responsibilities within an organization. It is also possible to have a hybrid 
team of internal and external staff. However, if this is not properly structured with clear 
outlined responsibilities in the CSIRP, it can leads to conflict of interest and non-cohesion 
among the team members.  
Other methods for classifying CSIRTs can be found in [51].   
Organizational Structure 
Although CSIRTs can be structured and positioned in an organization in various 
ways [2] [1] [70], it can be viewed as a body consisting of a core team, several support 
teams, several extended teams and several external teams [66].  
Members of the core team are responsible for carrying the core responsibilities of 
incident handling, planning and review. The team need to be balanced to reflect technical 
expertise and knowledge about the business and administration operations of the 
organization.  
The support teams are those that will have substantive involvement in the incident 
handling process but under the supervision of the core team. These teams normally consist 
of members whose main responsibilities in the organization are not related to CSIR. The 
support teams can be further divided into technical and logistical teams. Examples of 
 44 
 
technical teams include forensics, help desk, networking, data center and system 
administrators. Logistical teams include: administrative assistants, physical security, 
transportation, communication …etc. The technical teams can be grouped in one single 
team or in multiple teams and the same applies for the logistical team.  
The extended teams are those members of the same organization that provide 
indirect support or guidance to the core team. Most important among these teams is the 
executive and business teams in the organization whom the core team will be regularly 
reporting and consulting with during the incident response. Other teams include human 
resources, the legal team and the outreach team. These teams are normally outlined as 
contacts in the CSIRP to be reached as needed. Finally, the external teams include law 
enforcement, national and peer CSIRTs, and technical and legal consultants that could be 
reached if assistance is needed.  
A chart that depicts the above relationships between the core CSIRT team and other 
teams inside and outside the organization is found in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Organizational Structure of a CSIRT 
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It is noted in [51], that the element of trust is an essential aspect of the culture in 
which CSIRTs operate. It is a precondition for the numerous collaborations which a CSIRT 
establishes. Trust is normally built through necessity, opportunity or through introductions 
by trusted parties. The study also notes that there are four principles that were common 
about CSIR practitioners interviewed by the study. The four principles are operational 
independence, reciprocity, confidentiality and transparency. Operational independence 
mean the CSIRT should operate independently from other policy objectives, focusing only 
on CSIR objectives. The principle of reciprocity suggest that if a team shares some 
information, techniques or warning with a party, then it is expected that the other party will 
do the same as the need arise. Both confidentiality and transparency express one of the two 
essential professional ethics which CSIR practitioners adhere to.  
2.1.4 Computer Security Incident Response Plan (CSIRP) 
There are various templates for developing computer security incident response 
plans (CSIRPs), sometimes also known as CIRP (Computer Incident Response Plan). 
These templates might vary in the outline, structure and presentation methods, but the 
minimum requirements of what needs to be included is very similar.  
The NIST document [1] lists eight elements that need to be included in any CSIRP. 
These elements are: (1) Mission (2) Strategies and Goals (3) Senior Management Approval 
(4) Organizational Approach to CSIR (5) Communication between CSIRT and the rest of 
organization (6) metrics for measuring CSIR capability and effectiveness (7) Roadmap for 
maturing the CSIR capability (8) How the CSIR plan fits into the overall organization. It 
is noticed that the above template emphasizes the organizational perspective and the 
development roadmap but omits the technical details and the specifics of the IR phases. 
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This might be explained by the generic nature of the NIST document which emphasizes 
guidelines and policies over technical procedures.  
A sample of a CSIRP outline published at the website of the California Department 
of Technology is an example of plans that emphasize practicality and documentation 
method [71]. The sample outlines 17 actions that need to be taken along with the 
documentation requirements of each action which can be customized based on the nature 
of the agency preparing the plan. A list of these steps along with a description is provided 
in Table 4. The advantage of the above CSIRP outline is its practicality and simplicity 
which makes it accessible by various technical and non-technical personnel. The website 
lists other forms to be used for performing more technical activities like budget assessment 
of response. The disadvantage of such approach to CSIRP preparation is the lack of 
information about the rationale of the outlined steps and that links to the organization’s 
policies and strategies.   
# Title Description 
1 
Emergency 
Contact List 
A list of names and phone numbers to be contacted if an incident 
happens 
2 
Discovery 
Reporting 
Procedures of reporting the discovery of an incident if discovered by 
a member of the IT department 
3 
Public 
Reporting 
Procedures of reporting the discovery of an incident if discovered by 
a non-member of the IT department 
4 
Security Office 
Reporting 
Logging information if incident reported to the grounds security 
office 
5 
Initial 
Assessment 
Steps taken by the IT department after the reporting in terms of 
communication within the department and performing initial 
assessment of the severity of the incident 
6 
CSIRT 
assessment 
Initial steps by the CSIRT members with regards to incident 
assessment and setting a plan for response  
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7 
Incident 
Declaration 
Official declaration of an incident under one of the outlined incident 
categories 
8 
Response plan 
execution 
Execution of outlined steps suitable for the type of response, e.g. 
worm response procedure or system abuse procedures 
9 Forensics Application of forensics techniques to extract evidence 
10 
Immediate 
Actions 
Outline of immediate actions to be taken based on analysis done in 
Steps 8 and 9 
11 
Management 
Approval 
Getting management approval to execute the above response 
recommendations 
12 Restoration Steps taken to restore the system after containing the incident 
13 Documentation Full list of items that need to be documented post-incident 
14 
Evidence 
Preservation 
Steps to be taken to preserve collected evidence  
15 
External 
Reporting 
Inform external agencies of the incident like law enforcement, media 
and lawyers 
16 
Damage 
Assessment 
Assess damage and response cost 
17 Review Review response and formulate lessons learnt list 
Table 4: Outline of Action-Based CSIRP Sample 
More detailed CSIRP outlines can be found in [3] and [66]. In [3], a CSIRP is 
structured into eight major sections: (1) Plan Introduction (2) Incident Preparation (3) 
Incident Detection, Analysis and Declaration (4) Incident Response Supporting Actions 
(5) Incident Containment, Eradication and Recovery (6) Post Incident Activity (7) CIRP 
Roles and Responsibilities (8) Plan Maintenance. A summary of the main topics presented 
under each of the above sections is presented in Table 5. It is noticed that this outline is 
comprehensive and combines both organizational and technical details. Some of the public 
CSIRPs like [72], demonstrates much resemblance to the above outline.  
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# Section Title Contents 
1 Plan Introduction 
Objective, scope, assumptions, plan execution and command 
topology, plan ownership, plan structure 
2 
Incident 
Preparation 
Compliance framework, sensitive data, third party payments, 
third party services, compromise notification protocols 
3 
Incident Detection, 
Analysis and 
Declaration  
Sources of indicators, incident thresholds, incident analysis 
(business and technical impact), incident categories, incident 
declaration and declaration 
4 
Incident Response 
Supporting Actions 
Plan execution, organization and roles, process and rhythm, 
synchronization and decision making, release of public 
statements, evidence discovery and retention, liaison with law 
enforcement 
5 
Incident 
Containment, 
Eradication and 
Recovery 
The Data compromise team, containment procedures (isolation, 
verification of non-affected systems, third party connections, 
consequence management), eradication and recovery procedures 
(remediation, compensations, disaster recovery and business 
continuity) 
6 
Post Incident 
Analysis 
Incident Termination (criteria, decision process, evidence 
retention, response statistics), lessons learnt 
7 
CIRP Roles and 
Responsibilities 
Accounting, human resources, information security forensics, IT 
operations center, Investor relations, disaster recovery, internal 
communications, legal teams, public affairs, retail operations 
8 Plan Maintenance  
Regular updates, incorporation of lessons learnt, annual testing 
of the plan 
Table 5: Contents of CSIRP as outlined by [3] 
Another outline of a CSIRP is provided by [66]. The plan demonstrates similarity 
to that of [3] in terms of contents and being comprehensive. However, it follows a different 
structure. The plan consists of four major sections: Charter, Business Documents, Incident 
Checklist and Appendices. The charter focuses on the authority question and contains 
information similar to those presented under “Plan Introduction” of Table 5. The Business 
Document section contains the following information: plan revision history, testing 
schedule, organization chart, roles and responsibilities, data classification policies, 
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compliance regulations, training requirements and business continuity documents and 
disaster recovery documents. The third section on “Incident Checklist” contain the specific 
sets for various types of incidents like: cyber intrusion, denial of service, malicious code 
outbreak and phishing incidents. The final section on “Appendices” contains documents 
like: incident classification levels, escalation procedures both internal and external, data 
preservation procedures, law enforcement support, war room and communications, call 
tree, incident declaration forms and glossary of terms. It is noticed that this outline is 
designed such that to facilitate the maintenance and update of the CSIRP.  
2.1.5 CSIR Performance Evaluation 
This section discusses references made to performance evaluation (PE) in 
publications dedicated to the study of computer security incident response. The discussion 
starts with the CSIR comprehensive works that address the issue of PE like [25] [1] [73]. 
Then the discussion extends to CSIR studies such as [61] [22] [41] [74] [75] [76] that 
address some aspects relevant to PE, like preparedness and effectiveness of detection 
mechanisms.  
The 2008 CERT report: “Creating and Managing Computer Security Incident 
Handling Teams (CSIRTs)” [60] is probably the first major work in CSIR to make an 
explicit reference to performance evaluation. The report calls to: “define methods for 
evaluating the performance of the CSIRT”. As the report stresses, this is only possible once 
the response workflow is clearly outlined and incident management processes are well 
defined. However, the report falls short of providing more information on how to design 
these “methods” and how it could be integrated into the process.   
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The above CERT report adopts the US CERT model for the IR cycle, depicted in 
Figure 5, and hence identifies five main functionalities to be assessed: (1) Prepare (2) 
Protect (3) Detect (4) Triage (5) Response. The report mentions performance evaluation 
within the context of the fifth phase: “response”. This conservative usage of the term 
suggest a limited scope for performance evaluation. According to the report, “response” is 
limited to actions taken after the detection and triage, compared to the current usage of the 
term which includes the three activities together, i.e. detection, triage and response. Indeed, 
some subsequent CERT publications like [41] present a wider scope for performance 
evaluation to include all of the phases in the IR cycle, a perspective that is followed in this 
project. 
The way that [60] presents performance evaluation raises some fundamental issues 
relevant to this project. For example, according to the report, the subject of the performance 
evaluation is the CSIR team. Although this is a reasonable choice, as shall be presented in 
Chapter 3, this might be confining and it would be better to use the plan (CSIRP) instead 
of the team (CSIRT) as the main subject of the performance evaluation process. This shall 
provide several advantages and acts as a more generalized method. In my view, the 
performance of the team is a subcategory of the overall performance evaluation of the 
response outlined in the CSIRP. Along the same discussion, the CERT report considers 
performance evaluation as a method for measuring the performance of the team over a 
period of time that involves several responses. Again, this can be restrictive and it will be 
argued that performance evaluation should be generalized such that it could be applied to 
a single and multiple incidents. 
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The CERT report provided examples of simple performance metrics to be used like 
number of reported incidents, response time and amounts of incidents resolved. This 
acknowledges the importance of performance metrics within the development process of 
the performance evaluation system. Also, the report suggests that the overall performance 
of the team should be done in conjunction with the management and the constituency. Both 
issues, the role of performance metrics and who should conduct performance evaluation 
will be studied in Chapters 3 and 5.  
The NIST “Computer Security Incident Handling Guide” [1] published in August 
2012, is an important document guiding the operations of the industries in the area of 
computer security incident response. The document made two brief but important 
references to performance evaluation. The first reference is mentioned in the context of 
policy elements that are needed for response plans. The need for developing metrics to 
measure the capability and effectiveness of the plan is listed as one of the eight elements 
that need to be included when creating incident response plans. The guide later mentions 
that this could be done through data collection. The guide neither provides examples of 
performance evaluation policies nor describes the type of data that need to be collected, 
leaving it to the industry to come up with such policies and identify the relevant data.  
The second reference, an important one, is found when discussing post-incident 
activities. The guide suggests that one of the nine elements to discuss in a “lessons Learned 
meeting” is “How well did staff and management in dealing with incident? Were the 
document procedures followed? Were they adequate?” Assisting the industry to better 
answer the above questions is one of the issues of interest to this dissertation.  
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The guide proposes performing two types of assessments for each incident: 
objective and subjective. The objective assessment is based on analyzing the collected 
incident data, while the subjective assessment records the team members and resource 
owners evaluation of the performance of the response. The guide provides eight examples 
of what could be done in objective assessment. One of these examples, which is relevant 
to this project, is: “measuring the difference between the initial impact assessment and the 
final impact assessment”. One of the goals of the proposed performance framework is to 
come up with similar assessment methods, with properly derived metrics, that measure the 
performance of the major activities of the incident response. Using the above example, 
‘impact’ needs to be defined and metrics will be proposed on how to measure it in the 
context of CSIRPs.  
The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) community 
project [73] provides a framework for describing computer security incidents. The project 
developers describe it as: “a set of metrics designed to provide a common language for 
describing security incidents in a structured and repeatable manner.” The goal of the project 
is to help organizations collect and report incidents in a uniform manner that enables 
sharing analysis within the organization and with external entities. 
The project identifies five major areas that are needed to construct an incident 
narrative: incident tracking, victim demographics, incident description, discovery and 
response and impact assessment. A summary of the main descriptors/metrics used to 
describe each of these five areas is presented in Table 6.  
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The VERIS format is adopted by some major IT service providers, like Verizon, to 
report incidents. This makes the VERIS platform synchronous with recent threats and 
current industry practices.  
# Category Descriptors 
1 
Incident 
Tracking 
Incident ID, Source ID, Incident confirmation, related incidents, 
confidence rating, incident notes 
2 
Victim 
Demographics 
Victim ID, Primary Industry, Country of Operation, State, 
Number of Employees, Annual revenue, Locations affected, 
Notes, Additional Guidance 
3 
Incident 
Description 
Threat Actors (External, Internal, Partner), Threat Actions 
(Malware, Hacking, Social, Misuse, Physical, Environmental, 
Error), Compromised Assets (Variety, Ownership, Management, 
Hosting, Accessibility, Cloud, Notes), Security Attributes (CIA)  
4 
Discovery & 
Response 
Incident Timeline, Discovery Method, Root Causes, Corrective 
Actions, Targeted vs. Opportunistic, Additional Guidance 
5 
Impact 
Assessment 
Loss categorization, Loss estimation, Estimation currency, Impact 
rating, Notes 
Table 6: VERIS Project Incident Narrative Descriptors 
Three observations about VERIS could be highlighted which are relevant to this 
project. First, When an incident is reported, the project suggests giving a ‘confidence 
rating’ to the classification of that incident. This provides a practical solution to the 
observation highlighted by NIST [1] that detecting incidents with accuracy is a very 
challenging task. The NIST document acknowledges that this high impact on team 
performance and cost and suggests undergoing thorough initial assessments before 
declaration.  I speculate that if initial assessment procedures are coupled with the 
confidence rating metric proposed by VERIS, this could be a very valuable information to 
the CSIRT in terms of allocating resources and responding more efficiently.  
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Second, the victim demographics descriptors aim to describe the affected 
organization by giving information like: industry type, country of operation, number of 
employees, annual revenue and locations affected. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
single unique work that attempted to incorporate such information for the purposes of 
benchmarking. Although the above information is very basic and it is expected that due to 
its lacking of more information about the organization’s CSIR preparedness that it will fall 
short of providing meaningful comparisons, the VERIS project is commended for taking 
the first step. If several companies pursue the issue of benchmarking more seriously, this 
could provide the public with very valuable guidelines of best practices in the area of CSIR.  
Third, when performing impact assessment of a security incident the project 
suggests classifying impact into direct and indirect. Direct impacts are those targeting the 
assets and can be quantified in currency. On the other hand, indirect impacts are those 
resulting from a stakeholder’s reaction to an incident, e.g. customer, shareholder ..etc. The 
project admits that the indirect impacts are more difficult to quantify, and leaves it as an 
open research question. This also imposes challenges to using indirect impacts in 
performance analysis. As shall be presented in Section 2.2, some works in the performance 
evaluation of freeway emergencies [77] argued for including only direct measurable 
impacts in the performance evaluation of IR.  
A comprehensive list of “metrics” for measuring the capability of an organization 
to perform CSIR functions is provided in [74]. The comprehensive document, which 
appears in 200 pages, aims at providing guidelines to CSIRTs in terms of what needs to be 
existing in the CSIR capability. The provided metrics are presented in the form of questions 
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to be assessed through scoring. The scoring is mainly in the form of “Yes” or “No”, 
depending on satisfying a list of “indicators”.   
The study provides a remarkable and rich repository for detailed activities 
associated with the preparation of CSIRP. It could be viewed as a comprehensive guide for 
measuring the completeness of a CSIRP document, and partially as a tool to measure an 
organization’s preparedness for handling security incidents. Sample questions include: “is 
there a financial plan for incident management functions?”, “is forensics analysis 
performed on constituent systems and networks?”, “do the analytical processes incorporate 
methods to determine the risk or threat level of a confirmed incident”, and “is there an 
established business resumption plan to support disaster recovery?”.  
Comparing [74] with the performance study provided in this project, the following 
similarities and differences could be noted: 
1- The focus of this project is measuring the effectiveness of a CSIRP and a CSIRT, 
while [74] focuses on ensuring the preparedness of a CSIR capability. More 
specifically, [74] focuses on completeness, which is only one aspect of 
effectiveness as defined in this project.  
2- The main evaluation method used in [74] is ensuring the “existence” of an “ability” 
to perform an activity relevant to IR. However, this project is interested in assessing 
each of these abilities. For instance, [74] provides a list of actions to ensure that an 
organization has mechanisms to classify the severity of incidents. On the other 
hand, this study is interested in how to measure effectiveness of these mechanisms. 
3-  Major proportion of [74] is devoted to assessing the security measures in an 
organization, an aspect which is out of the scope of this project.  
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4- Both works have a similar goal which is to establish a system for assessing CSIR 
that leads to enhancement. However, [74] is more targeted towards building a CSIR 
while this project is geared towards maintaining it.  
Besides CSIRP completeness, another important activity in the preparation phase 
of the IR cycle that impacts performance is the preparedness of the CSIRT. It has been 
noticed [76] that the majority of computer security professionals spend their time in 
ensuring compliance with various standards and organizational requirements. However, 
these professionals normally lack the complex technical nature of incident response and 
the behavioral skills needed to conduct CSIR. The study also notices that CSIRTs who are 
capable of using several general purpose software in combination to the specialized 
software performed better in simulated training exercises. This brings forward the 
complexity of preparing CSIRTs to effectively perform their duties.  
In that direction, a proposal to measure performance through measuring the 
preparedness of a CSIRT is found in [61]. The authors presented “A Competency Lifecycle 
Roadmap (CLR)” as a model for assessing the preparedness of a CSIRT. The CLR builds 
on the argument that workforce effectiveness relies on two critical measures: competence 
and readiness. Competence is measured with respect to an individual, i.e. the level of 
understanding of a subject matter and the ability to apply a given skill; while readiness is 
the ability to apply a set of competencies to fulfill the requirements of a real task. The CLR 
is structured as five activities: assess, plan, acquire, validate and test readiness, and is 
executed through specific criteria within an environment.  
Similar to [60], the performance focus of [61] is the responders. Although the focus 
of this project is the CSIRP, it is important to highlight the correlation between the two, 
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i.e. the performance of the team and the performance of executing a plan. The readiness 
and competency of the CSIRT members influence the performance of any IRP execution 
and vice versa. Distinguishing between the two aspects should be observed when 
attempting to identify causes of poor performance.  
Another distinction between the focus of this dissertation and [61] is that the later 
views performance, at least in the context of the publication, as a pre-activity process 
targeting managers and trainers. However, I argue for a broader perspective in which 
performance is assessed prior to execution, monitored while execution and analyzed post-
execution. With that regard, the performance preparedness model presented in [61] could 
be integrated within the proposed framework as an element of pre-execution assessment. 
A subtle but important reference to performance evaluation is found in [75]. The 
study stands out for highlighting the importance of developing performance metrics for 
“incident management performance” during the “preparation” phase. The other works limit 
discussion of the preparation phase to preparedness, and consider performance evaluation 
as a post-activity in the last phase of the IR cycle. The study calls for “collecting metrics 
that assess the quality of a process improvement purposes” which is expansion of the 
requirement to have a policy for performance evaluation outlined in the NIST. Again, there 
were no details about these metrics as the study focuses on formal representation of the 
incident response tasks through defining unambiguous relationships, in the context of 
incident response management.    
A simulation study focusing on CSIRTs effectiveness of assessing threats is found 
in [22]. One of the study’s conclusions is that the vast majority of alerts passed to a CSIRT 
constitute non-threating incidents, mainly due to IDS false alarms, legitimate user activity 
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perceived as threating and other ambiguous network activity. This issue poses as an 
obstacle for achieving effectiveness. The study suggests careful classification of incidents 
at the early stages to properly define the threat levels. The proposed method for assessing 
a threat is to use a simple additive equation of three factors: (1) trajectory of the attack (2) 
assets targeted and (3) perpetrator. The detailed levels within each of these factors are 
elaborated in Table 7. Although, the use of an additive metric to measure the attack severity 
can be misleading, the study is commended for the simplicity of the proposed metric.  
Level [1] Attack Trajectory [2] Targeted Assets [3] Perpetrator 
1 
Targeting no specific 
entity 
No asset 
Careless or unknown 
entity 
2 
Targeting a specific 
single entity 
A client or set of 
client assets 
Action associated with 
criminal activity 
3 
Targeting multiple 
entities or high-level 
entities 
An infrastructure 
asset 
Action associated with an 
advanced threat 
Table 7: Model for Assessing Threats proposed by [22]. 
A recent workshop by CERT (January 2015) proposed a model to define and 
measure goals for an organization [41] based on the GQIM model proposed in [78]. 
Although the model is generic, it was designed for the purposes of managing computer 
security activities. The GQIM model defines objectives in which goals (G) are derived. 
The process then goes into formulating questions (Q), defining indicators (I) and finally 
metrics (M). The main contribution of the publication is providing detailed information on 
how to define goals in the context of computer security plans in a manner that permits 
performance measurement through indicators and metrics. The NIST guide to handling 
computer security incidents [1] requires the definition of goals and formulation of metrics 
in CSIRPs, and the GQIM model provides an implementation guide to deriving goals.  
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The framework proposed in this project borrows from [41] the taxonomical 
hierarchy, i.e. objectives are higher than goals and indicators are higher than metrics. Since 
the NIST guide neither distinguishes between goals and objectives nor between indicators 
and metrics, the above GQIM model does not create incompatibility issues with the guide. 
It could be viewed as a more refined method for applying the recommendations stated in 
the NIST guide. Furthermore, as [41] has left out elaborating on how to derive indicators 
and metrics from goals, the proposed framework aims at filling that gap by providing 
guidelines for such derivation and providing applied examples of performance indicators 
and metrics that could be used in CSIRPs.  
Finally, a recent report on computer security incident response plans at nuclear 
facilities was published by the International Atomic Energy Agency [79].  The report 
considers “measuring the effectiveness of a CSIRP” as an essential element of the post-
incident review phase. However, the report does not elaborate on how that could be 
achieved.     
2.1.6 Performance Evaluation of Computer Security Systems 
Occasionally, the issue of performance evaluation arises when studying various 
aspects of computer security and IT management. For example, several publications have 
studied the performance of intrusion detection systems (IDS) [64] [80] and vulnerability 
scoring [62] [81]. As this project seeks to design a framework for measuring the 
performance of CSIRTs, the effectiveness of the detection process will arise and such 
studies can be used as a resource when deriving performance indicators. However, this 
project is more generic and is focused on the design of higher level performance 
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measurement techniques which could be applied to a wider range of security incidents 
compared to designs that effectively handle specific category of security threats.  
On the other end, the performance evaluation focus of this project is more focused 
compared to performance measurement of IT incidents presented in studies like [23] and 
[82]. For example, an organization’s help desk team manages general IT incidents which 
might or might not involve security incidents of interest to CSIRTs.  Compared to incidents 
handled by CSIRTs, general IT incidents appear in higher frequency, have a relatively 
small cost and impose less impact on the operation of the overall organization. Therefore, 
the focus of performance measurement of general IT incidents would be on the average 
time and cost, while incidents handled by CSIRTs need to focus on both individual and 
average performance as the cost and impact of each individual incident might be 
magnificent.  
In the following paragraphs, a review of some publications in cyber security that 
address the issue of performance evaluation will be presented. These papers were selected 
based on their relevance, from my viewpoint, to the proposed framework in terms of the 
applicability of the presented ideas to the area of CSIRP performance measurement.  
The difficulty of studying performance analysis in computer incident management 
is highlighted in [82], which states: “The complexity of real-life enterprise-class IT support 
organizations make it extremely hard to understand the impact of organizational, structural 
and behavioral components on the performance of the currently adopted incident 
management strategy, and consequently, which actions could improve it.”. The authors 
presented a decision support model, SYMIAN (SYMulation for Incident Analysis), for 
improving the performance of incident management which models an organization’s IT 
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support as a Markovian open queuing network [63]. The model claims to simulate the effect 
of corrective measures before their actual implementation.  
The scope of the model presented in  [82] is similar to those presented in [23] and 
[83] as the three studies focus on the performance of managing several responses to general 
IT incidents. These incidents appear in high frequency and have relatively low impact and 
cost, in contrast to incidents dealt with in CSIRPs. Nevertheless, the proposed model in 
[82] raises attention to two relevant design considerations.   
The first consideration relates to the question of how to layout performance 
measurement procedures in a CSIRP, especially in the absence of prior measurements. The 
authors relied on the what-if-analysis method to predict the impact of changes before 
implementation. The technique relies on prediction of system performance based on the 
theoretical design and suggested handling procedures under various expected incidents. 
Indeed, most CSIRPs perform a similar analysis when laying out potential attacks and 
proposing procedures for handling it. Another example of how standard CSIRPs use what-
if analysis is compiling a list of secondary contacts, or backup teams, if the primary 
contacts and team members are not available. However, under the surveyed published 
CSIRPs, issues related to performance, if ever addressed, would be dealt with in an ad hoc 
manner by the core team. It is worth considering to use the what-if-analysis for issues 
related performance and provide basic documentation about it in the CSIRP.     
The second consideration relates to performance evaluation modeling. The paper 
treated performance evaluation in two orthogonal dimensions: effectiveness and efficiency. 
Effectiveness focuses on the chain process while efficiency focuses on every single support 
group. This approach could be adopted when a CSIRT is composed of several technical 
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groups like: network, forensics, management …etc. Such approach, which is a common 
practice in performance evaluation of quality management of chain processes, helps 
measuring the performance of each team, and the overall system performance. It also helps 
identifying bottlenecks and aspects of the system that have high impact on performance.   
The issue of uncertainty in incident response to intrusions has been addressed in an 
early study  [64]. In automated intrusion detection systems (IDS), alarm messages are 
generated when some suspicious activity is detected and are brought to the attention of the 
system administrator. There is a delay between the detection of the activity and the actual 
response, which henceforth will be referred to by the term “response delay”. This time 
period is normally used by attackers to further exploit the system. An earlier study [84] has 
demonstrated through simulation that if attackers get  a response delay of ten hours, then 
they will be 80% successful; and if given twenty hours of response delay then they will be 
95% successful. Although these results are outdated, the observation that response delay 
impact the incident response effectiveness remains valid.  
The problem that [64] was interested in is: since IDS systems are automated there 
is uncertainty whether a flag indicates an actual alarm or a false alarm. The authors identify 
three sources of uncertainty: uncertainty in detection, uncertainty in classifying the attack 
and uncertainty in preparing a response. The provided technical details of how to measure 
the uncertainty is no more applicable, as IDS and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) have 
undergone several advancements in the past fifteen years. Nevertheless, the question of 
uncertainty is still valid. For example, when an attack stops, this can be due to action taken 
by the response team or it could be simply due to factors known to the attackers. It would 
have major consequences if the response team falsely falls under the impression of proper 
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contamination while in reality the attack was temporarily halted by the attackers. This 
scenario and others stress the need for careful design of performance measures that are 
sensitive and conscious of the issue of uncertainty present in the response. In summary, the 
paper pays attention to the contention between response delay and uncertainty. A team 
might successfully reduce the response delay but through actions that might be neglectful 
of some uncertainty factors.  
One of the main side effects of  improper handling of the uncertainty factor is the 
stability of the response. A response might escalate or fluctuate throughout the response 
cycle, depending on the threat assessment of the incident.  Therefore, CSIRTs should rely 
on effective assessment methods that are developed in the various computer security 
disciplines. One example is assessment of vulnerabilities which is currently standardized 
in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [62]. The CVSS model was 
developed by the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), and is 
currently used integrated into the NIST [9] and CERT handbooks. It is the only open system 
and is characterized by its reliance on only quantitative metrics [81].  
The CVSS model categorizes metrics in three categories: base, temporal and 
environmental. Base metrics focus on the fundamental characterizes of the vulnerability 
that are constant across environments.  Examples include: Access Vector metric which 
measures how a vulnerability is exploited, Access Complexity which measures the 
complexity of the attack required to exploit the vulnerability, Authentication metric which 
measures how many times an attacker need to authenticate before exploiting a vulnerability 
of a target, Confidentiality Impact, Integrity Impact and Availability Impact. Temporal 
metrics focus on the variant threat levels of a vulnerability that may change over time. For 
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example, the exploitability metric measures the current state of exploit techniques or code 
availability. Finally, the environmental metrics measure the impact of a threat on a specific 
environment. Example metrics include: collateral damage potential, and target distribution.  
Models like the CVSS bring its rewards and drawbacks to the study of CSIR 
performance evaluation. The main reward is that such models produce rigorous metrics 
which the performance metrics will be derived from. Researchers need not to re-invent the 
wheel, and can build on the findings of studies in security metrics. For example, assessing 
potential damage of a vulnerability is a complex task, which impacts any measurement of 
the effectiveness of the response in reducing harm. However, when a well-research method, 
like the collateral damage potential metric in CVSS, is provided then a good proportion of 
the task is fulfilled. Researchers can focus on proper derivation of performance metrics 
from security metrics compared to full design of metrics. On the other hand, this leaves 
performance designers dependable on the reliability and accuracy of the security metrics. 
Inaccuracies resulting from poor design of security metrics are likely to propagate to 
performance measurements obtained from metrics derived from these security metrics. 
Striking a balance between building on findings of security metrics which might not have 
been necessarily designed to serve performance measurements, and proposing metrics with 
high accuracy would be a challenge.   
The previous discussion on the relationship between performance and security 
metrics incites visiting the broader works on computer security metrics. The field of 
software engineering had undergone extensive study on the development of software 
metrics, to assess the quality of each of the development phases of the software cycle . The 
ISO 9216 standard, with its series of publications [85] [86] [87] [88] , is a major reference 
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that outlines how these metrics are derived and used. The classification method for security 
metrics is generic and can be applied to the PE metrics. 
Metrics can be classified as: quantitative or qualitative, subjective or objective, 
static or dynamic and direct or indirect. A static metric is obtained during the static state of 
the software, while a dynamic one is obtained during the execution of the software. A direct 
metric is independent of other measures, while an indirect metric is dependent on 
measurements of other metrics. This is the most comprehensive method I found for 
classifying metrics, which could be borrowed to the field of performance evaluation of 
CSIR. More discussion on security metrics will be presented in Section 2.1.7.  
Another area to consult in the computer security literature is the performance 
evaluation of security systems. Responses to computer security incident normally involve 
interaction between human (the team) and non-human (e.g., machines, software) entities, 
and an effective response requires effectiveness from both fronts. These systems are used 
throughout the response cycle, including the detection, containment and recovery. The 
performance of intrusion detection systems, firewalls, forensics tools and backup systems 
contribute to the overall performance of the system. Again, this is a huge literature and it 
suffices to show an example, besides the example of intrusion detection provided in this 
section, of how this literature can be consulted when developing performance systems for 
CSIR. 
   In [89], the authors attempt to develop performance metrics to capture the impact 
of attacks on Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs). Unlike wired networks, MANETS 
have specific characteristics due to its dynamicity, as nodes and routes continually change. 
The mobility factor adds more challenges to the reliability of the routes compared to static 
 66 
 
wireless networks. The performance of MANETs is normally measured through packet 
delay, packet drop rates and routing effectiveness.  
The authors classified attacks on MANETs based on their objective, presenting six 
types of attacks: denial of service attacks, black hole attacks, flooding attacks, packet 
dropping attacks, route disruption attacks, wormhole attacks. The technical details of these 
attack can be found in the following survey of different attacks in MANETs [90]. The 
authors suggested then to develop metrics such that they measure the impact on two 
aspects: level of denial of service, and manipulation of network and routing topology. 
Ten quantitative metrics were presented. Some metrics can only be used to measure 
impact on denial of service, like the packet loss ratio metric, and others can be used to 
measure the topology and routing manipulation, like route length per packet metric. 
Interestingly, some metrics can be used to measure both like the round trip delay metric. 
This demonstrates that some performance metrics can be used to measure several aspects 
of the system performance, an idea which will be used in the proposed framework.  The 
various attacks were executed in a simulated environment with varying parameters. The 
results showed that some attacks had varying impacts based on number of nodes or number 
of attackers while the impact remained constant for some types of attacks. This provides 
MANETS operators with mechanisms to interpret various activities, how to classify attacks 
and which counter measures to follow in response. This demonstrates that the use of 
performance metrics can results in enhancements to the response process, as the above 
results were not clear prior to the use of performance metrics.  
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2.1.7 Measuring Security in Computer Systems 
In this section the notion of ‘how can security be measured?’ will be investigated. 
As shall be presented, the feasibility and practicality of quantification of security into 
metrics is debatable among researchers despite its wide spread usage. In the current 
endeavors about the development of metrics to measure the performance of CSIRTs, the 
above debate about security metrics arises. Performance metrics evaluating a CSIRT 
depend on how ‘success’ of achieving a specific task is defined, which is normally 
expressed through security metrics. Stated in other terms, the calculation of performance 
metrics will depend on some measurements of security metrics. The fuzzy definition of 
some security metrics and their questionable practical value can influence how much the 
outcomes of performance evaluation can be trusted. In the following paragraphs, a survey 
the findings of some major works in security metrics will be presented followed by my 
viewpoint on how that impacts the proposed framework.   
  One of the earliest works addressing the issue of security metrics [91] states that 
the nature of the field makes security measurement an “operational” process, i.e. it attempts 
to measure the ability of a system to resist an attack, or the ability of the system to remain 
free of breaches under specific conditions. Nevertheless, the study notices that most 
attention is being paid to measuring the safeguards followed during the design and 
implementation processes, which does not necessarily reflect the security of the system 
when it actually operates. The authors propose to view “security” similar to “reliability” 
by contrasting “system failure” with “system breach”. The consequence of adopting such 
model is producing metrics that are probabilistic in nature, like the expected number of 
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breaches in a period of time, and the probability of a specific mission to be accomplished 
without security breaches.  
Reliability is defined as the probability of failure free operation over a period of 
time. Such probabilistic definition makes reliability an operational measure compared to 
other measures that capture the static properties of the system. Comparing reliability and 
security, reliability measures failures which depend on system faults, which is analogous 
to security breaches that depend on system vulnerabilities. Another similarity is the high 
target of making the system “very secure” which is analogous to target of reliability of 
safety-critical systems. However, failures are mainly accidental while security breaches are 
normally intentional. Also the notion of ‘time’ is different in both contexts. In reliability, 
higher measures are proportional to longer times of fault-free, while on security this is not 
necessarily true as breaches vary in their degree and scope and the role of time in 
assessment is vague.  
The above comparison between reliability and security reveals that uncertainty in 
both contexts can be expressed through probability. The author warns that in the context 
of security the interpretation of probabilities is more subjective. For example, an attacker 
is ‘all-knowing’ of the breach mechanism but does not have certain and complete 
information about the system, while a system administrator is (ideally) ‘all-knowing’ of 
the system but uncertain how an attack might happen. This means that a probability can be 
interpreted differently depending on the viewpoint, in the above example: the attacker or 
system administrator.  
Reflecting on the above discussion, there are three remarks to record. First, during 
the design of performance metrics a distinguish should be made between operational and 
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static measures. Measuring the preparedness of a system is an example of a static measure, 
while measuring the execution performance of a specific task outlined in a CSIRP is an 
example of operational measures. Second, there is a need to deeply understand the notion 
of time in performance evaluation. Sometimes, time is a crucial measure as when 
measuring the time from detection to starting the response, while in other contexts time 
might be misleading as when considering the period of time the responders managed to 
secure against higher level attacks. This might be due effective security and response 
measures or due to mere coincidence and absence of targeted sophisticated breaches. Third, 
as performance evaluation is mainly an operational measure, the use of probabilistic 
measures is reasonable. However, it is important to define the ‘viewpoint’ of how these 
measurements will be interpreted. A measurement read by a technical system administrator 
might be interpreted differently than if read by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or by 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) [92].  
An extensive survey, published in 2009, examines the major works in the area of 
security metrics in the period of 1981 to 2008 [34]. The title of the work: “Quantifiable 
Security is a Weak Hypothesis” reveals the survey’s main conclusion about the hypothesis 
of “security can correctly be represented in quantifiable fashion”.  
The study identifies five characteristics of operational security that make it difficult 
to model and analyze. These characteristics are: (1) the dynamicity of the environment in 
which threats and security measures adapt to changes from each other (2) Low stationarity 
as systems and software are continually updating (3) Economics: there are various agents 
(e.g. attackers and defenders) with conflicting goals and interests (4) Dependence of 
various components of the system and users on each other (5)  Uncertainty. The study then 
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proposes a simple conceptual model to study operational security. Operational security is 
viewed as a system comprising of three components: (1) systems: structural components, 
security controls and users (2) Threats: active and passive agents capable of violating the 
security properties of the system. (3) Vulnerabilities: system properties that allow the 
exploitation of the system.   
Two main outcomes of the study are of relevance to this project. The first remark 
is counterintuitive and comes from analyzing the ‘perspective’ of security metrics. 
Perspective here refers to the conceptual viewpoint of what security is which motivates the 
quantification of metrics. The study classifies perspectives into four major categories: (1) 
Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA): which is the classical viewpoint of security 
as Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (2) Economics: viewing security as risk and 
trade-off analysis (3) Reliability: views security as a stochastic process subject to 
probabilistic analysis of the rate of system failures (4) Other techniques derived from 
computer science, like viewing security in graph models. The counterintuitive finding is 
that the CIA was the least commonly used perspective to derive security metrics. The study 
reasons that this is due to the advancement of the other perspectives in quantification 
methods as displayed in various disciplines. This made it easier to extend such methods to 
computer security than to derive metrics through the CIA model which is native to the 
computer security discipline. In my view, this also demonstrates that deriving security 
metrics is a challenging task.  
The second interesting finding is that the vast majority of works used assumptions 
that are inconsistent with the nature of operational security. For example, most models 
assume independence and rationality while practically security systems exert very high 
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dependence and empirical evidence suggests that a relatively large percentage of attacks 
are conducted through ‘irrational’ entities like automated software. The study 
acknowledges that assumptions need to be used while modeling, but critiques that these 
assumptions are diverge from the nature of operational security, causing validation 
problems to the quantification process. Overall, the survey concludes that proposing 
security models and metrics was proven to be easy but validating it is proven to be very 
challenging if not absent. Also, there is a lack of common experimentation methods that 
enable comparisons between various organizations. Finally, there is a chaos in the 
taxonomical usage of terms as they are normally borrowed from other fields.  
The last point can be re-expressed as the field of security metrics is yet to develop 
its own identity. This is manifested in the absence of unified terminology and scarcity of 
validation methods. The five characteristics of operational security described in the above 
survey stand as obstacles to achieving common taxonomy and sound validation methods. 
However, looking at the research conducted after the above survey, the field is gradually 
converging into developing its own common language. The VERIS project is an example 
of such attempts. In terms of validity, the study is reasonable in its questioning why should 
descriptive metrics should be trusted without any validation of their practical relevance. 
Still, the study seems to lean more towards rigors and formal validation methods, which I 
believe is unnecessary needed when describing security features and threats.       
Another extensive survey was published by NIST [93] and appeared at the same 
year of [34] . The survey affirms the previous observation that much research had been 
done in the area, but only few metrics have been deemed useful in the practical domain. 
The authors also note that unlike physics and chemistry which have well formulated 
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metrology systems, the area of IT metrology is still emerging. Therefore, the term ‘metrics’ 
in the area of computer security has been interpreted in various of ways. The survey notes 
that security metrics have been used for three main purposes: strategic support (e.g. 
planning and resource allocation), quality assurance (e.g. during software development) 
and tactical oversight (e.g. compliance of procedures, policies and regulations). It is noticed 
that if this classification is to be used, incident response can be classified under the third 
category. 
The study has two discussions which are significant to bring forward while studying 
performance metrics. First, how is the term ‘metric’ being understood and used in the 
security metrics literature? The authors found three common usages in the literature. Some 
researchers use metrics to refer to quantifiable measurements of some aspect of a system. 
Under this approach, qualitative measures are not considered metrics. The essence of this 
approach stems from the literal meaning of the term ‘metric’ which is also in alignment of 
how the term is being used in physics.  
The second approach considers metrics as tools designed to facilitate decision 
making to improve performance and accountability. The focus is on the objective of 
assessment not the mechanism of assessment, thus quantitative and qualitative would be 
the same if they used to achieve the same goal. In addition, the terms ‘metrics’ and 
‘measurements’ would be used interchangeably.  
The third approach differentiates between measurements, which are single-point-
in-time views of specific discrete factors, and metrics which are derived by comparing to 
a predetermined baseline two or more measurements taken over time. In other words, 
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measurements represent actual counting, while metrics represent analysis of 
measurements. Examples of major works that adopt this last definition are found in [94].  
For the purposes of this project, the second approach is more fitting to the research 
objectives. The objective of developing the PE framework is to enable the CSIRT members 
and decision makers to advance improvements in the performance. The difference between 
quantifiable or non-quantifiable metrics and the distinction between measurements and 
metrics is semantical with no practical implications for the interest of this research.     
The second discussion of relevance is the definition of effectiveness. The study 
define it as: “assurance that the security-enforcing mechanisms of the system meet the 
stated security objectives.” To refine this board definition to incident response plan, 
effectiveness can be defined as “assurance that the incident response plan achieves its 
stated objectives outlined in the CSIRP”. Yet, it is important to note that the above 
definition only relates to one aspect of effectiveness, which is the IRP design. Other aspects 
include the IRP execution, the utilization of resources, damage control and cost. In this 
regard, the notion of “effectiveness” in the context of CSIR needs further investigation.  
A notable recent study [42] builds on the survey findings of [34]. The study 
observes that most of the metrics developed in the field reflect security “management”, 
compared to security “measurement”. Metrics developed for security management attempt 
to assess an organization’s adherence to specific standards. On the other hand, the paper 
investigates the possibility of viewing “security” as a computer system property which then 
could be subject to measurement in quantifiable fashion similar to physical quantities. A 
customized model from control engineering is proposed in which computer threats are 
viewed as “disturbances” to the control. In my view, as the model is dependent on accurate 
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measurement, which is an aspect that is difficult to achieve, the proposed model will suffer 
from practicality issues.  
Another bias in the research of security metrics is highlighted in [95]. The authors 
noticed that most security metrics focus on preventive and detective measures. However, 
an argument is made that there is an equivalent need for metrics that measure survivability 
and restoration capabilities when an incident occur. The argument is based on the 
acknowledged observation that regardless of how much we attempt to prevent malicious 
events, incidents will occur. Therefore, a tradeoff between investment on both aspects of 
security need to be made. Metrics for CSIR performance can be grouped under the above 
perspective on survivability and restoration metrics.  
2.2 Multidisciplinary Literature Review of IR Performance Evaluation 
The field of performance evaluation is a well-founded discipline, especially in the 
fields of engineering and business management, and its findings are implemented across a 
wide spectrum of disciplines and applications. Various areas of incident response have 
used performance evaluation to derive its own customized performance frameworks and 
metrics. Examples of these fields include: 
 Medical emergency response, and response to epidemics [96] [97] 
 Law enforcement and fire departments incident response [98] [99] 
 Natural and environmental disasters responses [100] [101] [102] 
 Homeland security incidents [103] [104]  
 Engineering systems like critical safety systems and transportation systems [23] 
[77] [105]  
 Business administration and management [83] [106] 
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 Supply Chain Management (SCM) [107] [108] 
 Incident Management Systems [109] [110] [111] 
The following literature review scans through some major works in the above 
disciplines. The aim of survey is to investigate how these disciplines tackled the issue of 
performance evaluation of incident response within their contexts. Since this work is 
looking for insights and lessons to learn, focus will be on studies of generic nature 
compared to those that focus on technical implementation, an aspect which differs from 
one discipline to another. The proposed survey is neither comprehensive nor extensive, i.e. 
not all works in each discipline are surveyed and the surveyed works are not reviewed in 
depth.  
The selected works for the survey satisfy one of the following two criteria:  
1. The study provides an overview of the major works, summary of main findings 
or comparison of major tools and methods within that discipline, or is 
considered one of the major publications in the discipline.   
2. The study demonstrates relevance or provides insights to the objectives of this 
project focusing on developing a framework for CSIR performance evaluation 
A survey of about fifty works is presented. For each of these works, a critique or a 
description of how the work relates to the field of CSIR is presented.  
2.2.1 Challenges 
The difficulty of measuring the performance of incident response systems is 
acknowledged across various disciplines. Some of these challenges are unique to each 
discipline, but as this survey demonstrates, there are common challenges associated to the 
measurement of performance of the core activities of the IR process. In the following 
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paragraphs, a presentation of the major challenges is provided along with a brief discussion 
on their applicability to the CSIR discipline.  
Challenges of developing performance evaluation systems environmental incident 
response are highlighted in [100]. Specifically, the study targeted developing performance 
metrics for responses to oil spills. The study highlights that measuring the effectiveness of 
responses is “extremely challenging”. The authors discussed several factors behind this 
difficulty, from which two factors stands out. The first factor is the complexity of 
establishing a baseline context for measuring effectiveness. This is due to the observation 
that performance baselines are normally designed on incident-specific strategies, while in 
reality responses to oil spills are varied and are normally developed in an ad hoc manner 
in the early stages of a crisis. The second factor is the difficulty of measuring the public 
perception of successful handling as there are no normative standards of success that are 
established between decision makers and the public. Indeed, both parties normally provide 
contradicting interpretations of the response performance.  
The field of CSIR seem to suffer from both challenges highlighted in the above 
study. In terms of the complexity of establishing baseline contexts for measuring 
effectiveness, this comes from the reality that the types, scales and scopes of cyber-attacks 
are very diverse; perhaps more than the diversity presented when it comes to oil spills. 
However, the frequency of oil spills is relatively low compared to the high number of 
computer breaches, making a distinction between the two disciplines. It is true that the 
element of surprise is always expected while handling incidents; however, a computer 
incident is more likely to be similar to a previous incident compared to oil spills incidents. 
It could be argued that the difficulty of establishing baseline performance contexts are 
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inversely proportional to the frequency of incidents. Based on this argument, it would be 
relatively easier to create baselines in CSIR compared to oil spills incidents, but more 
difficult in CSIR compared to medical emergencies and other fields with high volume of 
incidents. The second factor of contradicting interpretations is also present in CSIR. There 
is a wide gap between how technical teams, executives and the public perceive the success 
of responding to computer incidents. This comes back to the fact that there are no well-
established tools, i.e. metrics, to measure the performance of CSIR. Such tools need to be 
precise and disambiguate to avoid the variance of interpretation among various 
stakeholders.  
Differences between measuring performance of manufacturing businesses and 
service businesses are highlighted in [106]. The authors observe that measuring 
performance in services is more challenging than in manufacturing. In manufacturing, 
enhancing performance is achieved through monitoring production processes, monitoring 
distribution processes, removing waste and limiting variances. In the manufacturing 
domain, this is possible due to the homogenous nature of production and distribution 
processes. On the other hand, service businesses operate under high unpredictability 
conditions in which the needs of customers vary widely. Such environments push 
executives and senior managers to tolerate relatively higher level of inefficiency and higher 
costs due to uncontrollable factors. The authors suggest that despite the difficulty of 
controlling unpredictability, performance measurement should focus on confining 
variances and deducing similarities between various service requests. The authors also 
argue that internal benchmarking is more meaningful than external benchmarking between 
various companies which vary in size, equipment, service level agreements and budget.  
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From the above description, the field of CSIR is closer to service businesses than 
to manufacturing businesses. It is very common to face new threats and advanced 
compromise strategies with high unpredictability. In addition, the current nature of the IT 
industry in which thousands of equipment, solutions and software that are regularly poured 
into the market, makes it very difficult to capture everything in the CSIR plan.  However, 
similar to how the authors have argued in the above study, focusing on main threat trends 
and common attack techniques can help design more efficient CSIRPs. Again, the volume 
of incidents in service industries are dramatically larger than those handled by CSIRTs. 
Consequently, the proposed strategy of limiting variance becomes more challenging in 
CSIR compared to general services.  
Another study that draws comparisons between incident response teams in different 
disciplines [97] highlights that the environment in which responders operate is very 
challenging. The authors describe the environment as complex, high in information load, 
wide information diversity, high uncertainty, continuous flow of data and quick change of 
information. The authors then suggest that understanding the collaborations between team 
members is crucial for improving the effectiveness of the response team.  
The above study, among others, highlights the role of the human factor in the 
incident response process which could be overshadowed by emphasis on tools and 
techniques. The response process normally involves a high level of interaction between 
various technical and non-technical members, both internally and externally. In the 
contexts of CSIR, the core CSIRT needs to internally interact with IT personnel, engineers, 
managers/executives, public relations and human resources. At the same time, it interacts 
with external entities like legal advisors, law enforcement and the media. Therefore, I 
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second the observation made by the above study, and suggest that the field of CSIR needs 
to conduct thorough studies to understand the collaborations during the response process.  
The study of [99]  provides a comprehensive survey of the disciplines concerned 
with emergency response. The study investigates operational research in emergency 
response over the scope of fifty years in the domains of fire suppression, law enforcement 
and ambulance response. The study states that “performance metrics in emergency 
response remain underdeveloped, particularly in the context of large-scale emergencies”. 
The study puts the blame mainly on the complexities arising from multiple stakeholders in 
the public sectors which have various, if not contradicting, objectives. The study also 
observes that within emergency response, the planning and implementation of solutions is 
inseparable, as incidents develop in a unique and semi-structured matter.  
There are three points that could be highlighted from my reading of the above 
survey. First, despite the long legacy and maturity of the field of medical and fire response, 
performance metrics in these fields remain underdeveloped. This brings a warning to those 
of us interested in studying the performance of computer incident response. It asserts that 
the issue of performance evaluation, especially with large-scale incidents, is very 
challenging and cautions against any claim that a single model or a group of developed 
metrics would be able to capture the performance of the response system.  
Second, the issue of contradicting objectives of stakeholders is no stranger to the 
field of cybersecurity. The tension between safety and privacy is a classic example. Hence, 
in order to make sense of any performance evaluation the audience should be clearly 
identified. This might also require conducting performance evaluation under several 
contexts.  
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Third, as the nature of the response bring planning and implementation hand by 
hand, it is important to carefully reflect on the expectations of the planning process. It 
would be more realistic to view a response plan as a guiding document more than an 
instruction manual. At the same time, since responders’ time is very valuable during the 
execution of a response, careful prior planning is crucial. Based on this, a response plan 
need to be both comprehensive and flexible which is not trivial.      
Another unique but relevant challenge brought forward by [98], from the domain 
of law, is the difficulty of assessing harm. The study aims at developing metrics for 
cybercrimes, like scale and harm, and comparing them to metrics used in traditional crimes. 
The author argues that the overall form of crime did not change due to the advent of 
cybercrimes. The classical classification of crime as (1) crimes against persons (2) crimes 
against property (3) crimes against state (4) crimes against morality; are the same online 
and offline. The only difference is the method used; i.e. use of automation in online crimes. 
However, unlike traditional crimes which are by default one-to-one, online crimes are by 
default one-to-many which raises interesting challenges.  Two challenges were recorded, 
the ability of law enforcement to apprehend the offenders and the ability to properly 
measure the scale of harm that may be inflicted. Not only the scale of harm is different but 
also the degree of harm by a single incident is of great contrast. For example, the average 
amount lost by a bank robbery in the US is $800, while a single online attack normally 
results of millions of dollars.  
While the legal domain functions quite differently than the technical domain of 
computer security response, there is much to learn from the legal experience. An analogy 
can be drawn between a CSIRT working on containing an incident and a law enforcement 
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team engaging in apprehending some offenders. Also, assessment of damage that CSIRTs 
perform at the early stages of an incident and in post-incident activities is analogous to 
assessment of harm inflected by crimes which is conducted jointly by law enforcement and 
the justice system. 
I consider the model proposed in the above article for assessing and measuring harm 
of potential interest to researchers in the area of incident response. The article classifies 
harm under three types: individual harm (like assault), systematic harm (aggregate 
individual harm or generalized individual harm, e.g. mass shooting) and inchoate harm (i.e. 
potential harm, e.g. conspiracy). The main task of prosecutors is to properly classify an 
incident/crime under a specific category, and then work on assessing harm within that 
category. The article provides long analysis of a hypothetical scenario involving  a crime 
of stealing a password, which is a common computer incident. The article then concludes 
with the note that coming up with cybercrime metrics is very essential, but it involves a 
lengthy and complex process.  
Unlike the field of law in which harm is normally assessed post-incident, those who 
work in the field of CSIR normally assess potential harm in the early stages of the incident. 
The main outcome of such assessment is the categorization of the incident and 
consequently declaring a response suitable for the severity scale of the incident. Currently, 
there are two common models for categorizing incidents in CSIRPs. The first model is 
based on the CIA security model and the second inspects the compromise techniques. The 
CIA model, which stands for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, describes the 
security aspect of the system that an attack attempts to compromise, regardless of the 
technique used. The second method, on the other hand, focuses on the attack mechanism 
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regardless of the targeted security aspect. For example, a network worm attack and a 
compromise resulting from lack of software batch would be classified differently under the 
second method even if they both result in leak of confidential customer data.  
At this current stage of the CSIR’s development, it is not clear if using the “harm-
model”, similar to the one presented in [98], in CSIRPs would outperform the other two 
methods. However, I foresee that using a hybrid model of the above three models during 
threat assessment would be helpful for efficient performance of the CSIRT. Also, the harm 
assessment model presented in the above study can potentially lead to development of more 
precise harm assessment methods which CSIRTs normally perform at the end of the IR 
cycle.  
Although there are other works that highlight challenges of conducting PE in IR, 
the above discussion is sufficient for the purposes of this dissertation. The challenges which 
were not mentioned could be mapped to one of the challenges highlighted above. As shall 
be highlighted, the challenges of studying the performance of IR can be abstracted in two 
general challenges: complexity and unpredictability. The high load of information, 
contradicting objectives, interaction with large groups, difficulty of designing baselines 
and lack of comprehensive performance metrics are all aspects of complexity. On the other 
frond, the diversity of incidents, the quick escalation, the instability of the environment, 
and the evolvement of planning along with implementation are elements that contribute to 
unpredictability. Hence, any performance evaluation system for the field of CSIR need to 
address both issues: complexity and unpredictability. Strategies for overcoming these two 
challenges will be proposed in Chapter Five.  
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2.2.2 Methods and Practices 
It is argued in [13] that the theory of performance improvement originates from 
three types of theories. The first is economic theories, which are the primary survival and 
driver for the success of organizations. The second is psychological theories, which view 
humans as the main source of productivity and trigger enhancements through behavioral 
and cultural changes. The third is systems theories, which recognizes processes, resources 
and subsystems that upgrade or degrade performance. 
Despite the theoretical nature of the above classification, it reflects practical 
realities applicable to the field of incident response. For example, CSIR performance 
analysis heavily involves economic factors that focus on financial gain and loss due to 
incident handling. However, the performance of the responders themselves is inspected 
through reviewing relationship, team structure, communication and training. Also, the 
procedures and policies of the response capabilities are introspected to identify areas 
impacting performance. Therefore, the above work inspires studying performance through 
three dimensions: the system, economy and behavior.       
A framework for incident response management for the petroleum industry, is 
presented in [105]. The study was triggered by the status quo of performance evaluation in 
the industry which is reactive in nature and limits the focus to technical measurements. The 
authors called for a more proactive socio-technical approach to performance evaluation.   
The incident response model which the study analyzes is simple and involves three 
phases: (1) Prepare (2) Detect and recover (3) Learn. The prepare phase which exhausts 
most of the team’s time consists of conducting risk assessment, proposing plans and 
defining roles, raising awareness in the organization, and finally monitoring and adjusting 
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to external dynamics. The second phase involves detecting unusual behavior, analyzing 
alerts, conducting initial assessment, executing a response, handling escalation and 
reporting. The final learning phase compromises of identifying sequences of events, stating 
root causes, proposing recommendations for security improvements and evaluating the 
overall incident handling process.  
It is noticed that the overall structure of the response model is similar to the one 
used in CSIR. This similarity supports one of the motivations of this project, which is to 
make inquiry into performance evaluation through the multi-disciplinary approach. It is 
interesting to find that in the above study the authors called for using performance 
indicators throughout the response cycle, but did not provide details on how to achieve 
that. This academic gap seems to be present in several disciplines, and the field of CSIR is 
among them as highlighted in Chapter One.  
In the domain of homeland security, the work of [103]  provides in-depth analysis 
of how to measure the preparedness of an emergency system. The study borrows its 
analysis methods from the field of reliability engineering and risk analysis, and offers a 
detailed study case on emergency response to chlorine release. The study was mainly 
interested in answering the following question: is it possible to predict the performance of 
an emergency response system for future events? In the context of this research, this could 
be mapped to the question of how to predict the performance of an incident response plan 
(CSIRP) before its execution. Proper understanding of the above question can enhance 
responders’ ability to resolve a common dilemma: what caused poor performance: poor 
planning or poor execution of the plan? 
 85 
 
The study is remarked with its genuineness. Previous methods for measuring 
preparedness can be categorized under two main models. The first model focuses on 
measuring the capacity of the response system like how many responders are available and 
how much equipment will be deployed. The study criticizes this model as providing 
measurement to the inputs of the system not the system itself. The second model focuses 
on examining the performance of the system through actual utilization of the capabilities 
to produce response outcomes. Exercises and simulations are used as methods of 
evaluation. Again, the focus here is on the outcomes of the system, not the system itself.  
The study provides another approach to measuring preparedness through what the 
authors called: “response reliability”. This metric questions how much confidence do 
responders have in the response system by measuring the likelihood that the response 
system performs well. Stated in other terms: what is the likelihood that events that prevent 
the system from performing well will not occur? 
The study offers a four step model to measure response reliability (1) define and 
map the system (2) identify failure modes (3) assess probability of occurrence (4) assess 
effects and severity. Events are classified based on scale, scope and complexity, then the 
system is tested to  determine the level in which the response plan may perform well in it 
but may not perform as expected above it. 
The details of how chlorine release could be effectively handled and the statistical 
techniques used to test the equipment are not directly relevant to CSIRT. However, the 
study does offer an important insight which is to study the preparedness through the system 
inputs, outputs and system reliability. The current best practices in CSIR advises 
responders to suggest Plan B for what might not work well during the response. For 
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example, a CSIRP should have list of secondary contacts to be reached if primary contacts 
were unreachable [12]. If the reliability dimension is added to the analysis of the response 
system, the system capability would be better captured and performance could be projected 
accordingly.   
Managing critical incident responses on the national level in domains of natural 
disasters and terrorism were studied in [104]. The authors properly observe the need for 
distinguishing the management of a single incident from the management of several 
simultaneous incidents. To the best of my knowledge, this distinction is never made in the 
published works in the area of computer incident response (CIR), as the focus is on single 
incidents and the situation of multiple simultaneous incidents is not addressed. As the scale 
and complexity of breaches is on the rise, this issue deserves more attention, not only in 
the context of government agencies, but also in the corporate domain. A comprehensive 
study on protecting national infrastructure from cyber-attacks [112] properly notes that: “it 
is unlikely that a large organization would not have simultaneous attack scenario to face”. 
The authors also decry the fact that “the notion of managing simultaneous response cases 
is largely unexplored in conventional computer security”.  
Another point raised by [104] is the call for the use of performance monitoring such 
that performance evaluation is viewed as a continuous management task that lasts 
throughout the life cycle of the incident response. The basic practice in CSIR views 
performance evaluation as a post-response activity. Although it is not necessary to provide 
continuous monitoring of CSIRT’s performance during a response, it is valid to consider 
observing performance at different stages of the response. However, this should be applied 
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cautiously as the overhead of continuous performance monitoring could hinder the core 
duties of the CSIRT.  
Since one of the factors that impact the performance of a CSIRT’s performance is 
the ability of the team members to interact with each other, enhancing performance through 
investigating team dynamics was presented in a recent study (July 2015) [97]. The study 
observes that there are three fields in which the responders act very similar to CSIRTs. The 
three fields are: emergency medical systems (EMS), military response (MR) and nuclear 
power plant operating (NPPO) teams. The authors investigated these fields to develop a 
model for boosting the performance of CSIRTs through enhancing the team dynamics. 
The above study proposed a five-factor model for improving IR teams 
effectiveness. The five factors are: (1) adaptation (2) collective problem solving (3) trust 
(4) communication (5) shared knowledge of expertise.  
The adaptation refers to the team’s ability to efficiently perform under unexpected 
situations. The study suggests adopting two adaptation modules from the military domain: 
perturbation training and stress exposure training (SET). In perturbation training, trainees 
are put in simulated scenarios which are similar to real-life scenarios. The simulation is 
then repeated several times, in which the trainers disable one of the relied upon resources 
(e.g. access to phones or internet) to investigate how the team adapt to this unexpected 
event. Studies have shown teams exposed to this training outperform other teams by 13%. 
The second training module, the SET protocol in the military, aims at providing individuals 
with cognitive and behavior skills that help team members maintain effective performance 
under stressful conditions. The authors also suggested two other training modules from the 
EMS and MR fields to enhance the coordination of team members to solve problems 
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together.  I expect the above training modules to be excellent resources for CSIRTs, 
especially those operating in the national level or within very large companies. To avoid 
high costs associated with such training, it is necessary for the organization and the CSIRT 
team to identify sources of weak of performance and provide backed evidence from 
previous responses on the need to enhance team effectiveness through such training 
modules.  
The issue of enhancing team communication is nevertheless an important aspect of 
team dynamics that is less costly but can reflect on tangible enhancements of team 
performance. The above study highlights that effective communication demands sending 
messages that are accurate, relevant and timely. To achieve that the study suggests three 
main methods. The first is to conduct a brief strategy meeting before starting a response. 
In the military, a 10-minute before start meeting enhanced team communication by 33%. 
The second method is to use uniform and brief sheets to communicate information when 
doing hand-offs, i.e. transferring a task from one person to another and from one team to 
another. In EMS, the use of mnemonics during handoffs decreased errors by 65%. The 
third method is using regular briefings during the response, similar to the one-to-four 
minutes briefings conducted in EMS. In these meetings nurses, surgeons, trainees and 
anesthesiologists communicate updates to an operation using checklists and very brief 
messages. This has shown to reduce communication failures by 64%.  These simple and 
costless techniques can be adopted by CSIRT for better collaborative execution of CSIRPs.   
Another recent doctoral dissertation (August, 2016) [102] investigated the role of 
volunteers in enhancing the performance of the response of emergency teams to complex 
incidents. The research focused on responses to earthquakes by analyzing online groups 
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formed during the Haiti (2010) and Japan (2011) earthquakes and then testing the proposed 
findings during the Nepal earthquake (2015). The study found that communications 
resulting from volunteer-based online participatory groups were essential in enhancing 
effectiveness of the responses.  
An in-depth theoretical and empirical study of the relationship between the formal 
organization response and the response conducted by online volunteers was presented. The 
study also highlighted that validating the credibility of information disseminated through 
online groups remains a challenge. The study ends with an important remark about the need 
to view incident response in the networked and digital era in different lens that transcends 
the current confined method to organizational response. From that perspective, it would be 
an interesting research work to investigate the role that online groups can play in CSIR. It 
is a double-edge sword. From one aspect, insights from bloggers and posts from security 
experts can bring important clues on responding to critical incidents. However, it is also 
possible that these posts are also read by the breaches themselves which can complicate 
the on-going breach.   
2.2.3 Performance Indicators and Metrics 
Watts Humphrey, a pioneer in software engineering said [113]: “quality 
management is impossible without quality measures and quality data.”. In the performance 
evaluation literature, the tools developed for measuring the quality of management and 
data are referred to as performance indicators and performance metrics. There is a variety 
of uses for the terms: “indicator” and “metric” across the disciplines and within each 
discipline. For example, the two terms can be distinguished by the methods used, e.g. 
qualitative and quantitative, where indicators are qualitative measures and metrics are 
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quantitative, or vice versa. The terms also appear in various taxonomical order, sometimes 
indicators higher than metrics and sometimes the reverse order is used. Several works also 
use the terms interchangeably. However, despite the nuances both terms are used to reflect 
some form of measurement of a quality property. To avoid confusion, and within the 
context of this section, the two terms are left to their usage within each surveyed article, 
which might not necessarily conform to the definition outlined in Section 1.4.2.  
There are numerous works that explore how to model and develop performance 
indicators and performance metrics for incident response systems. Focus will be on studies 
that provide methods for derivation and classification of performance indicators and 
metrics. In addition, some works that propose performance metrics that could be relevant 
to the area of CSIR will be surveyed. 
The US Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) conducted a five year study to propose a comprehensive list of 
performance indicators that measure the performance of Emergency Medical Service 
(EMS) [96]. Performance indicators were classified into seven categories: (1) system 
design and structure (2) human resources (3) clinical care outcome (4) response (5) 
finance/funding (6) quality management (7) community demographics. Each performance 
indicator (PI) is derived from a “Question” that captures some aspect of EMS, and each PI 
is mapped to one of three measurement types: structure, process and outcome.  The type of 
dispatch system is an example of structure, percentage of patients receiving a specific 
treatment is an example of process, and the difference of first and last pain scale values is 
an example of outcome metric. 
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Question A question in which an answer provides an aspect of the EMS.  
PI Name Name of performance indicator 
Process Path Which process and sub-process does the PI reflect 
Patient Need What patient need does PI reflect 
Type Measurement Type Structure, process or outcome 
Objective Why is this PI useful 
Formula The equation for the calculation of the PI 
Sampling Is sampling used? If yes, what is the sampling process 
# data points Minimum number of data points needed to calculate the PI 
Format Reporting format: Numerical or graphical 
Testing 
Formal structured evaluation of the PI (e.g. reliability, validity, 
difficulty of data collection)  
Contributors List of persons and organizations used in development of the PI 
Current 
Status 
Current development status: Amount of work completed to date 
relative to the final implementation of the PI 
Table 8: Format for describing performance indicators in the field of EMS 
The study captures EMS performance through 18 questions and 35 indicators. The 
study also develops a comprehensive method for describing performance indicators in a 
format that contains 24 “agreed upon” fields. A brief description of the main fields is 
presented in Table 8. 
Another method for classifying performance indicators, which is used in several 
incident response systems [93] [23] [114], is  borrowed from the field of economics [115]. 
Performance indicators are classified into three categories: leading, coincident and lagging 
indicators. A leading indicator measures the inputs, coincident indicators measure the 
system while running, and lagging indicators measure the outputs of the system 
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performance. In [93], the study observed that most metrics currently used in the field of 
computer security can be classified as lagging indicators.  
It is noticed that the difference between the above classification method and the one 
presented in [96] is only in terminology. Leading indicators are similar to PIs that measure 
the “structure”, coincident PIs are similar to PIs that measure the “process” and lagging PIs 
are similar to PIs that measure the output.   
The classification of indicators into leading, lagging and coincident is more 
common in the performance evaluation literature. Nevertheless, classifying PIs based on 
their scope: structure, process and output is simpler and less technical. This might be 
appealing to the field of CSIR, as there are several non-technical stakeholders expected to 
interpret the performance evaluation findings. 
Another study classifies performance measurements based on their subjects [116]. 
Measurements can relate to three different types of subjects: physical, ideal and social. The 
physical entities are the most common objects subject to measurement and they are 
confined by time and space. Ideal objects are theoretical objects that transcend time and 
space. Social objects are found within social constructions and are bound by time and 
space, like customer satisfaction. Using this classification, CSIR performance metrics 
would be mainly theoretical (security, impact) or social (team performance).  
A survey conducted by [117] studied the performance measurements used in the 
transportation and emergency services fields across the US. The survey found that 
“response time” was the main tool used by both fields, although there was wide variance 
in how various agencies interpreted and defined “response time”. It was also found that 
performance measurements was used for different purposes. In the transportation field, 
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performance measurements aimed at measuring the effectiveness of the overall incident 
management system, while in emergency services it was used as a resource management 
tool for allocating staff and equipment.  
There are three relevant findings of the above survey worth highlighting. First, the 
survey found that all agencies did not create a separate cost budget for planning, monitoring 
and analyzing performance. All agencies treated performance evaluation as an integrated 
activity in the incident management system. Second, it was found that only one eighth of 
the agencies produced periodic performance reports. The rest stored the performance 
results in a database for access as needed. Finally, the study concluded that attempting to 
build “one-size-fits-all” approach to performance measurement is not feasible.  
This last finding is relevant to this project. The transportation incidents demonstrate 
high similarity between incidents compared to the wide variance displayed in computer 
security incidents. If it is infeasible to build a unified PE model for systems like 
transportation, this would be extended to the discipline of CSIR.  
A categorization of metrics for service level agreements (SLA) is provided in [83]. 
An SLA is a legal contract document that governs the relationship between a service 
provider with a customer. The document outlines the characteristics of the Quality of 
service (QoS) that the service provider is committed to deliver [118], along with remedial 
actions and penalties when the provider fails to keep up to the promised QoS.  
In [83], performance metrics are viewed in, what the study calls, a multi-
dimensional manner. Three dimensions were defined: service objects, ITIL processes and 
measurability. With regards to the first dimension of service objects, the study identifies 
five basic IT object classes: Hardware, Software, Network, Storage and Help Desk. A list 
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of metrics for each object class, with a total of 45 metrics were given. Example metrics 
include: failure frequency, maximum down-time, availability, failure categorization degree 
and total service time.  
The second dimension uses performance metrics for the eleven ITIL components. 
The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) [119] is an industry standard for 
IT service management focusing on utilizing resources and enhancing services. The eleven 
levels, derived from ITIL v2 are: (1) service desk (2) incident management (3) problem 
management (4) configuration management (5) change management (6) service level 
management (7) service level management (8) capacity management (9) availability 
management (10) IT Service Continuity management (11) financial management. The third 
dimension, measurability, refers to the ability to automate the metric measurements. Three 
levels were defined: measurable, limited measurability and no measurability.  
Studying metrics within in the SLA domain is relevant to CSIR. Indeed, CSIR can 
be viewed as a special type of service between the CSIRT and the organization, or as a 
special management process within the ITIL framework. Since the field of IT management 
is very mature and has gone through several standardizations, the experience of developing 
metrics offers a good source for CSIR performance metric development. In the above 
study, the issue of automating metric measurements stands out as relevant. This 
classification goes beyond the simple categorization of qualitative and quantitative metrics, 
to questioning the ability to automate the measurement and the analysis of results. Since 
CSIRTs work under stressful environments, the automation of collecting and measuring 
performance metrics would allow the team to focus on their main duties with little overhead 
for performance evaluation. Other than that, the concept of multi-dimension presented 
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above is another fancy method of defining the attributes of performance metrics. The three 
dimensions can be mapped to the scope, objective and measurement method of the metric.  
Two articles in the area of petroleum engineering [23] [105] addressed the issue of 
incident response in the domain of information security. In [23], the authors provided a list 
of performance indicators for incident response management. The paper derived the 
indicators from studies on safety management and from interviews with leaders of the 
Norwegian Oil and gas industry. The focus of the study was on the performance of 
management, i.e. the performance of the incident response system over a period of time in 
which several incidents took place.  
The contribution of the above study of relevance to the proposed project is the 
discussion on how to evaluate performance indicators, i.e. how to know if the developed 
PIs are “good”? The study suggests five “metrics” to achieve that: 
(1) being observable and quantifiable 
(2) offers valid measurements 
(3) sensitive to change 
(4) compatible with other indicators 
(5) simplicity  
As the CSIR field works for developing its own performance evaluation 
frameworks, it is essential to ensure that the process of the design and derivation of 
performance indicators and metrics is sound. Metrics can be viewed as strong weapons that 
will be used to influence executive and financial decisions. If these metrics are not well 
designed and correctly used, it could lead to counter impacts on the organization. To avoid 
ambiguity, “metrics” used to evaluate the soundness of PIs and PE metrics will be called: 
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“meta-metrics”, a terminology adopted by several studies in software engineering [120] 
[121] and in computer security [122] [123] .  
A study in the area of natural disasters [101] provided a list of metrics for describing 
incidents and assessing potential responses. Three metrics were proposed for describing a 
natural disaster and eight metrics to measure the effectiveness of the response. These 
metrics were designed to be used in computer simulation scenarios, but partially could be 
applied to real world scenarios.  
One metric which stands out as relevant to this project is stability. In the context of 
natural disasters, stability measures the percentage of causalities per injury type whose 
condition worsens after being identified by the response team. It also records the 
percentage of causalities that were not identified by the response team. In the CSIR domain, 
the above measurement can be viewed through number of “breached” resources instead of 
causalities. In an ideal scenario, once a CSIRT identifies an incident, the process of 
containment should start and the incident should not cause further damage. This means that 
both the identification and containment processes should be perfect, which is practically 
very difficult to achieve. Since escalations are possible, if not common, the stability metric 
offers insights on its magnitudes and potential reasons for its occurrence. One simple 
method to achieve this is to record stability through recording the escalation or de-
escalation of attack severity throughout the response process. This could be easily 
incorporated in CSIRPs as there have clear guidelines on how to define various categories 
of severity levels.  
An article that investigates issues relevant to response to terrorist attacks [124], 
highlights three aspects that can significantly impact the effectiveness of the response. The 
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first is “just in time logistics”, which refers to the ability of responders to arrive at the scene 
precisely when needed. The second is “situational awareness” which could be provided to 
responders through data collected from early warnings. The third is: “enhanced situational 
awareness” which provides responders with better decision making capabilities.  
A study in the field of transportation engineering [77] investigates the performance 
of response teams to traffic incidents in the Portland (Washington State, USA) metro area. 
The study aims at studying how much the implementation of the current Portland freeway 
IR system contribute to the reduction of cost resulting from traffic delays and congestions 
caused by traffic incidents.  Jumping over the technical details which are specific to 
freeway traffic, highlighting the mapping between cost reduction and the performance 
evaluation of the response teams is noteworthy. The authors noted that it is very difficult 
to create a dollar value to benefits of implementing performance evaluation.  
It is estimated that 50% of the US highway congestion is caused by accidents. 
Through “faster” incident response, several benefits could be achieved like: reduced delay, 
reduced fuel consumption, improved flow of commerce, reduced harm to wildlife and 
water quality and improved public relations and good will. It is obvious that not all of these 
could be quantifiable in terms of cost, and hence the focus of the performance of the 
response team is on reducing the response time. The current cost of the response program 
is $750,000 and the cost of the performance monitoring system is $75,000. The authors 
argue that the success of a performance evaluation system is based on cost, i.e. does cost 
reduction exceeds the implementation cost of the system. For example, it was noted that 
faster response times resulted in cost reduction of annual vehicle hour delay by 13,000 
hours which is mapped to cost savings of nearly $200,000.  
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In the field of CSIR, determining how performance evaluation could be mapped to 
cost reduction remains an open question. Although it is intuitive that faster response times 
to cybersecurity incidents lead to several benefits, there are no current studies that map the 
response time to cost reduction. It also poses as a more complex question compared to road 
traffic. For example, it is relatively simple to map the response time of a denial of service 
attack on an online store through calculating the average cost of purchases per minute. 
However, this is more challenging when an attack involves having access to customer 
private data, e.g. social security numbers and credit card numbers. It is very complex to 
map how a unit time in incident response would map to cost reduction. Therefore, it would 
be more suitable to use other factors besides cost. For instance, number of affected 
customers and the importance of the breached data should be used.  
It is beyond the scope of this project to provide an empirical correlation between 
response performance and cost reduction. Nevertheless, the proposed PE framework can 
be viewed as an important milestone in the path of conducting more rigorous studies on 
that front.   
2.3 Discussion and Lessons Learnt 
2.3.1 State of the Art of PE in CSIR 
Main Advancements of CSIR 
The field of CSIR has undergone several important advancements in the past two 
decades. Three of these advancements are worth mentioning. The first is overcoming the 
obstacle of getting the community support to engage in the development and 
implementation of CSIR. Today, the vast majority of governments and corporates have 
well-formed CSIRTs and outlined CSIRPs. Although the preparedness of these CSIRTs 
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vary from one place to another, there is a common acknowledgement of the importance of 
CSIRT and that the cost of functioning without one exceeds the costs allocated to having 
CSIR capability. It took much efforts from various experts in the field to convince 
executives and government policy makers to adopt organized CSIR processes, but also the 
damage caused by various cyber-attacks provided unopposed reality that signaled to 
managers that they cannot remain unprepared.  
The second advancement is the development of several standards and industry 
documentations for the structuring and operation of CSIRTs. These documents not only 
facilitate implementation, but also engage the academic and professional communities in 
important discussions about issues of importance to the development of CSIR. 
The third advancement is yet to ripe, but seems to be going in the right direction. It 
is the collaboration and sharing of information between various CSIRTs. The reality of the 
interconnected complex internet, in which cyber threats spread and impact all, mandates 
that all parties interested in security should have strong collaborations and timely robust 
exchange of information. With the current structure and activities of FIRST, the field is 
heading towards the right direction. However, investigating the bureaucracy and lack of 
effective communication between various government bodies is only one example of the 
amount of work that needs to be done before celebrating this advancement.  
Focus on Preparation and Planning 
In the past decade, discussion about the quality of CSIR performance started to 
appear. Prior to that, the field was immersed in laying out the main structures, procedures 
and processes needed for establishing CSIR capabilities. As of now, the field has passed 
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debating about the benefits of integrating PE in the CSIR process. Many publications now 
consider PE as an embedded element of the CSIR process [1] [22] [73][25] [61] [41] [74].  
Nevertheless, the field seems to focus on the preparation and performance 
readiness, which is a pre-activity that aims at enhancing performance through better 
planning. Examples of efforts in that direction include reviewing CSIRPs for completeness 
and offering training to CSIRT members for better coordination and team work. Indeed, 
that direction of research is of high value to the development of the field and offers several 
operational recommendations for CSIRTs.  
What seems to be lacking is discussing post-activity performance evaluation. For 
instance, the need for developing performance metrics is acknowledged, but discussion 
about what these metrics are, how they could be used and the analysis methods to be used 
is scarce.  
This emphasis on pre-incident compared to post-incident performance evaluation 
can be due to four factors. First, the CSIR field has developed the culture that successful 
response is a product of extensive planning. Therefore, it is natural that discussion about 
performance is done in the planning stage. Indeed, most responders spend most of their 
time in preparation compared to actual response, so evaluation is directed towards where 
most resources are devoted [7]. Second, it is possible that many organizations have 
integrated CSIRPE into their existing quality management system and which has a 
repository of performance measurement techniques. Third, it is possible that many CSIRTs 
have developed their PE analysis performs and pools of performance metrics. However, 
due to the security nature of the field, little has been shared with the public. Finally, it might 
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be due to the natural evolution of the field, in which the need for performance evaluation 
tools became meaningful only when completing the planning and structuring processes.     
The Challenge of Developing Security Metrics 
As the development of performance metrics of CSIR highly depend on security 
metrics, the literature of security metrics needs to be studied thoroughly. The challenges 
highlighted by [34], were acknowledged along with additional challenges by several later 
studies like [125] and [126].   It is noticed that some of these challenges are intrinsic to the 
nature of studying security, like the element of uncertainty. I believe that such challenges 
will always be present, regardless of the advancements to be made. Such challenges can be 
termed as static challenges. In order to address static challenges, the research community 
would need to establish balanced protocols for developing, analyzing and later 
benchmarking data resulting from security metrics. Perhaps, the aspect to be given more 
attention should be the trade-offs between validity and practicality. By analyzing the CSIR 
literature, I endorse the current practice that grants precedence to practicality over 
validation because being operational is a resilient characteristic of computer security. 
However, there should be some minimum criteria for validation of metrics and data 
generated from them. This could be achieved by enforcing a meta-metric that specifies the 
confidence or the trust-level of the measurements obtained through these metrics. The 
model presented in [42] is an example of such research direction.   
The other aspect of these challenges is dynamic and could be tackled with further 
advancements in the field. For example, the complexity of intermixed perspectives to 
analyze security metrics could be managed with careful design of multi-dimensional 
analysis platforms that are built on various perspectives. The same could be applied to the 
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challenge of having conflicting objectives based on the requirements of various 
constituencies. Although the field is slowly consulting other fields for solutions like quality 
management, game theory and process management in industrial engineering, it is a matter 
of time until the field develops its own customized platforms of analysis.  However, 
investigating the security metrics literatures makes the author to agree the following remark 
put forward by [42], which states: “It is anticipated that refining and adjusting the concepts 
of computer security assessment may take decades and in fact is a challenge for the entire 
generation”.  
2.3.2 Lessons Learnt from Other Fields 
Absence of generic methodologies 
It is noticed that the various disciplines developed their own solutions to the 
challenges they faced when developing and conducting IRPE. These solutions are normally 
customized to the needs of the discipline in the form of models that suit the nature of the 
problem. This explains why the field of performance of incident response does not have 
generic models that are applied across the spectrum of various disciplines.  
The lack of generic methods and models put the area of Incident Response 
Performance Evaluation (IRPE) in contrast to other areas of PE which develop and produce 
generic methods. For example, in computer networking, measuring the performance of a 
network is measured in tools like throughput, link utilization and packet delay. Scheduling 
mechanisms and queuing models are developed to enhance performance. Most of these 
models are generic and are used across various disciplines within and outside of computer 
science. This creates much interaction between these disciplines in terms of sharing ideas 
and borrowing solutions. This is different than the current state of art in IRPE in which 
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each discipline seems to be operating in its own world with minimum interaction with the 
other disciplines.  
Two questions arise: why does IRPE lack generic methods despite the extensive 
work done in various disciplines? And can such generic methods be developed. A possible 
explanation of the point raised by the first question is that the various IR disciplines have 
different objectives. For example, the main objective of medical IR is to minimize death 
and human pain, which is different than environmental IR which is to minimize 
environmental destruction. Both of medical and environmental IR are also different from 
help desk incident response which aims at increasing average customer satisfaction. Such 
unique objectives might have created a perception that the addressed problems are distinct 
and implicitly pushed against collaboration between these disciplines.  
This leads us to the second question, in which I would answer by leaning towards 
the possibility of developing common models. It is true that the field of IR is very diverse 
which impacts how PE solutions are developed, but this does not eliminate the fact that 
there are various similarities that could be deduced from analyzing these disciplines. For 
example, all incident responders, regardless of their discipline, are interested in achieving 
faster response time. This does not conflict with the fact that each field has its own 
definition of response time that fits its context. I believe that some generic models could 
be developed to enhance team formation, incident declaration and management of major 
activities in the response cycle. The same could be said about enhancing the 
communications between responders during an incident and effective assessment of harm 
in a manner that transcends variance in team dynamics and types of harm.  
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To the best of my knowledge there is no generic work that discusses the main 
features and general solutions to performance evaluation in the context of IR. Also, as 
interest is rising with regards to conducting multidisciplinary research in the area of IR, 
this should be encouraged and pursued more seriously. It can be expected that findings 
from such research direction would be rewarding to all of these disciplines.  
The Challenge of Complexity 
It is observed, as stated in Section 2.2.1, that the two major umbrellas for challenges 
in the discipline of IRPE are complexity and unpredictability. Both of these challenges also 
pose as serious challenges to the field of CSIR. Complexity here refers to the presence of 
numerous contentious factors in the IR process which a CSIRT need to address at the same 
time, while none of these factors can be eliminated during the IR process.  
There are several factors that contribute to complexity. For example, as the storage 
space of machines is on the increase and as networks are on high speeds, the amount of 
data present for analysis is gigantic. A responder can neither ignore gigabytes of log files 
nor neglect the scanning of a significantly large volumes of disk space for remnants of a 
breach. In that regard, scanning for a software bug in code with tens of thousands of lines 
is a relatively simpler task than the task of a CSIRT. Another analogy that demonstrates 
the complexity of a CSIRT operation, is to think of a medical doctor examining a patient 
suffering from a virus. Doctors normally need to examine the symptoms and recommend 
medications to counter these symptoms. Imagine if the doctor need to investigate how the 
patient came in contact with the virus before prescribing medications. There are thousands 
of possibilities and the prescription of medications become a complex process compared 
to focusing on confining the virus and treating the symptoms, regardless of its source. Most 
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CSIRTs need to properly assess the source of the incident and propose solutions at the same 
time, which is a non-trivial task. 
The Challenge of Unpredictability 
The element of unpredictability refers to the observation that regardless of how 
much preparation is being made, the element of surprise is always present. In the field of 
CSIR, examples of factors that contribute to unpredictability include the fast-paced 
development of new attack trends and compromise strategies, the difficult of distinguishing 
between false alarms and actual threat indicators, and the scaling power of cyber-attacks 
which lead to incident escalation.  
The survey found that solutions developed by various disciplines to the challenge 
of uncertainty can be mapped to the following five main categories of solutions:  
1- Designing probabilistic schemes that rely on measuring system reliability [91] 
and predicting response reliability [103] 
2- Using confidence ratings to various decisions taken by the responders [42] [73] 
3- Analyzing common threat trends and mechanisms and developing measures to 
confine variances and deduce similarities [106] 
4- Producing response plans that demonstrates completeness [74] 
5- Ensuring that responders are trained and demonstrate competency to carry 
response duties [76] [61] 
The above five solutions can be further summarized into two main categories: 
preparedness and decision making capabilities in nondeterministic environments. These 
two strategies would be the basis of a framework to address the issue of unpredictability in 
CSIR which will be presented in Section 5.5.  
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Note that the term ‘nondeterministic’ is used here differently from how the term is 
used in computer algorithms [127], in which a nondeterministic algorithm  is one that may 
produces different outputs for the same input, or that produces different outputs based on 
the enumeration of the set of inputs.  
In addition, I argue that CSIR unpredictability is broader than systems that can be 
modeled through Markovian and stochastic processes. In Markov modeling [128], the 
system is modeled through states, and transition to the next state is made by probabilistic 
distributions based on the current available information. On the other hand, IR 
unpredictability exhibit different inputs that may lead to unknown new states, and 
consequently the output states may not be outlined through probabilistic distributions. 
Therefore, nondeterministic models can be as assisting analytical tools not as system 
models.  
It is probably the field of decision making in economics and management that may 
provide viable recommendations to CSIR. The field discusses nondeterministic scenarios 
which managers might be faced with and provide analytical tools that can guide future 
decisions [129]. These tools normally rely on associating risks in the form of probabilities 
with possible decisions, but may also use other non-probabilistic approaches [130]. 
Approaches that use such techniques will be referred to as Non-Deterministic Decision 
Making (NDDM) models.     
Is it possible to fully capture the performance of an IR system? 
Before conducting the survey, it was anticipated to find a well formulated list of 
performance metrics that fully capture the incident response performance, especially in the 
fields like medical emergency which have long practical legacy. However, this proved to 
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be an over simplification of the nature of incident response. It is noticed from the surveyed 
studies in various disciplines that there was no single study that claimed to provide an 
exhaustive list of performance metrics that fully assess the effectiveness of the response. 
Instead, the surveyed studies followed one of two approaches to performance design. In 
the first approach, an incident response system is analyzed to deduce the main duties and 
then design performance metrics focusing on these major activities. The other approach is 
to isolate a specific activity or mode of interaction within the incident response system and 
subject it to extensive review for proper performance measurement. In both approaches, 
there are aspects of the system which are not subject to performance measurement.    
There is something to learn from the above experiences. Instead of attempting to 
provide precise and complete performance evaluation systems for CSIR, the focus should 
be shifted towards proper identification of aspects in the response system which need to be 
subjected to performance analysis for potential improvement. Expecting precise and 
complete performance evaluation is both expensive and impractical. Thus, the field should 
ask the following two questions: “what aspects of CSIR should be subjected to performance 
evaluation?” and “how precise the measurements should be?”.  
Simple Factors with High Impact 
The literature review of both the CSIR and IRPE suggests that there are some 
factors that need to be thoroughly examined by those interested in developing PE models 
for CSIR. These factors can be easily confused to be simple and easy to handle, but 
practically they are complex to measure and analyze. For example, estimating financial 
loss due to an incident is a very difficult task contrary to how it appears. For example, 
estimating financial loss due to a vehicle accident is not only limited to damages to vehicles 
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involved in the accident. The financial assessment needs to include estimations of financial 
loss due to traffic delays which is not a simple task. The same extends to CSIR as estimation 
financial loss should take account of non-trivial factors like customer trust, privacy 
violation and public perception.  
In Table 9, four issues are identified. These issues are highlighted to be non-trivial 
tasks of IR as discussed by various disciplines. It is expected that these four challenges will 
also be non-trivial to the field of CSIR.   
Issue Description 
Threat 
Assessment 
How can the actual threat of reported events be precisely 
assessed? Under which threat level should the incident be 
classified?  
Harm 
Estimation 
At the end of the IR process, how can the actual caused damage 
be measured?  
Communication 
Effectiveness 
As any IR involves high volume of communication between 
internal and external members, how can the communication 
effectiveness be measured? 
Overall 
Performance 
Since no single performance metric can be used to measure the 
effectiveness of an IR, how can the results obtained from various 
metrics be used to provide an overall assessment?  
Table 9: Summary of Factors with high impact on CSIR performance evaluation 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical aspects associated with developing 
frameworks and models for evaluating the performance of a computer security incident 
response (CSIR) capability. The design considerations and possible development and 
functional models are discussed. The chapter can be viewed as a design guide that an 
organization can use to develop its own performance evaluation framework, from the early 
stages of planning to the actual integration of the framework into the CSIRP. It also can be 
viewed as a research map of the issues pertaining to CSIRPE that deserve the attention of 
researchers in the field.  
The framework design presented in this chapter is not an extension of a specific 
work or model. It is a result of the synthesis of the large volume of works surveyed in 
Chapter 2, both within the field of CSIR and in the other disciplines. It is also guided by 
the feedback received from professionals in the field about the current practices in the 
industry. Whenever possible, references will be provided in support of the selected design 
choices or when further extensions of the discussion are required. However, because the 
chapter addresses plentiful of issues more emphasis is put on the presentation of the 
framework components compared to expansion of various possibilities.  
The chapter is composed of six sections. The first section provides an overview of 
the main components used for describing and constructing a CSIR performance evaluation 
framework. It also highlights the relationships existing between these components 
providing a holistic perspective to the development process. The second section presents 
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the conceptual assumptions of how CSIR is understood for the purposes of this project. 
The following four sections provide details for each of the four development phases, where 
section three addresses the first phase about designing the CSIRPE framework through 
setting parameters and layout strategies and policies; section four describes how to 
formally define a CSIRPE model through defining PE goals, PE aspects and performance 
indicators; section five tackles the issue of measuring performance by discussing 
performance metrics, analysis methods and validation methods; and the sixth and final 
section discusses implementation considerations.  
3.1 Framework Overview 
3.1.1 Framework Components 
In order for an organization to develop a computer security incident response 
performance evaluation (CSIRPE) framework, the organization needs to go through 
several planning and implementation stages. These stages can be captured in eleven main 
steps, grouped under four major development phases, as depicted in Figure 8. Each of these 
steps are referred to as a CSIRPE framework component, or as a PE development step.  
Below is a brief description for these eleven components:  
1. Design Parameters: Generic parameters which values significantly impact the 
environment in which PE will be introduced. These parameters can be 
perceived as factors that can produce various types of PE frameworks.  
2. Strategies & Policies:  Approaches to address the issue of PE within the context 
of CSIR, which are not delimited by simple values. This include paradigms of 
understanding PE, strategies for addressing CSIRPE and generic policies that 
are necessary for any successful PE design.  
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Figure 8: CSIR Performance evaluation framework Components 
3. Performance Evaluation (PE) Goals: The process of defining the performance 
evaluation goals in terms of what ideally should be achieved and the 
performance needs of the CSIRT 
4. Performance Evaluation (PE) Aspects: Identifying parts of the CSIR system 
that need to be subjected to performance measurement 
5. Performance Indicators (PIs): Identifying the desired performance qualities of 
the system, and factors that determine the quality of the response 
6. Performance Metrics (PMs): The process of deriving and defining 
measurement tools for assessing various performance indicators 
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7. Performance Evaluation Analysis Models: The selection of analysis 
methodologies for how performance evaluation metrics results need to be 
interpreted to reflect the performance of the response.  
8. Performance Validation Models: The process of ensuring that the performance 
measurements are valid and that it will result in correctional activities that 
enhance performance.  
9. PE Functional Models: Models that determine how performance evaluation 
activities will be integrated into the incident response life cycle.  
10. Roles and Responsibilities: The process of outlining tasks and assigning 
performance evaluation responsibilities among the response teams 
11. CSIRP Integration: The process of integrating the designed performance 
evaluation model into the response plan, i.e. CSIRP.  
3.1.2 Framework Development Process 
The eleven framework components can be conceptualized as a product life-cycle 
process starting from a generic performance evaluation framework to a final output of a 
performance evaluation model implemented in a specific environment. A depiction of this 
development process is presented in Figure 9. A description of the inputs and outputs of 
the various development stages is presented below: 
Below is a description of the inputs and outputs for the seven components: 
 CSIR Capability: A computer security incident response capability adopted by 
an organization, that appears in the form of a CSIRT and an approved CSIRP, 
which lacks mechanisms and tools for measuring the performance effectiveness 
of incident handling.   
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 CSIRPE Framework: A performance evaluation framework customized 
through specific values of the design parameters and governed by formulated 
strategies and policies to suit the nature and needs of a specific environment.  
 
Figure 9: Performance Evaluation Framework Components Relationships 
 Abstract CSIRPE Model: A theoretical model derived from a predefined 
framework, that outlines why and what needs to be evaluated within a specific 
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environment. The model is abstract as practical tools that specify how the 
evaluation will be carried are absent.   
 PE Metrics List: A list of performance metrics, i.e. performance measurement 
tools, produced to be integrated into a predefined Abstract PE Model.  
 Operational CSIRPE Model: a practical model for performance measurement 
that have defined objectives and operational mechanisms for how these 
objectives will be achieved in a specific environment 
 Performance Evaluation Model: The final product of the performance 
evaluation design process which appears in the form of a model equipped with 
clear objectives, measurement tools and implementation guidelines.  
The following four sections will examine each step of the development process. To 
enable accessible referencing to various aspects of each framework component, the codes 
introduced in Table 10 will be used for the rest of this dissertation.  
Code Category Code Category 
A._ Assumption M._ Metric Design Parameter 
D._ Design Parameter N._ Analysis Model 
F._ Functional Model S._ Strategy 
PI._ Performance Indicator V._ Validation Model 
Table 10: Framework Components Codes 
3.2 Assumptions 
Since there are various understandings about the nature of CSIR and the tasks 
assigned to CSIRTs, the basic assumptions about how CSIR and the environment in which 
 115 
 
CSIRTs operate as understood in this project are outlined in this section. These 
assumptions are referred to as CSIR assumptions, and are summarized in Table 11.  
# Name Description 
A1.1 
Civilian 
Environment 
The CSIRT operates in a non-cyberwar environment in 
which responses are limited to defense compared to a 
defense-counterattack model 
A1.2 
Team 
Structure 
The CSIRT is composed of at least two members, compared 
to an individual tasked with handling IR responsibilities 
A1.3 
Incident 
Complexity 
Incidents demonstrate some complexity and impact beyond 
simple security incidents 
A1.4 
Incident 
Handling 
Services 
The CSIRT responsibilities are focused on incident 
handling response and only indirectly tasked with system 
security 
A1.5 
Computer 
Security 
Incidents 
The CSIRT is responsible for handling incidents with some 
security element compared to regular computer incidents 
A1.6 
CSIR 
Capability 
The organization either has an established process for 
handling computer security incidents or acknowledges the 
importance of CSIR and allocates reasonable financial and 
human resources.   
A1.7 
Secure 
Environment 
The CSIRT operates an environment that at least have 
minimum measures for securing the environment 
Table 11: Global CSIR Assumptions 
The main objective of presenting these assumptions is to alleviate any ambiguity 
on how CSIR is understood compared to the several understandings available in the 
literature. The assumptions can also be viewed analogous to environment assumptions that 
are normally presented before network models in the computer science literature. 
Below is a description of the seven assumptions.  
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A1.1. Civilian Environment 
It was argued in Section 2.1.1 that with Stuxnet, the field of CSIR is challenged 
with a serious level of sophistication. The issue of cyberwar, regardless of how it is defined, 
is extensively being discussed in the media, among security professionals and government 
officials. I anticipate that the field of CSIR will be distinctly split into civilian and military 
like domains, a reality which might have already taken place. The main distinction between 
the two domains is not limited to the scope level, i.e. major vs. minor incidents, but also 
extends to the operative method. Traditional CSIR works in defensive mode, while in 
cyberwar environments the mode of operation is defensive-offensive. For the scope of this 
project, it is assumed that the CSIR operates in a non-cyberwar environment.  
A1.2. Team Structure 
Although in some organizations, especially those of small size, CSIR handling can 
be delegated to a single individual, the reality of security threats mandate the involvement 
of a team in the incident handling. The field of CSIR acknowledges this fact by giving the 
term: CSIRT (CSIR Team) to responders to emphasize the collective and cooperative 
nature of the response. The NIST standard [9] highlights this aspect through the definition 
of a CSIRT which starts with: “A group of individuals”.  
Investigating the performance evaluation in a team context is more comprehensive 
than evaluating the performance of individuals. Perhaps, individual performance 
evaluation can be viewed as a sub-category of team performance evaluation.  
Estimations on the minimum needed number of team members vary. For example, 
the SANS publication of [131] considers the basic structure of a team to be of two dedicated 
CSIR members reporting to the CIO, and four support individuals are needed during the 
incident: network engineer, public relations, legal and human resources. A similar 
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argument is made by [26] for three full time members or 5+ part timers. In order to avoid 
being restrictive, the most stringent requirement for the number of responders put forward 
by some works like [67], which is two members, will be used. One of the members should 
have knowledge of the business and management structure of the organization, and the 
other of the IT and network infrastructure. Another way to view the two individuals as a 
team leader and a team member.  
Therefore, it is assumed that whenever the term CSIRT is used, the team consists 
of at least two members.   
A1.3. Incident Complexity 
 This assumption is presented here to emphasize the adopted definition of an 
incident as outlined in Section 1.4.1. An incident is assumed to demonstrate either a need 
for sophisticated and coordinated response or significant potential harm to the operations 
or the data of the organization.  
A1.4. Incident Handling Services 
  There is a wide range of services that a CSIRT can offer to an organization. The 
CERT document [2] classifies CSIRT services into three main categories: reactive, 
proactive and quality management; see Table 12. For the purposes of this project, the focus 
is on the performance quality of the reactive services of a CSIRT. This is consistent with 
the NIST document [1], page  23, which states: “It is outside the scope of this document to 
provide specific advice on securing networks, systems, and applications. Although incident 
response teams are generally not responsible for securing resources they can be advocates 
of sound security practices.” 
It is assumed that whenever performance evaluation is mentioned then it refers to 
the evaluation of services that are of reactive nature and directly relate to incident handling. 
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Proactive and quality management services are not considered part of the scope of the 
study. The evaluation of these services can be done through various existing performance 
evaluation tools, which are independent of the technical aspects of CSIR.  
Reactive Services Proactive Services 
Security Quality 
Management Services 
Incident Handling  
Incident analysis, IR on 
site, IR support, IR 
coordination) 
Announcements & Technology 
Watch 
Security related information 
dissemination 
Risk Analysis 
Business Continuity & 
Disaster Recovery 
Planning 
Vulnerability Handling 
(analysis, response, IR 
coordination) 
Security Audit & assessment 
Awareness building 
Education & Training 
Alerts & Warnings 
Artifact Handling 
(analysis, response, 
coordination) 
Development of security tools 
Configuration & maintenance 
of security infrastructure & 
tools 
Security consulting 
Product evaluation or 
certification 
Table 12: Summary of CSIRT services outlined in the CERT document 
A1.5. Computer Security Incidents 
 This assumption is put forward to support the definition of a computer incident 
provided in Section 1.4.1, which limits the scope to incidents of security nature. It also 
relieves ambiguity arising from other definitions of computer incidents that include general 
computer incidents or even non-computing incidents, like the definition used by the SANS 
publication of [132].  
A1.6. CSIR Capability 
  The development of CSIRPE assumes the pre-existence of a CSIR capability 
within an organization. If an organization lacks such capability, it is infeasible to discuss 
quality management and performance evaluation methodologies. However, the 
presentation of CSIRPE in this work would be of interest to an organization that lacks such 
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capability but is interested in developing one to be equipped with quality measures and PE 
capabilities. This would need to be reflected in allocation of sufficient funds, gaining 
management support, and the technical teams acknowledging the importance of 
incorporating PE as an element to the planning process.   
A1.7. Secure Environment 
 This assumption complements A1.6 by stressing the need for a pre-existing 
security measures within an organization that is interested in developing a CSIRPE. Having 
valid and enforceable security policies is a pre-condition for any effective implementation 
of any CSIRT [26] . The term “secure environment” is used loosely here to refer to the 
existence of some security measures in the environment that would enable CSIRTs to 
respond, like logs, IDS, malware detection tools …etc. With the absence of such measures, 
a CSIRT would be focusing on “securing” the system more than handling an incident, 
which is contention with A1.4.  
3.3  Phase I: Designing a CSIRPE Framework 
3.3.1 Setting Design Parameters 
At the early phase of constructing a performance evaluation framework for any 
given environment, there are important decisions to be made which shall shape how the 
whole framework is structured and developed. These decisions are formulated in this 
section in the form of design parameters to be presented to the CSIRT members engaging 
in the planning process. The way how these parameters is set will significantly impact the 
rest of the design process.  
The design parameters were selected such that the values of each parameter could 
possibly produce a different PE framework. For example, a PE framework that evaluates 
the performance of a centralized CSIRT demonstrates significant differences than a PE 
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framework for a distributed CSIRT. Similarly, a framework that evaluates incident 
handling of concurrent incidents has major considerations different than one that evaluates 
single incidents.  
# Parameter  Description Values 
D.1 CSIRT Type 
Will CSIRPE be applied to a 
centralized, distributed or a 
customized organizational CSIRT 
model? 
Centralized 
Distributed 
Customized 
D.2 
Evaluator 
Type 
Who is evaluating the CSIRT? Is 
it the CSIRT performing self-
assessment, an internal team 
within the organization, or an 
external auditor? 
CSIRT 
Internal  
External 
D.3 
Number of 
Incidents 
Does the PE model evaluates 
individual incidents, several 
incidents over a period of time, or 
both? 
Single-incident 
Multiple-incident 
Adjustable-window 
D.4 
Incident 
Concurrency 
Is the PE model applicable to 
single, simultaneous incidents, or 
both?  
Sequential 
Concurrent 
Elastic 
D.5 Analysis Time 
When will the CSIRPE be 
conducted and translated into 
corrective actions?  
Post-incident 
Continuous 
Incremental 
D.6 Benchmarking 
Will the performance evaluation 
results be used for benchmarking 
with results from other 
departments or institutions? 
Standalone 
Internal-Benchmarking 
External-Benchmarking 
D.7 
Measurement 
Type 
Will the performance model use 
quantitative, qualitative 
performance metrics or both? 
Quantitative 
Qualitative 
Both 
D.8 CSIRP Scope 
Does the PE framework evaluates 
the effectiveness of the plan 
design, plan execution or both? 
Design 
Execution 
Both 
Table 13: Framework Component 1: Design Parameters 
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A list of eight design parameters along with brief description is collected in Table 
13. Each design parameters is presented with several values, which can be viewed as 
performance design decisions to be made by the CSIRT. 
D.1. CSIRT Type 
  The way how a CSIRT is structured has an impact on how it would be evaluated. 
Therefore, the three structural models: centralized, distributed or coordinated will be 
mapped to three possibilities for performance frameworks. These frameworks will mainly 
differ in the selection of performance indicators, functional models and how analysis is 
conducted.   
 Practically, the two distinct performance frameworks are the centralized and the 
distributed. The coordinated model can be viewed as a customized model that derives its 
features from the two frameworks. To be more generic, the third value has been designated 
as: “customized” instead of “coordinated” to include other structural models that have 
features from both the centralized and distributed models.    
Compared to centralized framework, the distributed framework is expected to 
display the following distinctions:  
1. Coordination Effectiveness: Major part of the performance measurement would 
focus on measuring the effectiveness of the coordination channels between various 
parties. For a distributed execution, the coordination is sometimes as important as 
the actual actions taken by the CSIRT members.  
2. Communications Effectiveness: Instead of assessing the effectiveness of a 
centralized command flow, the communication messages need to be examined for 
potential redundancies and undue overhead.  Unlike coordination effectiveness 
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which inspects the ability of various members to work together, communication 
effectiveness inspects the contents of the messages and how they are exchanged.   
3. Distributed Analysis: Each “distributed” entity needs to have its dedicated 
performance evaluation. Next, the whole response system need to be assessed.   The 
analysis need to identify if performance deficiencies are due to unit or system 
issues.  
4. Multi-context analysis: In the distributed model, the evaluation should consider that 
various parties have different levels of access to information. Therefore, the 
analysis need to consider multiple contexts. Also, the protocols for establishing 
trust and confidentiality among various parties would need careful assessment.   
Only recently few publications started to examine distributed CSIRTs [133] [17]. 
This explains the focus of this project on centralized CSIRTs, as specified in assumption 
A2.3. Awaiting further publications in that area, assessing the PE of the distributed mode 
of operation can be an extension of this work in a future project. 
D.2. Evaluator Type   
The entity providing performance evaluation of the CSIR capability can be the 
CSIRT itself, an internal body in the organization other than the CSIRT, like the quality 
unit, or an external body. Each choice comes with advantages and disadvantages, and will 
also impact how the CSIRPE is designed and implemented. A comparison between the 
three methods is provided in Table 14.  
It is noteworthy to mention that this design parameter should be inspected while 
discussing options for S.1 (CSIR Quality Assurance) and S2 (CSIRPE Quality Control). 
The three design considerations are interconnected, but each demonstrates slightly 
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different concentration. The CSIR quality assurance focuses on the constituencies’ 
perspective, the CSIRPE quality control on the organization’s perspective, while D.2 
focuses on the CSIR itself. In addition, S.1 and S.2 are mainly pre-incident activities, while 
D.2 focuses on the activities during and post to incident handling. 
 CSIRT Internal Unit External Body 
Cost Low Low High 
Duration 
Relatively short as 
responders are 
acquainted with 
incident details 
Depends on the quality 
management system of 
the organization 
External auditing 
is a long process 
Neutrality 
Can be subjective due 
to “gaming of 
numbers” [134] 
Can be subjective due 
to emphasizing 
organizational aspects 
over technical 
Objective 
Analysis 
Focus 
Technical and self- 
learning 
Organizational, 
financial and 
procedural 
Depends on 
auditor emphasis 
Planning 
Overhead 
High, endured by the 
CSIRT 
High but collaborative 
between various 
departments 
Minimum or none 
Ownership 
Fully owned by a 
CSIRT. Ownership of 
PE enhances positive 
change [135]   
Ownership by quality 
unit can be mis-
interpreted as “finding 
someone to blame”  
No ownership by 
CSIRT. Can be 
seen as imposing 
irrelevant factors 
Table 14: Comparison between evaluator types design options 
Finally, the “evaluator type” has been presented as a design parameter, compared 
to a strategic aspect, to highlight that it is an essential decision to be made at the planning 
stage. It is applicable independent of the absence or presence of quality assurance and 
quality control capabilities at the organization.   
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D.3. Number of Incidents 
  A performance evaluation framework can be designed to evaluate single incidents, 
i.e. without analyzing the CSIRT’s performance over multiple incidents. It could also be 
designed to evaluates performance over a period of time that constitutes incident handling 
of several incidents. A more desirable but more complex option is to design a framework 
that is capable of evaluating single and multiple incidents.  
The first option of standalone evaluation platforms is suitable for several contexts. 
For example, it is appealing to “CSIRT Providers” [136] that need to report their 
performance to their clients after concerning each incident handling. In such scenarios, the 
client is interested in seeing metrics that reflect that the delivered CSIRT services met the 
expected quality of service requirements. The client is not concerned about how the CSIRT 
performed with regards to other customer’s, unless it is presented in a context of 
comparison confirming that the delivered service is on the same level to that delivered to 
other clients.  
 Another potential application for single-incident platforms is special taskforce 
CSIRTs or ad hoc CSIRTs that are formed to handle a special incident. In such context, 
there is little interest in how responders perform outside the assigned mission. The same is 
applied to a CSIRT responding to a unique incident that is rare to happen and require 
substantive allocation of resources. Here, due to the infrequency of such incidents, analysis 
over multiple incidents or over specific period of time is infeasible.  
 There are two main challenges in designing single-incident platforms. The first is 
the absence of data from other incidents in which the current PE results could be compared 
to. Therefore, performance metrics need to be designed such that to reflect achievement of 
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pre-defined goals or the fulfilment of specific quality of services requirements outlined in 
a contract.  
The second challenge is the potential of conducting non-objective analysis. The 
analysis would normally involve analyzing outputs of numerous descriptive metrics. There 
is nothing to guarantee that how selected or excluded readings from analysis would impact 
the validity of results. In addition, it is difficult to argue that specific achievements are due 
to good performance or due to external factors that are distinct to the incident being 
handled.  
The second approach is to design performance platforms that analyze the team’s 
performance over multiple incidents. This seems to be the approach used in the CERT’s 
publication of [60] which implies that PE is measured over multiple incidents over a period 
of time. This is also the method commonly used for evaluating help-desk teams and IT 
services that are provided in high frequencies [23] [82] [83].   
In multiple-incident platforms, performance metrics would normally exhibit some 
statistical nature. Performance metrics can be averages, means, medians, variances and 
frequencies. In such metrics, it is important to define the contexts in which the statistics 
would provide meaningful results.  
For example, does an average response time demonstrates performance if measured 
over three incidents? Does it provide meaningful reading if not read along with minimum, 
maximum and the variance values? If the measurement context is not pre-defined, the 
analysis can also fall short to the non-objectivity drawback.  
Examples of contexts that are suitable for multiple-incident platforms include 
CSIRTs that need to report their performance in the form of annual reports or over a 
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specific number of years. Another example is performance reports that are prepared for 
strategic planning and budgeting which focus on the overall performance more than results 
of specific incidents.  
A comparison of the advantages and challenges of both approaches is provided in 
Table 15.  
Issue Single-Incident Framework Multiple-Incident Framework 
Suitable for 
Special CSIRT taskforce 
PE of unique and rare incidents 
requiring unusual amount of 
resources 
CSIRT Providers reporting to 
each customer 
CSIRTs with high number of 
incident handling 
CSIRTs that need to report in 
periodic number of years 
PE reports needed for strategic 
and budget planning 
Type of 
PMs 
Non-statistical metrics 
Statistical metrics like averages 
and variances 
Objectivity 
Measures PE through 
achievement of pre-defined 
goals and quality of service 
requirements 
Measures collective PE that 
encompasses all incidents. PE is 
measured under similar 
environment conditions  
Subjectivity 
A response PE can display 
achievement & quality of 
service but is poor when 
compared to other responses 
Results of PMs might fail to report 
poor performance in several areas 
if average readings are acceptable 
Table 15: Comparison between single and multiple-incident PE frameworks 
An adjustable-window framework is one that is designed to provide performance 
evaluation for single incidents and also time-analysis for several incidents. In an ideal 
situation (CSIR-UPEF), the window could be focused into a single incident or expanded 
to include as many past incidents as needed. This approach combines the advantages of 
both of the two methods, but would require more resources for the planning and 
measurement collection. 
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Some practical guidelines concerning the design of an adjustable-window 
framework are provided in Table 46 in Appendix A.   
D.4. Incident Concurrency 
The response techniques of handling incidents that appear simultaneously is 
different than response techniques to that handle incidents one at a time [104]. This requires 
that a PE framework that allows for evaluating concurrent handling be supported with 
different performance measurement mechanisms than a PE framework that is confined to 
single incidents.  
As noted in [112], the current CSIR literature lacks research in the direction of 
simultaneous handling of incidents. But it is expected that the research community will 
soon respond to the government and industry needs. For example, the National Response 
Framework (NRF) requires that planning should assumes: “multiple catastrophic incidents 
or attacks that will occur with little or no warning” [110].   
To contribute towards building the taxonomy, a PE framework that focuses on 
evaluating responses to incidents that appear exclusively will be called a sequential PE 
Framework. A framework that inspects the PE of handling concurrent models will be called 
a concurrent PE Framework. A model that is flexible to handle both types will be referred 
to as the elastic PE Framework.   
Unlike single incidents, concurrent incidents require responses with efficient 
resource allocation, multi-incident management, priority scheduling, and higher 
coordination mechanisms. A summary of how this will impact PE design is demonstrated 
in Table 16.  
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Issue Sequential PE Model Concurrent PE Model 
Utilization 
The utilization of resources 
is measured against the 
maximum potential 
The utilization of resources is 
measured against maximizing 
overall performance 
Scheduling Not Applicable 
The effectiveness of scheduling 
mechanisms need to be evaluated 
Prioritization 
Basic evaluation of the 
CSIRT’s ability to manage 
several tasks sharing same 
goals 
Multi-layer evaluation of the 
CSIRT’s ability to perform tasks 
pertaining to contending goals, i.e. 
evaluation of priority classification 
and scheduling 
Contextual 
Analysis 
The context of PE analysis 
will focus on the available 
resources 
The context of PE analysis will 
include available resources and 
presence of the other incidents 
Table 16: Comparison between sequential and concurrent PE models 
D.5. Analysis Time 
This design parameter outlines the time period, in reference to incident handling 
life cycle, in which the performance evaluation will be conducted. This will directly impact 
the functional performance model and consequently the analysis techniques. 
The most commonly used design approach is to limit performance activities during 
incident handling to collecting measurements and defer the extensive analysis to the post-
incident period. The second approach is to provide continuous analysis during incident 
handling, which is known as performance monitoring. A third approach, the incremental 
model, performs partial analysis at specific milestones of incident handling and completes 
the analysis post-incident. The details and implications of adopting each of these three 
choices is deferred to Section 3.6.1 when discussing functional models.   
D.6. Benchmarking   
Benchmarking is one of the most common management tools for measuring 
performance. It provides performance analysis through comparing the performance of an 
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organization to the best practices of the industry or to is competitors [137]. Such approach 
is proven to encourage competition which leads to performance enhancement [134]. As 
there are no public CSIR benchmarks; the term ‘benchmarking’ is used broadly to refer to 
the collection of activities of comparing a CSIRT’s performance to that of other similar 
teams, internal or external.  
A PE framework that uses benchmarking methodologies is expected to be different 
than one that does not. When benchmarking is used, an organization will frame its PE 
methods and metrics around those used in the benchmark. Although this would be 
restrictive design aspect, the main advantage is the value of the results which are viewed 
with more validity. On the other hand, a framework that does not use benchmarking would 
be more flexible and adaptable but would be challenged with a more complex process to 
provide objective analysis.    
A benchmark can be internal or external. It is argued in [106] that internal 
benchmarking is more beneficial than external benchmarking, a point of view that I support 
considering the current state of the field.  Three main arguments are in support of this view. 
First, benchmarking analysis is sensitive to numerous parameters of the incident’s 
environment which are difficult to normalize across diverse environments. Second, several 
aspects of performance are suppressed when using public benchmarks due to 
confidentiality and privacy considerations. Third, public benchmarks, especially those 
designed by commercial entities, tend to give more weight to market demands and 
investment issues over technical issues. If these three challenges are addressed, then 
external benchmarking would be a viable option, probably with greater benefits.  
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Finally, it should be highlighted that this design parameter and D.3: number of 
incidents are mutually exclusive. A single-incident PE framework could be designed with 
or without benchmarking. For instance, a single incident can be evaluated against a 
benchmark, and multiple incidents can be analyzed independently without comparison to 
that of other entities. The same argument is applicable to multiple-incident PE frameworks 
which can be designed with or without benchmarking.    
D.7. Measurement Type 
One of the most common classification methods for performance measurements is 
to group measurements into two categories: quantitative and qualitative [85]. Several 
disciplines like scientific measurement and financial analysis rely solely on quantitative 
measures, while other disciplines like sociology and politics extensively use qualitative 
measures in the form of surveys and polls. The performance measurement disciplines use 
a mixture of both methods but with slight preference towards quantitative measures.  
A summary of the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and quantitative 
measures [138] [139] is provided in Table 17. 
In the field of CSIR, the main design decision would be whether to include 
qualitative measurements or not. Meaning, a CSIRPE would either be fully quantitative or 
be equipped with measurements methods from both types. It is unlikely that an effective 
PE platform would be designed using only qualitative measures. Therefore, the question is 
narrowed down to: is it better to design a fully quantitative framework, or should qualitative 
measures be used?  
Answering the above question exposes the polarized viewpoints on a greater debate 
which the CSIR field inherits, which was highlighted in Chapter 2. Practically, most of the 
metrics used in the field of computer security are quantitative; however, serious concerns 
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have been raised about forcing quantifiability into the notion of security [34] [42]. Another 
survey demonstrated that schism exists in the research community concerning the benefits 
and shortcomings of introducing or excluding qualitative measures [139]. The survey 
studied the value of IT in organizational performance, a topic of similarity to this project.  
 Qualitative Quantitative 
Output form Text Numbers 
Usage 
Understanding, exploring 
possibilities, analyzing 
behavior, focused analysis 
Fact documentation, measuring 
outputs, observations, patterns, 
generalizations 
Examples 
Satisfaction, trust, 
transparency, communication, 
coordination, consistency, 
traceability (documentation) 
Response time, cost, frequencies, 
counting (e.g. occurrences, 
infected records), utilization, 
availability.    
Verifiability 
Relatively more difficult to 
verify 
Generally easy to verify 
Complexity 
Normally, simple design but 
complex analysis 
Normally, complex design but 
simple analysis 
Objectivity Viewed to be more subjective Viewed to be more objective 
Measurement 
process 
flexible and may vary from 
instance to instance 
Well defined and uniform 
Automation More difficult to automate Relatively easier to automate 
Table 17: Comparison between qualitative and quantitative measures 
The NIST document [1] sided this debate by dividing assessment methods into 
subjective and objective measures, without mentioning qualitative and quantitative 
measures. However, this implicitly acknowledges the need for both, as qualitative 
measures are normally subjective, and vice versa.  
Following the above spirit, I second that both types of metrics should be used as 
needed. If there is an issue that is naturally easier to understand and analyze through 
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qualitative measures, or if the quantification process results in a complex solution, then use 
of qualitative measures should not be discouraged. An example of this is metrics that aim 
at measuring team dynamics like trust, cohesion and collaboration. These aspects are 
normally easier to measure through qualitative measures.  
Nevertheless, whenever quantification is possible, I lean towards the use of 
quantitative measurements for the following four reasons: 
1- Quantitative measures provide more objective and verifiable performance 
results.  The lack of validity for performance results has been highlighted as 
one of the issues that field of security metrics suffers from, and it is desirable 
to avoid it.  
2- Quantitative measures have the advantage of being easier to automate, an aspect 
which might be stressing in the field of CSIR that experiences high overhead.  
3- It was argued earlier in this project that the field of CSIR is an operational 
discipline. This sets naturally preference to quantitative measures.  
4- Use of quantitative measures facilitates building benchmarks, which is a 
potential effective method for analyzing the results of CSIRPE.    
There are other factors that might influence a CSIRT’s decision to use qualitative 
or quantitative measures. For example, if the organization has its own quality system with 
clear performance measures, then a CSIRT need to align by the system and use similar type 
of measures. The same will apply if a CSIRT decides to use benchmarking as the main 
analysis method, as the choice of the benchmark will strongly influence the type of 
measurement.  Also, many organizations use incident management software systems which 
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might influence the selection of measurements based on their compatibility with the 
software.    
D.8. CSIR Scope 
A performance framework can be designed to assess the effectiveness of a CSIRP 
design or to assess the effectiveness of a CSIRT’s incident handling. In an ideal 
environment (UPEF), a performance model should be capable of conducting both. 
However, there are several practical and design considerations that can shift emphasis to 
one aspect over the other. Examples of these considerations include: 
1- CSIR Maturity: When is performance evaluation introduced to the CSIRT? A newly 
formed CSIR capability tends to put more focus on planning and design compared 
to a well-established CSIRT that is interested in identifying areas of improvement 
2- Pro-activeness: Is there an organizational culture that promotes advanced planning 
and implementing proactive measures (CSIRP effectiveness) compared to 
responding to immediate needs and risks. For large organizations, long-term 
planning is essential; but for starters, small companies focusing on operational 
needs might be the norm.  
3- Development Model: Many organizations start with a small CSIRT and slowly 
grow based on the feedback from deployment. In this approach, operational 
feedback plays crucial role in the quality enhancement (CSIRT effectiveness). 
4- Analysis Reference Point: This a higher level question related what is static and 
dynamic in the underlying environment, the CSIRP or the CSIRT? See S.6: 
Reference Analysis Point.            
The above considerations demonstrate that CSIRT and CSIRP effectiveness are not 
mutually exclusive. They both go hand by hand. However, there are some factors related 
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to the environment and to the management approach that make a performance framework 
focus on one aspect over the other.  
The main implication of this design parameter is how performance indicators and 
metrics are selected.   When focusing on CSIRP design, performance indicators like 
reliability, preparedness, capacity, completeness, and competency will take precedence in 
the performance analysis. And when focusing on CSIRT execution indicators like: 
response time, detection accuracy, containment effectiveness and harm reduction will 
receive more attention.   
3.3.2 Framework Assumptions 
Without loss of generality, another set of assumptions are introduced here based on 
the above design parameters for presentation purposes. These assumptions are referred to 
as Framework Assumptions, and are summarized in Table 18. Without the introduction of 
this set of assumptions, the framework presentation will contain redundancies and 
unnecessary lengthy discussions that do not map to actual contributions. 
# Name Description 
A2.1 CSIR Model The CSIR uses the Hybrid Model 
A2.2 Member Dedication 
Members of the core CSIRT are tasked with only 
responsibilities of incident handling without other 
overlapping responsibilities within the organization 
A2.3 Central CSIRT 
The CSIRT follows the Central model of 
organization 
A2.4 Internal CSIRT 
All of the CSIRT core members are internal and 
serve as members of the organization being served 
A2.5 Sequential Handling 
A CSIRT handles one incident at a time, i.e. does 
not handle incidents concurrently 
Table 18: Global Framework Assumptions 
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A2.1. CSIR Model 
 As argued in Section 2.1.2, the hybrid model has the features of having reasonable 
number of phases, being currently used in the industry and focuses on actions compared 
relationships. Confining discussion to a specific CSIR model is used for presentation 
consistency and does not impact the major themes discussed in the PE framework design.  
A2.2. Member Dedication 
 In practice, most CSIRT members hold responsibilities within the organization 
besides CSIR handling. Examples of these roles include: IT managers, Information 
Security officers, Network Managers and accountants. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
members of the core CSIRT do not hold other roles within the organization. For instance, 
when it is referred that a CSIRT communicates with a network manager or a help desk 
officer, it is assumed that the members are exclusive, while in reality they could be the 
same individual. This assumption is consistent with CERT [2] which conceptualize a 
CSIRT in manner that displays very small overlap with the larger security team of the 
organization.   
A2.3. Central CSIRT 
 Out of the three models for structuring a CSIR outlined in [1], the centralized 
model is selected in this project for presentation purposes. The central model is currently 
the most commonly used CSIRT structure model in the industry. Theoretically, in terms of 
CSIR functions, the other two models, i.e. distributed and coordinated, are similar to the 
centralized model as the operational difference is in terms of executive power and role 
assignment, not the CSIR phases or main functions.  
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A2.4. Internal CSIRT 
 For simplicity, it is assumed that all members of the CSIRT are also members of 
the same organization. This assumption ensures that the responders have access to all 
information relevant to the incident; which is not the case if the CSIRT is external. With 
external teams, there needs to be disclosure procedures and policies for sharing the 
information to avoid privacy issues and giving responders access to information which 
might be sensitive to the organization [140]. Inaccessibility to all relevant information 
would have an impact on the decision making of the CSIRT and hence its effectiveness. 
For the scope of this project, this factor is eliminated for presentation purposes but the issue 
can be of interest to an extension work.  
A2.5. Sequential Handling 
  Although it is reasonable to expect computer security incidents to appear 
concurrently, there are no published works that discuss how CSIRT should operate under 
concurrent incidents [112]. Therefore,, it is premature at the current stage to design PE 
platforms that support concurrent responses. Nevertheless, incident concurrency has been 
highlighted as a design parameter (D.4) for PE frameworks for completeness purposes.  
3.3.3 Laying Out Strategies and Policies 
By selecting the proper values for the design parameters, a CSIRT would have 
taken the first step towards defining its own performance evaluation framework. However, 
the available framework would have been defined only through parameters which are 
descriptive of the environment. Another step is needed to refine the framework through 
how the organization’s leadership and the CSIRT envision the role of PE in CSIR.   
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In this step, which comes after or along with the specification of design parameters, 
the CSIRT leadership attempts to project its generic plan to address the main issues 
associated with CSIRPE design.  
A strategy is: “a plan to achieve long term or overall objective” and a policy is: 
“intentions and direction of an organization as formally expressed by top management” 
(ISO 9000 [43]). Through this understanding, this step aims at outlining the general 
guidelines of how the PE development should be steered to achieve its forecasted 
objectives. This is reflected in the form of strategies from which policies are generated or 
by defining a set of policies that reflect a common strategy.  
# Issue Descriptions Strategies 
S.1 
CSIR Quality 
Assurance 
How can the organization be assured that 
the designed CSIRP is expected to 
provide the expected IR performance? 
Simulation 
External Audit 
Compliance 
S.2 
CSIRPE 
Quality Control 
Who should oversee the enforcement and 
implementation of the policies pertaining 
to CSIRPE within an organization? 
CSIRT 
Quality Unit 
S.3 
CSIRPE 
Complexity 
What are the strategies to tackle the 
challenge of CSIRPE being very 
complex?  
Approximation 
Simplification 
Aggregation 
S.4 
CSIR 
Unpredictability 
What are the strategies for CSIRT to 
perform effectively amid the 
unpredictability nature of CSIR? 
Preparedness  
NDDM 
S.5 
CSIRPE 
Overhead 
How can PE be introduced to CSIR 
without high overhead? 
U-Shaped Dev. 
Automation 
Comm. Efficiency 
S.6 
Reference 
Analysis Point 
What is the main reference point of 
analysis, is it the team or the plan? 
CSIRP 
CSIRT 
Table 19: CSIRPE Issues that require strategic design 
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In other terms, the CSIRT will endeavor here to agree on some approaches, not 
actual steps, of how it would develop its CSIRPE framework. A list of the issues that 
require some strategic planning or policy making is presented in Table 19.  
After outlining the assumptions, defining the design parameters and sketching the 
strategies and policies the CSIRT would have finalized the definition of its own 
performance evaluation framework. The produced framework is suitable for a specific 
environment and reflects the vision of a specific CSIRT. The following three development 
stages will evolve in the boundary of this CSIRPE framework. .  
S.1. CSIR Quality Assurance  
The term quality assurance is used here in reference to methods used to verify that 
the CSIR capability within a specific environment is what it claims to be. Although several 
publications use the term loosely or interchangeably with “quality control”, the above 
definition is adapted from the ISO: 8402-1994 standard [141]. In other words, how would 
it be known that a specific CSIRT is expected to offer a specific level of quality of service 
during incident handling? Answering this question is of interest both internally, to the 
higher management, and externally to customers and constituencies.  
With absence of direct works that address quality assurance in the context of CSIR, 
a demonstration that members of the CSIRT had undergone training seem to be common 
practice, at least from the perspective of the available publications. However, staff training 
is a method for preparation, perhaps a strong one, but not necessarily a guarantee of the 
expected delivery of service.  
Recently, some works discussed the use of simulation [142] [22] [97]. Simulation 
can be viewed as a more advanced method of training, and if the outcomes are assessed 
properly it can provide a satisfactory expectation of quality of service. However, it has 
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been noticed that only very few CSIRTs, mainly military, had undergone simulation 
training. Also, these simulations only involve the core CSIRT members without simulated 
interaction with other support teams like the legal, HR and police personnel [14]. 
Therefore, developing exercises that simulate real-environment remains lagging.  
Also,  it is noted in [140] that, in the industry, reviewing CSIR processes is 
becoming a subject of interest for external audit. It is expected that issues like privacy and 
data security will arise as soon as external auditing gets acceptance in the industry.  
Compliance to industry standards is another way to demonstrate quality assurance. 
Although, the NIST document [1] can be considered a good compliance platform, it is not 
a standardized system in the formal sense. Therefore, demonstrating compliance with [1] 
should be treated with caution if it is the only method used for quality assurance.  
In summary, it is important for the CSIRT during its early stages of PE development 
to think about its strategy for quality assurance. Training, simulation, compliance and 
auditing are the current available options.  
S.2. CSIRPE Quality Control  
It is a common industry practice to establish a dedicated management unit to 
oversee the quality management aspects across an organization. This unit is sometimes 
referred to as “quality office” or “quality unit”.  The ISO 9000 standard uses the term: 
“Quality Management” as the broadest term in which all activities relevant to quality are 
included, such as: quality planning, quality assurance, quality control and quality 
improvement [43]. Therefore, some or all activities of performance evaluation of the CSIR 
capability could be classified under quality management, which is supervised by the quality 
unit.  
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It is a strategic decision to be made by the CSIRT about who will oversee the quality 
control of the CSIRPE. Quality control here refers to activities associated with the 
enforcement of the quality requirements [43]. The decision will be influenced by the 
defined PE goals and the existing organizational structure of the CSIRT. This could be 
fully owned and managed by the CSIRT itself, or by the organization’s quality office. 
Although, managers naturally prefer the centralized management through a single unit in 
the organization to ensure consistency and facilitates strategic planning, it is noted in [51] 
that CSIR practitioners prefer to operate independently. They feel that external influences 
by organizational policy mandates normally contends with the objectives set by CSIRTs 
which focus on fulfilling CSIR goals.  
 Practically, the quality management and control tasks will get shared between the 
CSIRT and the quality unit, but the weight given to each party will vary. In all cases, it is 
important for the CSIRT to think early about this issue to avoid any undesired 
consequences. For instance, a CSIRT who have self-administered its CSIRPE might be 
forced to re-design it in order to meet the requirements set by the management through the 
quality office.  
An important factor that will determine who will evaluate is the intersection level 
between the various quality components of the organization with CSIR [7]. Several 
evaluation activities pertaining to CSIR intersect with other IT and organizational 
activities. Examples include: security resiliency, vulnerability assessment, disaster 
recovery planning, business continuity planning and risk assessment.  
A comparison that demonstrates the advantages and disadvantages of making the 
quality unit or the CSIRT to administer quality control is presented in Table 20.  
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Issue 
Entity overseeing Quality Control 
CSIRT Quality Unit 
Flexibility 
The CSIRT will have high 
flexibility in terms of planning, 
design and quality control 
CSIRT will inherit the flexibility or 
rigidity of the practices adopted by 
the quality unit 
Overhead 
The CSIRT will undergo higher 
overhead to administer all 
aspects of quality control [15] 
The CSIRT overhead will be 
relatively low and confined to 
reporting to the quality unit 
Ownership 
Empowers CSIRT members and 
advocates viewing PE as an 
integral activity of CSIR 
CSIRT members might view PE as 
an external or imposed activity  
Accountability 
The CSIRT will focus on 
outcomes of interest to the 
management 
The CSIRT will be accountable for 
its overall PE including inputs, 
outcomes and processes 
Blind-Spots 
Might neglect developing PMs 
that are important to the 
organization 
Might neglect developing PMs that 
are of technical importance 
Table 20: Comparison between methods of CSIRPE quality control 
S.3. CSIRPE Complexity  
One of the main findings of the survey presented in Chapter Two is that the main 
two challenges to IR performance evaluation across disciplines is complexity and 
unpredictability. Since complexity is a sophisticated issue that requires collaborative 
efforts from researchers and practitioners to produce effective models of analysis and a list 
of best industry practices, it is beyond the scope of this project to formally model CSIR 
complexity or provide a rigorous assessment for it.  
Nevertheless, a simple model is presented in Section 0 to guide CSIRTs on how to 
address the issue of complexity in practical terms. The suggested model is referred to as 
“SAC Complexity Model” referring to the three strategies that are used in deriving the 
model. The three strategies are :simplification, approximation  and cascading.   
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The SAC complexity model is proposed as one of the various ways that a CSIRT 
can overcome the challenge of complexity. Whether a CSIRT adopts this model or uses its 
own solution to the CSIR complexity challenge, there needs to be enough effort exerted 
during the planning phase to tackle the issue. Ignoring this step might result in producing 
a CSIRPE that is also complex to implement and analyze, or producing a CSIRPE that fails 
to capture the actual performance properties of the CSIR capability due to its 
impracticality.  
S.4. CSIR Unpredictability 
 As highlighted in the second chapter, unpredictability or uncertainty poses a major 
challenge to incident response disciplines, including the CSIR. It is beyond the scope of 
this project to provide modeling for CSIR unpredictability, which requires different 
analysis techniques than the ones used here. Nevertheless, a platform that focuses on policy 
and operational guidelines is presented to assist responders in handling this challenge.   
A platform for understanding and analyzing CSIR unpredictability is proposed. The 
framework can be used as a tool to help CSIRTs develop strategies and policies to handle 
the issue of unpredictability. It also can be used to assist developing performance indicators 
and metrics that are sensitive to the fact that CSIRTs operate in an environment with high 
number of uncertain conditions.  
 The platform is called “The NFP Unpredictability platform”. The acronym NFP 
stands for the three principles that are used in the platform, namely: Non-deterministic 
decision making, flexibility and preparedness, see Table 21.  
The three principles  are derived from the survey results of chapter two, and are 
aligned to the requirements set by the NIMS and NRF. The National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) [109] and its derived National Response Framework (NRF) [110], provide 
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the main principles and strategies that need to exist for management of emergency 
incidents, including cyber incidents. The two documents are designed to manage incidents 
of various magnitudes and complexity. The details of the NFP unpredictability platform 
are provided in Section 5.5. 
# Principle Description 
1 NDDP 
The CSIR capability should be equipped with decision making 
tools suitable for nondeterministic environments 
2 Flexibility 
The CSIRP should be flexible to allow CSIRT members to adjust 
to the needs arising from unpredictable factors 
3 Preparation 
The CSIRT should be prepared in terms of planning and 
competency to address unpredictability 
Table 21: The three principles of the NFP Unpredictability Platform 
S.5. CSIRPE Overhead 
Adding a performance evaluation component to an existing CSIR system is 
expected to bring several advantages but will also be accompanied by some undesirable 
side effects. Overhead is one of these unwelcomed consequences. During incident 
handling, every minute of the CSIRT’s time is valuable. Therefore, introducing the PE 
module should be sensitive enough not to hinder the core functionalities of the CSIRT. 
Since overhead cannot be completely eliminated, focus should be paid to 
minimizing it as much as possible. It is one of the duties of the CSIRPE planning staff to 
ensure that the proposed modules do not involve unreasonable overhead, which is a 
subjective matter depending on the underlying environment.  
There are several strategies to minimize the overhead effect, three of them are 
briefly described hereafter. 
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1- U-Shaped Development Model: This model suggests that most of the time should 
be spent at the beginning and at the end, and very little is done at the middle. The 
term ‘u-shaped’ is used in similar ways in several works [143] [144]. In CSIRPE, 
this translates to spending most of the time during the preparation and analysis time 
and aiming for minimizing work-time during the incident handling.  
2- Automation: The objective is to minimize performance evaluation tasks through 
use of automated tools, which are mainly software tools [83]. The following five 
advantages have been highlighted by [145] with regards to computer security 
incident response: (1) timely and efficient detection of incidents (2) multi-factor 
risk assessment (3) efficient notification (4) trend analysis and reporting (5) 
compliance with privacy laws.  In CSIRPE, focus should be on automating the 
collection of performance metrics readings and performing basic analysis. This has 
been highlighted as an important aspect to increase effectiveness [146]. However, 
involvement of automation in planning and during final analysis should be 
minimized.   
3- Efficient Communication Models: The impact of efficient of communication on 
team performance is highlighted in [147]. The objective here is to minimize 
communication overhead as much as possible. The existing models suggest, 
coupling communication with needs, periodical short updates, changing from 
explicit to implicit communication through the shared mental model, involving the 
whole team in the derivation of mission and goals, and careful structuring of the 
team.       
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S.6. Reference Analysis Point 
When analyzing the PE of an organization, there are two methods to frame the 
analysis context. The first method focuses on the CSIRT and the analysis is framed around 
the question of: “does the CSIRT’s performance achieve the desired PE goals?”. By 
making the reference point of analysis to be the CSIRT, the CSIRP is viewed as an outcome 
of the CSIRT’s performance during the preparation phase.  
When using CSIRT as the reference point, the preparedness of the CSIRT through 
training and planning, the expertise and qualifications of the CSIRT members, the harmony 
and cooperation between the team members, the decision making capabilities, the tools 
selected during the incident handling are factors that strongly influence good and poor 
performance. Issues like effectiveness of security policies, efficiency of handling 
procedures and robustness of the preventive methods are secondary and can be blind-spots 
to CSIR performance analysis. This method of analysis is intuitive and is practically used 
in various disciplines [60] [61].  
The second method adopts the CSIRP as the analysis point of reference and the PE 
question is framed as: “does the implementation of the current CSIRP achieves the desired 
PE goals?”. Here, the performance of the CSIRT is inspected within the boundaries of the 
CSIRP. It is expected that if a CSIRT implements the procedures outlined in a CSIRP then 
that should lead to some degree of good performance, presuming that the CSIRP is well 
prepared. The main analysis blind-spots here would be the volatility of decision making 
when needing to go out of script and identifying performance issues arising from poor 
CSIRP design.  
It is clear that there is a high correlation between the CSIRT performance and the 
CSIRP effectiveness. For instance, poor performance can be due to poor design, poor 
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implementation or both [9]. Therefore, when selecting an analysis reference point, it should 
be considered as the primary perspective, and the second should be treated secondary; 
instead of being ignored.    
Issue  CSIRT CSIRP 
Scope 
CSIRPE can be used in various 
locations in which the CSIRT 
operates using various CSIRPs 
CSIPRE can be used in all locations 
in which the CSIRP is enforced 
through various CSIRTs 
Update 
Frequency 
Whenever there is a major update 
to the CSIRT size or membership, 
the CSIRPE needs to be updated 
Whenever there is a major update 
to the contents of a CSIRP, the 
CSIRPE needs to be updated 
Analysis 
Outcomes 
Poor performance can be directly 
mapped to CSIRT preparedness 
and execution effectiveness 
compared to policies and CSIRP 
design effectiveness 
Poor performance can be directly 
mapped to policies and handling 
procedures compared to CSIRT 
execution effectiveness  
External 
CSIRTs 
If an external CSIRT is invited 
for assistance, the CSIRPE is 
used for execution effectiveness 
not for prevention effectiveness 
If an external CSIRT is invited, the 
CSIRPE is used  
System 
Security 
System security and team 
performance are disjoint entities 
The system security and team 
performance is treated as one entity 
Cost 
Cost of training all staff, or 
replacing a team member is 
relatively high 
High costs at the planning stage. 
Cost of updating CSIRP is 
relatively low.  
Table 22: CSIRT vs. CSIRP Analysis Reference Points 
Regardless of the selected reference analysis point, an organization should be able 
to identify the sources of good or poor performance and map them back to the CSIRP or 
the CSIRT. However, it is simpler to conceptualize CSIRPE using one of the two reference 
points which will impact how the CSIRP is documented and how performance metrics are 
derived. Mixing both methods can result in incoherent planning and analysis and possibly 
contradicting conclusions. Probably, if an organization seeks intensive PE analysis it is 
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possible to conduct the PE analysis in two phases using a different point of reference for 
each phase.  
Although adopting a reference analysis point can be a matter of design preference, 
there are several factors that can make one method preferred to the other within a specific 
environment. Examples of these factors include: company size, CSIR budget, staff 
retention and CSIRT being internal or external.  
A comparison between the two perspectives is presented in Table 22, and a simple 
guide for which method to select is provided in Section A.3.   
A simple questionnaire to guide the CSIRT leadership in selecting the proper 
reference point is provided in Table 47. If an organization is not certain which reference 
point to use, I recommend using the CSIRP method [92] [7]. This speculation is based on 
my observance of the evolution of the field (See for example the note put by the New 
Zealand CSIRT that consistency, reliability and resilience are established through a CSIRP 
not the CSIRT [31]). At the early stages of the field development, an organization is likely 
to have a good IR capability if they hired a well-trained security professional; which is not 
necessarily true anymore. Much efforts and financial resources are being invested in the 
preparation of CSIRPs which provide more robust and stable CSIR environment compared 
to hiring professional experts with low retention probability. Also, the CSIR process is 
viewed more comprehensively through the lens of the CSIRP which captures the overall 
IR capability compared to the CSIRT perspective which is sensitive to the qualifications 
of the CSIRT members.  
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3.4 Phase II: Defining a CSIRPE Model 
3.4.1 Overview 
As a CSIRT gets into this second phase of development, it would have achieved 
two main things from the previous phase. First, setting the design parameters eliminates 
issues that are not of concern to the team. Second, the team would have inspected issues 
pertaining to the organization and envisioned a list of strategies and policies which the PE 
model to be developed need to abide by.  
 
Figure 10: Phase II: Defining Performance Evaluation Model 
Through this second phase, a CSIRT would define its own PE model by setting its 
goals, specifying what needs to be measured and outlining the desired features of the 
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performance. This is depicted in Figure 10, which also shows the inputs and outputs of this 
development phase.   
This phase is composed of three components. The first component, Defining 
Performance Goals,  aims at defining performance goals which explain why CSIRPE is 
introduced to the CSIR capability and how it is expected to enhance it. The second 
component, Identifying PE Aspects, analyzes the CSIR system and identifies areas that 
would be evaluated. The third component, Defining Performance Indicators, pinpoints 
factors that determine good and bad performance based on the outlined goals and aspects. 
The following sections provides the details for the three components.  
3.4.2 Defining Performance Goals 
There are two perspectives to answering the question of why is PE needed for CSIR. 
The first perspective is generic and can be applied to any CSIR environment while the 
second is contextual and can vary depending on the operating environment. The two 
perspectives can also be treated as a two-stage process of defining goals, starting from 
general goals to more specific ones attuning to the organizational needs. 
Using the model presented in the CERT publication of [41], objectives are treated 
as higher than goals. Therefore, the generic goals of CSIR will be called PE objectives, 
and the organizational goals will be called PE goals. Using the terminology of the field of 
management, PE objectives correspond to official goals while PE goals correspond to 
operative goals [148].  
The main output of this development step is a concise list of goals capable of 
guiding the derivation of measurement tools and the remaining steps of the development 
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process. An organization may choose to generate two lists, one for objectives and for goals, 
or simply one maintain one list that is directional and operative.  
Defining PE Objectives: 
The definition of PE objectives is concerned with the general themes and 
motivations for introducing a performance evaluation module to a CSIR capability. Since 
these objectives are context free, they could be collaboratively generated by researchers 
and practitioners. It is recommended that these objectives be publically shared which will 
contribute towards building best industry practices. 
Surveying the current publications and documentations about preparing a CSIRP 
and comparing how other performance disciplines define their objectives, it can be noticed 
that CSIR PE objectives revolve around the following three themes (see [19] [7]): 
1- Business Continuity & Growth: by implementing a PE model an organization will 
have a system for quality assurance, quality management and continuous 
enhancement to its CSIR. Deploying such system is expected to contribute to the 
overall business operations. Without CSIRPE capability, an organization will not 
be able to maintain its CSIR capability, assure that its delivering a quality service, 
or be able to recommend effective enhancements.  
2-  Effective Resource Allocation: by implementing a PE model an organization will 
be able to gain effective allocation of its fiscal and human resources for CSIR. This 
leads to more cost-effective and better coordinated responses.  
3-  Disaster Prevention and Management: by implementing a PE model an 
organization will be able to have accurate tools to identify risk factors and operating 
obstacles during and before a disaster due to cyber incidents. More specifically, the 
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organization is interested in having tools to identify, measure and minimize 
associated harm due to cyber incidents.    
 
Figure 11: Example of CSIRPE Usefulness Test 
A CSIRT can treat the above three themes as the starting place from which the PE 
objectives are derived from. The three themes can also assist in constructing an evaluation 
test for assessing the benefits of introducing PE into CSIR. The test could be called: The 
CSIRPE Usefulness Test, as it attempts to answer the question: “Did the integration of a 
CSIRPE module help the organization progress in all or some of the three main goals of 
0 = None or negligible 
Business Continuity 
& Growth 
Resource Allocation 
Effectiveness 
Disaster Prevention 
and Management 
How much do you rate the impact of introducing CSIRPE in helping 
the organization progress in each of the following three areas? 
Impact Scale 
1 = Minor or partial 2 = Major & Substantial 
Adder 
Score 0 or 1 
Introducing CSIRPE 
was redundant with 
negligible impact 
Score 2 , 3 or 4 
Introducing CSIRPE 
had partial positive 
impact 
Score 5 or 6 
Introducing CSIRPE 
was rewarding and 
have substantial 
impact 
Current PE system is 
redundant and needs 
major re-design 
Current PE system 
needs more 
planning, dedication 
and revision 
Maintain current PE 
system and continue 
enhancement  
 152 
 
CISRPE: contintuity & growth, resource allocation effectiveness and disaster prevention 
and management”.  
The test is generic and qualitaitive and is meant to help redirecting or refining the 
definition of PE goals, and the higher-level issues of the design. More rigours and 
quantitative approaches for essessing the effectiveness of introducing CSIRPE can be done 
in the eighth componenet of this framework on validation models.  
Performance Evaluation Goals: 
Building on the previous step, a CSIRT needs to contextualize its PE objectives 
into a list of goals that serves the needs of the organization. These goals need to be relevant 
and provide operational guidance.  
In order for any performance measurement system to be effective, the PE goals 
need to be derived from or aligned by the organizational goals [149]. In the context of 
CSIR, there are two main sources in which PE goals need to be derived from and aligned 
with. The first is the CSIR goals/objectives, which are normally defined at one of the early 
sections  of CSIRP.  The second is the mission statement and overall organizational 
objectives. A CSIRPE that is based on shallow understanding of the CSIR and 
organizational goals is expected to be ineffective.  
Providing an example for deriving from the organizational mission, if a mission 
statement reflects emphasis on customer satisfaction, then it should be expected that a 
CSIRPE module will have some contributions towards that. A possible PE goal would be 
to: “to develop tools to measure customer satisfaction to the organization’s response to 
computer security incidents”. Another example for a PE goal derived from CSIR 
objectives, if CSIRP considers one of its goals “to protect infrastructures X and Y during 
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a compromise”; then a PE goal would be to “develop mechanisms for measuring the 
effectiveness of a CSIRT in protecting critical infrastructures X and Y during an incident 
handling”.  
Refining Goals: 
Since goals play a crucial role in directing the development phase, distinct attention 
should be paid to its design and approval process. The stressing question here is “how does 
a CSIRT know that it has defined the correct goals for its PE module”? I have found that 
the most commonly used method in performance systems [150] is the SMART model 
[151].  The name of the model stands for: specific, measurable, actionable (i.e. achievable), 
relevant (i.e. result-based and realistic) and time bounded. In [41], the model was modified 
to SMARTER by adding (E) evaluated and (R) reviewed. In my view, this is unnecessary 
as the amended features reflect the design process more than the goals themselves.  
The SMART model is generic and is originally designed for evaluating goals and 
objectives in the contexts of organizations and projects, not necessarily in the area of 
computer security or CSIR. Therefore, a customized interpretation of the model is needed 
for the CSIR context. This is provided in  Table 23.  
Finally, it should be noted that the definition of goals is a collaborative process 
between the CSIRT and the management. When a CSIRT defines its own performance 
goals, it helps integrating the performance activities into the response activities as the 
developers of the goals are the same individuals that are executing them. It also ensures 
that the goals are realistic and reflect the operational needs of incident handling. The 
involvement of the management works as a validation method and assurance that the define 
goals serve the overall performance of the organization.   
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 SMART Term Interpretation in CSIR Context 
S Specific 
 The PE goal targets a specific performance aspect of CSIR 
(Section 3.4.3) 
 The PE goal is written in a simple language that could be 
unambiguously interpreted by the CSIRT and management 
 The list of PE goals is concise, preferably less than  
M Measurable 
 The PE goal focuses on outcomes not actual actions 
 The PE goal can be expressed through CSIR performance 
indicators 
 The PE goal can be represented by several PIs. If not, consider 
expanding or merging with another goal.  
 The PE goal is expressed in a manner that encompasses several 
contexts of measurability 
A Achievable 
 The PE goal is feasible to achieve the PE goal given the CSIRT’s 
competency and available resources 
 The PE goal is expressed in action-verbs and provides 
operational guidance 
R Relevant 
 The PE goal is derived from the CSIR objectives  
 The PE goal is aligned with the organization’s  mission and goals 
 The PE goal does not demonstrate conflict with the policies and 
procedures outlined in the CSIRP or enforced by the quality unit 
T 
Timely 
 
 The PE goal implies a time-frame, or permits the definition of a 
time-frame, to achieve the goal. 
 The PE goal is recognized as short-term or long-term 
Table 23: SMART Model for Defining CSIRPE Goals 
3.4.3 Identifying PE Aspects 
After defining the PE goals, a CSIRT needs to attempt identifying aspects of the IR 
system that will be subject to performance evaluation. Both goals and aspects will be used 
to define performance indicators in the consequent step of the CSIRPE development.  
The term aspect is used here to refer to the collection of actions performed during 
the CSIR cycle that will be treated as one block in performance evaluation. Examples of 
aspects include: designing a CSIRP, containing an incident, collaborations with external 
consultants and CSIRT’s reporting to management. Each of the aforementioned examples 
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refer to a group of actions, not a single one, and are normally considered valuable to the 
CSIRT or consume much of its efforts prior, during or post to an incident response.  
 There are various methods for identifying CSIR aspects. Five different 
methodologies are presented in Table 24. The first and third methodologies can be viewed 
as CSIRT centric, the second and fourth can be viewed as CSIRP centric, while the 
organizational model is a hybrid one. These methodologies are inferred from the 
requirements set by the NIST and CERT documents, while the organizational model is 
borrowed from classical works in the field of performance evaluation [152].  
# Methodology Description 
1 Time Analysis 
The CSIR life cycle is viewed as a time line starting from the 
CSIRP preparation to the end of post-incident analysis. The 
timeline is divided into time clusters each representing the time 
period in which a group of activities is performed. Each time 
cluster is defined as a performance aspect.  
2 
Phase-Based 
Analysis 
Each phase of the IR life cycle phases defined in a CSIRP is 
defined as a distinct performance aspect 
3 
Value 
Analysis 
The main activities of a CSIRT are analyzed and categorized 
into major and minor based on their importance to the incident 
handling. Each major activity is defined as a performance 
aspect, and every group of correlated minor activities are 
aggregated into a performance aspect.   
4 CSIRP Based 
The performance aspects are defined in reference to a CSIRP. 
The two major activities are: CSIRP design and CSIRP 
Execution. It could be further divided, e.g. escalation protocols.  
5 
Organizational 
Model 
The whole IR process is conceptualized as a combination of five 
elements: inputs, processes, products, outputs and outcomes. 
Each of these can be customized into a single or multiple 
performance aspects.  
Table 24: Methodologies for Identifying PE Aspects 
Examples of how each of the above methodologies can be used in identifying 
aspects is presented in Table 25. 
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There are advantages and disadvantages for using each of the above methodologies. 
For example, the time-based analysis is suitable for identifying the major time clusters of 
incident handling, which can correspond to areas in which the response resources are 
highly used. It is reasonable to subject these lengthy time clusters into PE evaluation in 
order to shorten the time period which will consequently lead to better resource allocation. 
However, the methodology falls short of identifying the moments which are critical to the 
incident handling but do not necessarily consume long time periods. An example of this is 
the initial assessment performed during a very short time period at the early stages of the 
IR life cycle, but have magnificent impact on the effectiveness of the response. It could be 
noticed that in all of the above methodologies, the overall system is broken down into 
several aspects which each will be subject to a separate performance evaluation. Such 
approach would be insufficient unless it is coupled with an evaluation of these aspects 
when analyzed as a whole. Therefore, regardless of the selected methodology, there should 
be another aspect defined which is “overall system performance”. This aspect is normally 
evaluated after the evaluation of the other aspects.  
Based on the above note, it would be more effective to use a combination of 
methodologies to derive the PE aspects. More precisely, it is better to use at least two 
methods which are of different emphasis, i.e. CSIRT vs. CSIRP. For example, consider an 
external CSIRT invited to handle an incident which is beyond the capability of an internal 
team. In such scenario, the CSIRP based model is of less interest because the effectiveness 
of the CSIRT is focused on the execution not the design of the CSIRP. Therefore, the 
phased-based methodology could be coupled with the value-based methodology. Using the 
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examples presented in  Table 25, a depiction of how the aspects could be merged using the 
two methodologies is presented in Figure 12.  
# Methodology Example 
1 Time Analysis 
Divide the IR timeline into four time clusters: 
 [1] preparation & training 
 [2] incident identification and assessment 
 [3] incident containment 
 [4] incident eradication and system recovery 
 [5] Overall system performance 
2 
Phase-Based 
Analysis 
Assuming the SANS model is used: 
[1] preparation          [2] identification  
[3] Containment        [4] eradication            [5] recovery          
[6] lessons learnt       [7] overall system performance 
3 
Value 
Analysis 
A CSIRT operating in major municipality might define the 
following three major aspects: 
[1] Isolation of critical assets after incident identification 
[2] Immediate partial system recovery 
[3] Identification of perpetuators 
[4] Overall system performance. 
Other minor activities are classified into two aspects: 
[5] Public and media interaction 
[6] CSIRT collaboration with support teams 
4 CSIRP Based 
[1] CSIRP design 
[2] Policies defined in a CSIRP 
[3] CSIRP Execution of containment and recovery procedures 
[4] Escalation protocols defined in a CSIRP 
[5] overall system performance 
5 
Organizational 
Model 
[1] inputs: preparedness 
[2] processes: identification, containment, recovery 
[3] products: incident classification (from identification phase)   
[4] outputs: response Time, response cost 
[5] outcomes: Damage assessment 
In addition to: [6] overall system performance 
Table 25: Examples for the Methodologies for Identifying PE Aspects 
Note how the first phase, the preparation, is ignored because the external CSIRT 
was not involved in the preparation of the CSIRP. Also, the public and media interaction 
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are not of direct responsibility to the external CSIRT; thus it is changed to reporting to the 
organization management which shall communicates with its customers and the relevant 
media. Further, the identification, containment and lessons learnt phases are broken into 
two aspects, which could not have happened if only the phase-based methodology was 
used.  
 
Figure 12: Example of Combining two methodologies to define PE Aspects 
In Table 48, (see Appendix A), a list of practical recommendations for the 
identification of performance evaluation aspects is presented.  
Value-Based Methodology 
Major Minor 
[1] Isolation of  
critical Assets 
[2] partial system 
recovery  
[3] Attacker 
Identification  
 [4] Public & 
media 
interaction  
[5] Interaction 
with support 
teams 
Phased-Based Methodology 
[1] Preparation [4] Eradication 
[2] 
Identification 
[5] Recovery 
[3] Containment 
[6] Lessons 
Learnt 
Phased-Based + Value-Based 
Preparation Phase 
Identification Phase 
Not used 
[1] Isolation of critical Assets [2] Declaration & Assessment 
Containment Phase [3] Partial System Recovery [4] Escalation Prevention 
Eradication Phase 
[5] Eradication & Full 
System Recovery Process 
Recovery Phase 
Lessons Learnt  [6] Attacker Identification 
Overall 
Performance  
[7] Collaboration with 
Internal CSIRT 
[8] Reporting to the 
management 
[7] Overall System Performance 
[7] Overall System Performance 
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3.4.4 Defining Performance Indicators 
The main philosophy behind the use of performance indicators and metrics is the 
renowned principle: “What’s measured can be managed” [106]. The principle is sometimes 
phrased as: “one cannot improve what one cannot measure” [11] or “if you cannot measure 
it, you cannot improve it [153]”. Therefore, Performance Indicators (PIs) are factors that 
determine the quality of an incident response (See Section 4.3). In this proposed CSIRPE 
framework, performance indicators are considered the interface between the performance 
goals/aspects and the actual measurement tools, i.e. performance metrics.  
 
Figure 13: Defining Performance Indicators Process 
Using the proposed CSIRPE framework, the two main sources in which PIs will be 
derived from are the goals and aspects. Performance indicators can be viewed as adverbs 
for the PE goals, adjectives for the PE aspects or descriptors for the states of response 
system. Examples include readiness, reliability, stability and length of response time.  
[1] Analyze 
PE Goals 
[2] Analyze 
PE Aspects 
[3] Analyze 
overall system 
[4] Assess 
Measurability 
[5] Align with 
Goals & Aspects 
[6] Identify 
KPIs 
[7] Provide 
Formal Definition 
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It is expected that each goal and aspect will be mapped to at least one PI. It is a 
common practice to consider PIs with high impact on the performance as key performance 
indicators (PKIs). Each PI should have at least one performance metric (PM) as a tool to 
provide quantifiable measurements.  
The process of developing performance indicators can be abstracted in seven steps, 
see Table 26.  These seven steps can be grouped under three main stages. In the first stage, 
the goals and aspects are analyzed to identify the performance factors. The result is a list 
of desired features about the quality of the response activities and the achievement of goals. 
Since each goal and performance aspect need to be analyzed separately, the whole response 
system is then analyzed as one unit for determining the higher level performance factors. 
The output of the analysis is a list of performance factors, called PIs.  
In the second stage, each PI is inspected individually to assess its measurability and 
its alignment to the goals and aspects. Non-measurable PIs need to be discarded or 
redefined. The mapping between the PIs and the goals and aspects need to be verified. If a 
goal or aspect has no mapping to the pool of PIs, then either one PI need to be generated, 
or the goal need to be re-defined.    
The final stage includes the classification and formal definition for each PI. The 
classification can be based on priority, i.e. KPI and regular PI, or based on factors suitable 
for the operating environment. A sample template for how formal definition of a PI could 
be achieved is presented in Table 49 (See Appendix A). Each PI will be properly defined, 
outlined with the goals/aspects and later with the developed performance metrics. When 
mapping to several goals/aspects, the formal definition should elaborate the context of 
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interpreting the PI under each goal/aspect, if necessary. More details about the seven steps 
in the above process are provided in Table 26. 
# Step Description 
1 
Goal 
Analysis 
Analyze each PE goal to derive factors that determine the 
achievement of the goal. This could be done by inspecting the 
action verbs used in the goal statement and searching for an 
adverb that describe a good implementation of the action verb, 
or a noun that describes the state of the system after achieving 
the goal 
2 
Aspect 
Analysis 
Analyze each PE aspect to derive factors that determine the 
quality of the outputs resulting from implementing the aspect’s 
sequence of actions. This could be done by inspecting the nouns 
used in the aspect statement and searching for an adjective that 
describes good output, or a noun that describes the state of the 
system if the actions within a PE aspect were successfully 
implemented.  
3 
System 
Analysis 
Examine the overall IR system and think of factors that 
determine the success of incident handling. This could be done 
by inspecting the PE objectives, the overall system performance 
aspect and thinking of the state of the system if multiple PI’s 
(derived from step 1 and 2) were positive.   
4 Measurability 
Examine the feasibility of using tools to measure the factors 
obtained from Steps 1 to 3. Focus on tools that are represented 
in numbers or provide objective assessment. Good PIs need to 
have two or more measuring tools. Re-examine or discard 
indicators that are non-measurable  
5 Mapping 
Examine how each factor relate to the goals and aspects. Each 
factor should be mapped to at least one goal or aspect. If a factor 
relates to three or more goals and/or aspects, then it should be 
mapped to the overall system performance aspect  
6 Classification 
Distinguish between indicators that are mapped to the overall 
system performance aspect and those mapped to individual 
goals and aspects. Also, assign priority levels to these 
indicators. A simple scheme is to use key performance 
indicators (KPI) and regular indicators (PI) 
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7 
Formal 
Definition 
For each PI, assign a name, provide description, define scope 
and priority, outline relationship to goals and aspects and 
possible performance metrics.  
Table 26: Description of the Steps for Defining Performance Indicators 
Note that the second stage of the above development process can be considered a 
validation phase. The two factors that determine that the selection of performance 
indicators are valid is the measurability and alignment to the PE goals. These two factors 
are assessed during the development process and also later when validating the whole 
CSIRPE model (Component 8). Furthermore, as PIs are interface between goals and 
performance metrics, the validation of both indirectly contribute to the validation of the 
PIs.  
Finally, in Chapter 4, a compilation of performance indicators is presented. Each 
performance indicator is defined, and supported with interpretation guidelines and sample 
performance metrics. 
3.5   Phase III: Measuring CSIR Performance 
After completing the second development phase, the main characterization of the 
CSIRPE framework would be the list of PIs. Each PI represents a desirable performance 
feature of the response system, and the full list of PIs is supposed to capture the overall 
performance of the system. The next phase is to design performance analysis and 
measurement tools. This can be broken into three main steps: deriving performance 
metrics, defining performance analysis techniques and defining validation techniques, see 
Figure 14. The details of these three steps are provided in this section. 
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Figure 14: Transition from Phase II to Phase III: Measuring CSIR Performance 
3.5.1 PE Metrics Derivation Process 
At the end of the response life cycle, the CSIRT will need to prepare a report 
demonstrating its success based on these outlined PIs. In order to do that, a CSIRT needs 
to think about the tools that it will use to measure its success in each of the PIs. These tools 
are called performance metrics. 
The IRPE literature, as presented in Section 2.2.3, does not discuss models for 
deriving performance metrics, as there is no standardized way for achieving this and it is 
highlight dependent on the system design. Instead, discussion is concentrated on the 
desirable features and design considerations for performance metrics. A similar discussion 
in the context of CSIR is provided here.  
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# 
Design 
Parameter 
Values Description 
M.1 Metric Type 
Performance 
Descriptor 
Is the metric used for actual performance 
measurement or as a descriptor, i.e. input, for 
other performance metrics? 
M.2 Scope 
Generic 
Specific 
Can this metric be used across all security 
incidents, or is it applicable to a set of 
incident categories? 
M.3 Quantifiability 
Quantitative 
Qualitative 
Does this metric provide qualitative or 
quantitative measurement 
M.4 
Measurement 
Tool 
[Type] 
What is the type of qualitative or quantitative 
assessment tool used. If the metric is 
quantifiable does the numbers represent 
actual measurement, calculation output, 
binary values, scale level, …etc.  
M.5 
Performance 
Indicators 
List of PIs 
Is this performance metric used in the 
analysis of a single or multiple performance 
indicators? 
M.6 Dependence 
Direct 
Indirect 
Does this metric depend on measurements 
obtained by other descriptor or performance 
metrics? 
M.7 Accuracy 
Actual 
Estimation 
Does this metric use actual readings or does 
it involve an estimation or assessment by one 
of the CSIRT members? 
M.8 [Conditions] [List] 
In order to provide meaningful measurement, 
are there conditions that need to be satisfied 
before collecting the readings of the PM?  
M.9 [Attributes] [List] 
Does the metric have attributes which may 
have impact on the reading, like instrument 
or software name, time stamp, estimation 
method, ..etc 
M.10 Interpretation [Description] 
How should the outputs be interpreted? 
When does it indicate good or poor 
performance? Are there contextual issues 
that need to be taken into consideration? 
Table 27: Design Parameters for Performance Metrics 
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  Starting with performance metrics design considerations that are relevant to CSIR, 
a list of ten design considerations is presented in Table 27. Each design issue poses a 
question to the designers that targets how the metric will be used or analyzed. The list can 
be treated as a guideline for deriving performance metrics from each PI. 
Using a formal definition template that is consistent with the template used for 
defining PIs, performance metrics can be formally defined through the template in Table 
50 (See Appendix A).  
Once performance metrics are derived, a CSIRT needs to verify the correctness and 
usefulness of these metrics. Tools used for this verification are called PE meta-metrics. 
Several works in other IR disciplines addressed PE meta-metrics [23] [120] [121] [122] 
[123]. However, only selective list of these meta-metrics are relevant to CSIR. The 
applicable metrics to CSIR can be classified under three main meta-metrics: relevance, 
comparability and simplicity, which can be abbreviated as (RCS). A description of these 
three meta-metrics is provided in  Table 28.  
Feature Description 
(R) Relevance 
 Aligned with a KPI, or several PIs 
 Compatible with the CSIR capability  
 Expected to provide results that could enhance performance 
(C) Comparable 
 Uses objective assessment methods 
 Provides actual or well-defined estimation range 
 Demonstrates invariance to some system factors 
(S) Simplicity 
 Simple to read and analyze 
 Uses minimum resources and endures little overhead 
 Unambiguous to interpret by both technical and non-technical 
members of the organization 
Table 28: Features of good CSIR performance metrics 
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M.1. Metric Type  
There are two types of metrics that can be used in PE: descriptive and performance 
metrics. It is important to distinguish between each type as descriptive metrics can be easily 
confused as performance metrics which can produce inaccurate PE results.  
Descriptive metrics are those used in measuring a specific property of the CSIR 
system that does not necessarily reflect performance. For instance, the size of the response 
team and number of infected machines in an incident are examples of descriptive metrics 
that do not reflect a performance quality in themselves. Descriptive metrics normally 
provide actual readings and are simple to collect. They are mainly used as inputs for the 
calculation of performance metrics. On the other hand, performance metrics are directly 
aligned with the pool of performance indicators through providing measurement 
mechanisms. 
It is desirable for an organization to have a good pool of descriptive metrics which 
can be recorded by the responders or through automated tools. These descriptive metrics 
can be used in calculating several performance metrics. It is also important to detect any 
inaccuracy or inconsistency in descriptive metrics, as that can propagate to the validity and 
accuracy of performance metrics.  
M.2. Performance Metric Scope  
Some performance metrics are generic and could be used across all types of 
incidents. Examples include, incident response time, incident classification accuracy and 
customer satisfaction. Others are specific to certain category of incidents or under specific 
conditions. For instance, a server down time or unavailability is a metric that is relevant to 
incidents involving denial of service attacks. Another example is average response time 
from external agencies, which can be mapped to the partnership effectiveness PI. This 
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metric is only applicable if the incident handling involved some contact with pre-defined 
external agencies like law enforcement or peer CSIRTs.  
Generic PMs’ analysis need always to be conducted in performance reports as they 
provide some holistic analysis of the response performance. They are also the most 
commonly used tools in benchmarking. Furthermore, they can be used to identify 
performance bottlenecks relevant to the management of the incident. On the hand, specific 
PMs provide more focused performance analysis. They are also used to identify 
performance issues pertaining to the technical aspects of the system.  
M.3. Quantifiability  
   The advantages and disadvantages of using quantitative and qualitative 
performance measurement tools were discussed in the design parameter D.7. However, the 
discussion was focused on the higher level decision of whether to incorporate qualitative 
measures or not into a CSIRPE framework. In this step, a CSIRT would need to decide for 
each PI whether a qualitative or quantitative measure needs to be developed, assuming that 
a framework supports both.  
The following considerations need to be taken into account when making the 
decision: 
1- Representativeness: Which tool provides better capturing (realistic and 
holistic) of the performance as defined by the PI? 
2- Simplicity: Which tool provides a simpler method for collecting and analyzing 
the PI? 
3- Cost: Which tool would consumes less of the CSIRT’s time and resources? 
4- Sustainability: Which tool is more sustainable in the long run? 
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5- Objectivity: Which tool strikes better balance between objectivity and 
representativeness?  
As a general design strategy, it is preferred to support a PI that has several 
quantitative measures with a qualitative measure, and vice versa. This will ensure that the 
PI is assessed more comprehensively, and is deemed by some practitioners to provide more 
effective performance analysis [154].   
Finally, several performance evaluation studies suggest that qualitative metrics can 
acquire the benefits of quantitative metrics if designed through fuzzy logic. Fuzzy models 
have the feature of being quantified but over a qualitative scale, which provides a 
reasonable performance reporting. Example fuzzy performance metrics include [155] for 
measuring flexibility, [156] for measuring individual performance, [157] integration of 
fuzzy metrics in the balanced score card (BSC) model, and [158] for measuring agility.  
M.4. Measurement Tool 
When a decision is made that a specific PI is to be measured through a qualitative 
or quantitative metric, the next decision would be which measurement tool should be used. 
For example, qualitative metric could be a checklist, survey or a rating on a scale or rubric 
assessed by specific individuals. Likewise, a quantitative measure can be additive, 
multiplicative, average, variance or simple counting. Each of these “measurement 
instruments” have advantages and some shortcomings, and it is a design decision by the 
CSIRT to define each PM by an appropriate instrument. Although this step might seem 
simple, it should be noted that subtle changes in the measurement tools can have significant 
impacts on the performance analysis.  
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M.5. Performance Indicators 
Using the framework proposed in this project, a performance metric needs to 
originate from some performance indicator. Occasionally, there might be a performance 
metric discussed in academia or among practitioners that a CSIRT would consider 
deploying. In that case, there needs to be clear alignments between the PM and the pool of 
PIs. A “celebrated” PM that cannot be aligned with the outlined PIs is of no practical 
benefits.  
Each performance metric can be mapped to a single or multiple PIs. If a team uses 
a small number of PMs, then the team should target selecting PMs that either measure a 
KPI, or multiple PIs.  
Whenever a PM maps to multiple PIs there needs to be clear outline of how the PM 
results should be interpreted in the lens of each PI. For instance, if the network injected 
with a virus/worm and a large number of machines in various subnets are infected. Let the 
virus targets transmitting “private” or “secure” data from each machine to an external 
source. Assume the team uses a metric called: “rate of secured machines” which measures 
number of machines inspected and successfully cleaned per hour. Also assume that this 
metric is aligned with two PIs: “eradication effectiveness” and “confidentiality”. Under the 
first PI, a higher rate of secured machines indicate might indicate better eradication 
effectiveness. The same could be argued about “confidentiality” as the more secure 
machines the higher confidentiality is maintained. However, if machines have different 
weights in terms of the “security level” of the stored data, then using the above PM is 
incorrect. The rate should be calculated using machines with the same level of “security 
level data”.    
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M.6. Dependence  
One of the methods that the ISO 9216  [85] classifies metrics is through the 
relationship to other metrics. A metric that is independent from other metric measurements 
is called direct metric, otherwise it is called indirect metric.  
Although it would be desirable for simplification purposes to have all metrics as 
direct, the majority of practically used metrics are indirect. Additive and multiplicative 
metrics, and the majority of metrics with statistical properties are examples of indirect 
metrics.  
When deploying indirect metrics, the designers need to insure that all inputs are 
normalized and variances are minimized. This is a necessary condition for producing 
correct results, and should be outlined in the definition of the metric. For instance, total 
response time is an additive metric that uses several time measurements, each pertaining 
to an elapsed period during the incident handling cycle. If these time periods are collected 
from several sources, then all of these sources need to share the same definition and 
understanding of how the incident timeline is divided. This specific simple observation is 
documented to be one of the issues that caused inconsistencies in performance 
measurements [117].  
M.7. Accuracy  
The concepts of accuracy and precision are essential to the theory of measurement. 
But, as noted by [116] performance measurements operate on the tradeoffs between quality 
and available resources compared to accuracy and precision. In the real world, it is more 
meaningful to report to a manager that the unavailability of a resource is between 0.3 and 
0.4 compared to an exact value like 0.3435 [159] [160].  
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To be more specific, it could be argued that most CSIRPE PMs do not require high 
accuracy to provide meaningful interpretation. However, the CSIRPE system require some 
metrics to be accurate. This is normally applicable to descriptive metrics like timestamps 
and counting metrics, e.g. number of compromised records.   
When defining PMs for a CSIRPE the following issues need to be considered with 
regards to accuracy: 
1- Does the metric require accurate measurements? Metrics that require exact 
values should be distinguished from those that do not 
2- Whenever accuracy is not mandated, a tolerance gap should be defined. This 
can appear in the form of a margin of error [78], variance [161] or confidence 
rating [73]. 
3- When estimations are used, factors used in the estimation should be recorded 
4- Whenever estimation is made, there needs to be a mechanism to identify the 
practitioner that made the estimation.  
5- Does an estimation require a validation? The simplest method is to make 
multiple estimation by several practitioners and record the variance.    
M.8. Conditions  
Conditions refer the description of the setting that is needed to collect a meaningful 
reading for the PM. For example, some performance metrics concerning the team 
performance would require that the number of team members be above a specific number. 
Also, volatile data collected during live forensics might require specific processes or 
network traffic be switched off or temporary disabled while collecting a measurement. The 
same would be applied to a statistical metrics which might require the domain size be above 
a specific value in order to make a meaningful reading.  
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Specifying the conditions is not required for all metrics. However, neglecting 
specifying the conditions of measurement collection may result in inaccuracies in 
measurement or interpretation.  
M.9. Attributes  
The definition of some metrics require the specification of attributes. Unlike the 
conditions which focus on collection, attributes impact how metric readings are interpreted. 
For example, the form type and number of surveyed individuals do impact how a survey 
results are interpreted. Also, in some settings the type of software used in measurement or 
analysis impact how results are interpreted. Other factors include, who conducted the PM 
reading analysis, environment context and incident context.  
M.10. Interpretation  
Each PM needs guidelines on how it should be interpreted in reference of 
performance. For instance, does a high value indicate good or poor performance? Does the 
PM reading demonstrates actual measure or a trending measure? Does the variance in the 
metric reading reflect performance levels or not? Does the metric reading need coupling 
with other PM readings?  
3.5.2 PE Analysis Models 
When the structure of the PE framework is designed and it is equipped with 
measurement tools, it is desirable for the CSIRT to foresee how results produced from 
deploying the PE framework will be analyzed. Doing this provides more objective 
assessment that endures less overhead compared to a situation when analysis methods are 
outlined after the completion of incident handling.  
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A list of performance analysis methods were extracted from the performance 
analysis literature, see Table 29. These methods are examined for adaptation to the CSIR 
field. The list is also used in developing the Integrated Analysis & Validation Model (IAV) 
proposed in Section 5.2.  
# 
Analysis 
Model 
Description 
Category 
N.1 Gap Analysis 
Difference between optimal / desired 
performance and actual performance 
(Comparative) 
Component 
Analysis 
N.2 Benchmarking 
Compare incident performance against 
industry best practices and competitors’ 
performance 
N.3 
Targeted 
Analysis 
Perform thorough analysis of a specific 
aspect of incident handling or confine 
analysis to a restricted focus to identify 
potential enhancement venues 
N.4 
Bottleneck 
Analysis 
Analyzes the PE results to spot performance 
bottlenecks, i.e. those that have high impact 
on poor performance Deficiency 
Analysis 
N.5 
Root-cause 
Analysis 
Asks why poor performance happened.  
N.6 
Goal 
Achievement 
Evaluates the success of achieving the PE 
goals 
Holistic 
(System) 
Analysis 
N.7 
Trend 
Analysis 
Analyzes performance over a period of team 
seeking the identification of recurring 
performance issues 
N.8 
Stakeholder 
Analysis 
Conducts PE analysis from the perspective of 
various stakeholders  
N.9 
Predictive 
Analysis 
Evaluates the system performance under 
several hypothetical situations 
Predictive 
Analysis 
Table 29: PE Analysis Methods 
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The above nine analysis techniques provide different perspectives to performance 
analysis. The techniques also vary in the validity degree of the performance results, as some 
techniques could be applied informally. The main tradeoff of these techniques is objectivity 
and operationalization, i.e. producing validated results vs. producing results that reflect the 
operational nature of CSIR and result in actionable plans.   
The above techniques can be grouped based on objectivity or based on the analysis 
subject. The NIST document uses a binary classification for assessment methods in the 
form of subjective and objective methods. Through this classification, the analysis 
techniques of N1,N2 and N7 demonstrate a higher level of objectivity due to their reliance 
on quantified metrics. The remainder of the techniques can be subjective or objective 
depending on the selected method of analysis.  
In terms of analysis subject, the techniques can be categorized into four main 
categories: component analysis techniques, deficiency analysis techniques, holistic or 
system analysis techniques and predictive analysis techniques.   
Component analysis techniques focus on analyzing separate parts of the system 
independent from the remaining parts. This allows for more focuses analysis and better 
identification of technical and/or performance issues. On the other hand, holistic or system 
analysis techniques view the system as a whole, and analyzes performance through the 
combined interaction of various system components. The DHS document [162] uses the 
terms component metrics and enterprise level metrics (ELMs). This is analogous to the 
usage of component analysis and holistic analysis.   
Deficiency analysis targets unfolding performance bottlenecks and factors that 
impact performance. Deficiency analysis can be applied on the component level or on the 
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holistic level. Finally, predictive techniques are advanced methods that involve comparing 
actual performance to hypothetical scenarios of what could have been done.  
A CSIRT is not required to apply all of the above techniques. Instead, each team 
should select methods that are suitable for the operating environment in a manner that 
provides objectivity to the analysis. A list of recommendations of how to select analysis 
techniques is presented in Table 51 (Appendix A).  
N.1. Gap Analysis 
Gap Analysis is one of the most common techniques for analyzing performance 
[163] [164] [165]. The technique measures the difference between the desired performance 
and actual performance. The results should recognize the aspects of the response that are 
lacking in terms of performance or the extent of the performance problem [135]  .  
In the context of CSIR, the first question that arises is what is the optimal 
performance? The theoretical answer can be found in the Universal PE Framework 
(UPEF), see Section 5.1, in which optimal can be mapped to the idealistic values. However, 
in many situations achieved performance can be too far from this optimal reference, due to 
practical considerations. Therefore, the optimal performance can be defined in operational 
terms as maximum potential performance. This has been highlighted by [166] as a more 
realistic method for applying gap analysis. The author referred to maximum potential as: 
“reasonable” performance.  
Yet, the above does not solve the issue, as defining “reasonable 
 or “maximum potential” performance in absolute terms is nontrivial. Potential 
performance is sensitive to factors related to the operating environment and advancement 
of technology, which makes the definition relativistic.   
The above discussion suggests that the a CSIRT can either: 
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1- Perform gap analysis over the ideal values and maximum potential values and 
report both results 
2- Perform gap analysis over the maximum potential values, associated with a 
justification of how these values were calculated and considering some margin 
of error.   
The second issue arises from reading the following example of objective 
assessment in the NIST document [1]: “measuring the difference between the initial impact 
assessment and the final impact assessment”.  Indeed, this applies gap analysis but from a 
different angle, which is the difference between perceived values and actual values, or 
estimated values and actual values. The objective of such analysis is to measure the 
effectiveness of the estimation techniques of the CSIRT, or the ability of the team to make 
decisions under unpredictable conditions. Specifically, it could be used in models like the 
NFP unpredictability platform presented in Section 5.5.  
Based on the above, the term ‘gap analysis’ can be refined in the context of CSIR 
to mean: “difference between optimal and actual performance, or between perceived and 
actual values for parameters in the incident response”.   
N.2. Benchmarking 
See Section D.6: Benchmarking.  
N.3. Targeted Analysis 
Targeted analysis is a generic term used here for any analysis motivated by a 
specific objective normally targeting a system component or a performance aspect. It is 
noted in [163] that targeted analysis comes as a third step after gap analysis and root-cause 
analysis. Thus, targeted analysis is geared towards more precise identification of the causes 
or towards finding solutions.  
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N.4. Bottleneck Analysis 
Performance bottlenecks are factors that render performance. This can happen 
through causing system failure or causing the system to operate under poor performance 
conditions. The removal of these factors normally cause a significant boosting to the 
system performance. Bottleneck analysis is the method of finding these factors. This 
process is normally done after gap analysis if it establishes that a specific incident response 
reflects negative performance characteristics [167]  
Bottleneck analysis is normally conducted through analyzing a large pool of post-
incident data. However, it could also be performed during the preparation phase when 
specific tests are performed, like scalability testing [168]. Furthermore, trend analysis data 
could be essential to the identification of bottlenecks.   
Causes of performance bottlenecks could be due to system capacity, response 
delays or incompetency. The following list of bottleneck causes were reported by several 
CSIR practitioners to be common [169] [170] [171]:  
1- Reliance on tools which might be ineffective or outdated .  
2- White noise, i.e. large number of false alarms and redundant alerts 
3- Failure to adequately set priorities  
4- Lack of competency from responders  
There is no standardized method for conducting bottleneck analysis. It has been 
even argued that it is more of an art than a science [172]. However, the general approach 
is to conduct analysis over incident data, and especially trend analysis results. The analysis 
could focus on processes (i.e. series of actions) or on actors (e.g. CSIRT members, 
software/tools). Identified bottlenecks are analyzed for correlations with various factors 
which are later validated through a process of elimination.    
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N.5. Root-Cause Analysis 
While gap analysis wants to find if a problem exist, root-cause analysis focuses on 
what caused it [163]. Although there are attempts to propose formalized models for 
conducting root-cause analysis that involve digital evidence [173], most organizations use 
informal or semi-formal root-cause analysis techniques mainly conducted by the technical 
teams [174]. One of the objectives of the current CSIRT Metrics Special Interest Group is 
to develop models for root-cause analysis of operational benefit [52] 
Three example methods of how root-cause analysis could be applied to the field of 
CSIR had been suggested by [29]. These methods are: the five-whys approach, why-
because analysis (WBA) and cause-and-effect (fishbone) diagrams.  
The five-whys approach is borrowed from the Six Sigma DMAIC methodology 
(Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control) [175]. The approach is simple and can be 
applied to a wide range of scenarios. It starts by writing down a problem, e.g. performance 
issue, and then asking why it happened. A tentative answer is provided which is treated as 
another problem statement and the why question is asked again. In each iteration, the 
problem is broken down further hopefully up to the root-cause of the issue. In each 
iteration, the team needs to reach an agreement on the cause or revisit the previous iteration 
for enhancing the problem statement.  
The why-because analysis (WBA) [176] is another iterative approach that seeks 
causality for accidents. The approach builds a why-because graph (WBG) that analyzes the 
accident and produces a chart that connects causes to effects. The intermediate connecting 
items are called factors, i.e. their occurrence contributed to the occurrence of the incident. 
These factors are categorized and analyzed to construct a list of countermeasures that could 
prevent the incident from re-occurring.  
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The fishbone cause-effect diagram is another cause-root analysis tool that is used 
in Six Sigma, proposed by the Japanese quality scholar, Ishikawa [177]. The analysis 
method is visual and is used during brainstorming sessions for unfolding the causes of an 
incident. This method is effective in determining the root-cause if it is a product of several 
causes. Potential factors are grouped under categories like: rules/policies, 
equipment/software, environment, people …etc. The output of the analysis is a chain of 
causes in the form of a process that led to the incident.  
N.6. Goal Achievement 
Goal Achievement analysis, along with trend analysis and stakeholder analysis are 
types of holistic system analysis techniques. This category of analysis focuses on 
investigating the CSIR system as a whole, compared to reporting performance on 
segregated components of the system.. Using the structure of PE framework presented in 
this project, holistic analysis techniques should be used whenever a CSIRT selects “overall 
performance” as one of its performance aspect. 
Features of using holistic analysis techniques include: 
1- Ensure that performance analysis does not fall into the fox paradox [137]. The 
paradox suggests that good performance in partial aspects of the system might 
not necessarily reflect good overall performance.  
2- Be able to spot performance issues arising from the interaction between various 
system components [107].  
3- Focus on use of sustainable performance measurements compared to 
component analysis that might use performance metrics volatile to incident 
circumstances and used technologies [178].  
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Assessing goal achievement is a common practice in organizations and businesses, 
both at the scope of long-term strategic goals and at the short-term project-based objectives 
[151] [19] [78]. The CSIRPE framework presented in this project is goal-oriented as 
definition of goals is considered the highest system level definition from which 
performance aspects, indicators and metrics are derived.  
The following approaches could be used to evaluate the achievement of goals: 
1- A simple Yes/No assessment of whether each goal has been achieved. This is 
relevant when goals are defined through well-specified targets. Therefore, it is 
more likely to be used for evaluating strategic sub-goals, or goals set for a 
specific unit or group of PE activities. An example of CSIRPE goal evaluated 
through this approach is when a CSIRT sets a threshold time given for the 
CSIRT from the moment an incident (on a specific severity scale) is detected to 
the moment of the first CSIRT meeting concerning that incident.   
2- A calculation of the percentage of achievement. This could be achieved in two 
ways: action-oriented or process-oriented analysis. In the action-oriented 
approach, achieving a goal is mapped to performing a group of activities or sub-
targets, regardless of these activities being correlated or exclusive. Level of 
achievement at each activity is measured, and the total goal achievement is 
calculated bottom-up. The process-oriented is suitable when achieving a goal is 
defined through a plan that outlines a process or roadmap towards fully 
achieving the goal. The percentage of achievement would be a measure of the 
amount achieved through the process line towards the end-goal.  
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3- A qualitative achievement analysis. This approach addresses the issue that not 
all goals can be measured in quantifiable fashion. In such scenarios, qualitative 
measures could be used to assess how the CSIR achieved the set goals. For 
instances, goals involving terms like flexibility, adaptability, team cohesion and 
trust are more likely to be measured through qualitative methods.  
N.7. Trend Analysis 
Trend analysis conducts performance analysis over a period of time or over a group 
of incidents. There are two major benefits coming from using trend analysis in performance 
measurement. First, the analysis transcends good and poor performance due to the unusual 
circumstances which provides more realistic representation of the system performance. 
Second, trend analysis captures the effectiveness of the enhancement processes and lessons 
learnt analysis through demonstrating whether the system performance is improving or 
deteriorating after the implementation of recommendations.  
Although trend analysis is independent of individual incident analysis, it is a good 
practice to apply performance measurements on both fronts [135]. For instance, after 
recording response time for a specific incident, the average response time could be 
inspected for increase or decrease [23].  
The benefits of conducting trend analysis in the context of CSIR are summarized 
by [29] and [74]: 
1- Identify patterns of cyber security incidents 
2- Detect any increase or change in the number and type of vulnerabilities 
3- Identify common factors that influence the occurrence of incidents and proper 
incident handling 
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4- Determine the effectiveness of security controls 
5- Identify targeted areas of the organization  
6- Understand costs and impacts associated with cyber incidents 
In addition, note that trend analysis could be performed jointly by multiple 
organizations that have established information sharing agreements. Such trend analysis 
can be helpful in determining attack trends and mechanisms, and consequently which 
countermeasures were effective.  
N.8. Stakeholder Analysis 
This category of analysis techniques suggest that performance should be 
evaluated from various perspectives, each corresponding to the perspective of a group of 
stakeholders. It has been shown that applying financial metrics into non-financial aspects 
is problematic [134]. A brief discussion is provided below about three common 
techniques that fall under this category: balanced scorecards, the performance prism and 
triple bottom line performance system. 
The Balanced scorecards performance measurement model [134] is considered one 
of the early mechanisms triggering multi-perspective performance analysis. The model was 
originally designed to reform the traditional practice of institutions that rely only on 
financial performance metrics like return on investment. The model analyzes performance 
against four perspectives: financial perspective, customer perspective, internal perspective 
and innovation and learning perspective. The model is widely used by major international 
corporations. It is also used to derive some information security performance systems 
[179]. However, the model was criticized for its bias towards the economic aspect of 
performance [178], along with other practical challenges [180].  
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The prism performance model [181] attempts to expand the focus on financial 
stakeholders to include other organizational perspectives. The model analyzes performance 
through five perspectives: stakeholder satisfaction, strategies, processes, capabilities and 
stakeholder contribution.  
The triple bottom line model [182] expands further to include stakeholders that 
have no transactional interests with the organization, like local government and human 
services. The model analyzes performance from three main perspectives: economic, social 
and environmental. In other words, the model goes beyond business and organizational 
aspects to include external and indirect stakeholders. It has been argued in [178] that this 
wide approach creates more sustainable performance systems.  
N.9. Predictive Analysis 
Predictive analysis techniques are more advanced methods that not only include 
collected performance data for analysis but also consider hypothetical scenarios of what 
could have been done. Such methods are used across disciplines for purposes of evaluating 
performance [82] [155] and for evaluating the reliability [103] and robustness [155] of 
response systems. 
Predictive analysis is bidirectional, i.e. it inspects the past and the future. When 
analyzing past actions, the focus is on what could have been done better, or what could 
have been the output if an alternative course of actions were implemented. The future 
inspection attempts to foresee the impacts of the implementation of some control measures 
or security policies. The simplest method of inspecting both directions is through the what-
if analysis approach. Below are some examples of how this approach could be used in the 
context of CSIR performance evaluation: 
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1- What-if specific performance metrics were deployed and measured [41].  
2- How specific incident activities and their countermeasures impact infrastructure 
[52] 
3- Conducting cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or break-even Analysis for the cost 
effectiveness of incident handling procedures [183].  
4- Expected rewards of implementing preventive measures [31] over the system 
security and CSIRT performance.  
5- Forecasting future performance issues, e.g. failures or bottlenecks, before they 
arise based on current system states [181]  
3.5.3 PE Validation Models 
The last step in the framework development is investigating the validity of the 
performance models. Prior to this discussion, an understanding of what ‘validity’ means in 
the context of CSIRPE is presented. 
In simple terms, measurement validity is ensuring that numbers and scores actually 
represent what they claim to be [184] [23]. Expressed in other terms, to ensure that users 
cannot circumvent the results of the performance metrics [135]. Translating this to CSIR 
terms, validity means ensuring that the performance results correspond to actual incident 
handling performance.  
However, validation has another dimension pertaining to design, which is to ensure 
that the designed performance system actually captures the expected needs. This is 
sometimes distinguished by the term ‘verification’. This usage is compatible with the wide-
spread  Six-Sigma model that is used for measuring performance in business and 
manufacturing environments. The Six-Sigma  considers validation of performance models 
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as part of its DFSS (Design for Six Sigma) process which is structured in five phases: 
define, measure, analyze, design and validate [175].   
In this project, the term validation is used generically to include the above two 
aspects of validation. In addition, the above usage of the term should not be confused with 
other common usages of validity in the field of computer security which revolve around 
the concept of data integrity.  
As it was documented in the literature survey, several works like [34] have 
documented that the field of computer security is poor in validation methods. However, 
this remark was criticized by its narrow definition of validation which correspond to formal 
methods.  
Analyzing works concerning performance validation, the used methodologies 
could be classified into four types: 
1- Formal Methods: Use rigorous mathematical models for data validation and 
logical arguments for reached conclusions 
2- Heuristic Methods: Instead of performing complete validation, a probability 
could be assigned to how much confidence should be put on the results. 
3- Development methods: argue that if the design and process of collecting and 
analyzing data is valid, then the results are ought to be valid. 
4- Operational methods: disregard theoretical analysis and view the experience 
of the practitioners as the main validator for what works and what does not 
work.   
It was argued earlier in this project that focusing on formal methods is of little 
benefits to CSIR practitioners, due to the complexity of the process and the operational 
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nature of the discipline. The later three methodologies will be discussed by giving one or 
two examples, and highlighting advantages and disadvantages. Four methodologies are 
presented in Table 30.  
# 
Validation 
Model 
Description Category 
V.1 
Feedback 
Systems 
Validate design through getting operational 
feedback of what worked and what did not 
Operational 
Validation 
Method 
V.2 Compliance 
Review policies, procedures and processes for 
compliance with industry standards 
Development 
Validation 
Method 
V.3 Bootstrapping 
Achieve validation through involvement of 
management in the development process 
Development 
Validation 
Method 
V.4 
Confidence 
Rating 
Assigning a confidence rating to various 
aspects of the design and analysis 
Heuristic 
Validation 
Table 30: Validation Models for CSIRPE Frameworks 
V.1. Operational Validation (Feedback Systems) 
Validation through operational experience is the main practiced method for 
enhancing CSIR, which is also extendible to CSIRPE. Team members engage in post-
incident analysis to discuss the positive and negative aspects of incident handling. 
Consequently, positive factors are maintained and negative factors are countered through 
correcting measures. The process is iterative as it is repeated after each incident handling. 
For a list of actions performed during post-incident analysis see [26] [59] [1].  
The main arguments for using the operational model go back to three factors. First, 
computer security and so CSIR are operational disciplines. Thus, operational models and 
techniques resonate more naturally with CSIR practitioners. Second, research in the area 
of security metrics suggests that validation is difficult and impractical. Since CSIRPE relies 
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on security metrics, this challenge is passed on. Third, since computer technologies and 
cyber threats are on continuous change, it is easier to develop operational measures instead 
of long-term planning which might not be applicable when technologies or threat tactics 
change. In other words, the overhead of keeping robust validation methods is too high 
taking in consideration the ever-evolving nature of the discipline.  
On the other side, relying on operational findings which suffer from subjectivity  
and are sensitive to short-term factors can be counterproductive. Some classical works in 
military training asserted that relying on experience for learning does not improve people 
[185] [13]. Therefore, unless operational feedback processes are evidence-based and are 
governed by objective procedures, operational feedback outputs cannot be trusted as a 
validation method [15].  
V.2. Development Validation (Compliance) 
Validation through compliance is a method to ensure that a developed model is 
consistent with the industry requirements and best practices. When a CSIRT develops a 
process or model, e.g. performance model, establishing compliance suggests basic 
validation that the proposed model is good.  
Since standards are developed through careful and collaborative efforts of industry 
and research experts, it provides a sufficient indicator to an organization that its 
implemented system is sufficiently good. This brings the advantage that an organization 
will grow through the growth of the industry as a whole, and it suggests that the 
organization need not to devote resources to developing better solutions, unless it is 
necessary.  
The disadvantage of relying on compliance as a validation scheme is that standards 
are normally higher-level and do not necessary address details that might be crucial to the 
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success of the model. This is true about the NIST and CERT documents which only provide 
very basic information with regards to performance evaluation.  
V.3. Development Validation (Bootstrapping)  
Unlike compliance which ensures that a developed model meets industry 
expectations, bootstrapping ensures that a developed model meets the organization 
expectations. The term bootstrapping refers to a development method in which the 
developers regularly validate the design with the management and constituents throughout 
the development stages [129]. The term can also be used to refer to the validation 
investigation results, through iterative validation with various teams about the findings of 
each investigation steps [186].  
The main advantages of bootstrapping is its simplicity and its assurance that the 
designed model is aligned with the organizational mission and objectives. However, 
caution should be observed as relying solely on organizational needs without considering 
best industry practices may produce ineffective models.  
An example of how bootstrapping could be used to enhance CSIR performance 
system can be found in [161]. The study targeted developing and enhancing system 
trustworthiness through constructive system design and paying attention to requirements. 
Trust is defined here as a higher measure composed of security, reliability survivability 
and other sub-system measurement tools. 
Another example applicable to the CSIRPE framework presented in this project, is 
the validation of performance metrics design. After designing and formulating a list of 
performance metrics, it is a good practice to review the list and perform a quick review. 
This review needs to be done by several individuals, other than the developers, to ensure 
that the list meets the expectations. This review, which is a form of bootstrapping 
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validation, can be done in iterations: first by the technical teams, then by the quality staff 
and finally by the management and the CSIRPO.   
V.4. Heuristic Validation (Confidence Rating)  
Heuristic validation methods use techniques that rely on probability instead of 
clear-cut metrics.  It could be argued that since security can never be guaranteed, then so 
validation of security systems cannot be certain. Using heuristic approaches, systems are 
validated through expressing how much confidence is being exemplified. Heuristic 
approaches are used in computer security metrics [162]. For instance, password strength is 
determined by heuristic approaches to a predefine thermometer.   
 Using the above understanding, heuristic approaches could be used to validate 
performance design and also performance results. The design is validated heuristically by 
inspecting elements like reliability, trust, failures, risks and survivability [103] [183]. 
Performance results can be validating through assigning a confidence rating to the results, 
similar to the methods used by [73] [42].  
Although heuristic approaches provide practical and simple solutions to a 
complicated problem, they could suffer from subjective interpretation. For instance, what 
does it mean that a CSIRT executed a response that is in the range of [90-80%] cost 
effective. Such statement can be interpreted by different parties, e.g. financial officers vs. 
technical staff, in different ways. Therefore, heuristic approaches need to follow clear 
definitions and assessment processes, which could be argued to resemble effective 
qualitative assessment.  
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3.6 Phase IV: Implementing a CSIRPE Model 
3.6.1 PE Functional Models  
While the PE Design Process focuses on actions to build a PE model for a specific 
environment, it only describes actions that are performed at the preparation stage. Another 
model is needed to address when and how PE actions are executed during the life cycle of 
a response. These models will be referred to as: “PE functional models”.  
The design of PE functional models highly depends on when PE analysis is 
expected to be performed, which is expressed in the design parameter D.5: Analysis Time. 
Three functional models are presented below corresponding to the three possible values for 
parameter D.5. The presentation of these models takes into account Assumption A2.1 about 
the use of the Hybrid Model for the IR life Cycle.  
# Name D.5 Value Description 
F.1 
Design-Collect-
Analyze (DCA) 
Post-Incident 
Measurements collected during incident 
handling, all analysis done afterwards 
F.2 PE Monitor Continuous 
PE is monitored throughout the incident 
response, frequently assessed and results are 
fed-back to the CSIRT 
F.3 
Incremental 
Model 
Incremental 
PE is analyzed at pre-defined points during 
the incident handling process.  
Table 31: Types of PE Functional Models 
F.1 The Design-Collect-Analyze (DCA) Model:  
The Design-Collect-Analyze (DCA) model is the simplest and most commonly 
functional approach used by CSIRTs. The model concentrates performance evaluation 
activities to the preparation and lessons-learnt phases, i.e. the first and last phases of the 
CSIR life cycle. During incident handling, performance activities are confined to collecting 
measurements for the pre-defined performance metrics, which could be done through 
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automated tools. The main advantage of the DCA model is that it has minimal overhead 
during incident handling, giving responders more time to focus on the technical aspect of 
the response. The shortcoming is its lack of mechanisms to make corrective actions during 
incident handling based on performance data. 
The DCA model is to be used when parameter D.5 is set to “Post-Incident”. A 
graphical depiction of the DCA function model is presented in Figure 15 applies.  
 
Figure 15: DCA Functional Model 
F.2 The PE Monitor Model: 
 The PE Monitor Model uses an on-going approach to performance evaluation. 
During incident handling, a “performance monitor” is used to assess and report 
performance throughout the incident life cycle, see Figure 16. This could be either done 
through setting up performance triggers that send warnings/alerts about the performance 
status of the response calling for the attention of the CSIRT leadership to take corrective 
actions.  
The PE Monitor model is suitable for complex incident responses that needs high 
level of interaction or occupies long response time. In such scenarios, taking corrective 
actions based on performance results would impact the cost-effectiveness of the response 
and enhance the response time. For example, it is suggested that PE monitoring be used for 
the effectiveness of the mitigation of security incidents targeting nuclear facilities [79]. 
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The Monitor model is to be used when parameter D.5 is set to “Continuous”. The 
type and level of rewards expected from adopting a PE monitor model to the field of CSIR 
remains shady. At the basic level, there is no immediate industrial need for using such 
model [7].   
 
Figure 16: PE Monitor Functional Model 
One of the main implications of adopting the PE Monitor Model is the need to 
develop another type of performance measurements, called interactive PMs. The classical 
performance metrics are generally classified as diagnostic or mechanistic tools, while 
interactive PMs are tools for monitoring and control [187]. It has been noted that despite 
interactive PMs being more “organic” the emphasis of the performance measurement 
disciplines had been on the diagnostic tools [188] .  
F.3 The Incremental Model:  
The Incremental Model is a hybrid model that strikes a balance between the benefits 
of the DCA and PE Monitor models. It follows the basic structure of DCA of condensing 
performance evaluations at the preparation and lessons learnt phases, with one exception. 
At specific marks of the incident handling, some partial performance analysis is performed 
for purposes of the on-going incident procedures.  
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The performance evaluation conducted at these marks are condensed and launched 
for specific purposes. It can be as simple as a short report on response time and cost, or 
more informative with a summary of current values to a short list of performance 
indicators/metrics readings. The main motivation of making such intermediate PE analysis 
is the early detection of any major deficiencies in performance to enable planning for 
corrective actions.  
The marks at which incremental analysis is performed can be phase-based, i.e. after 
each phase or a group of phases; at specific time slots during incident handling, e.g. main 
CSIRT meetings; or at/prior to some major activities, e.g. media release, first executive 
summary. Since performance evaluation done at these marks should be simple and 
informative, it can be considered as semi-analysis or partial analysis that will be updated 
later during the more comprehensive analysis done at the lessons learnt phase.  
The incremental model avoids the high overhead associated with continuous 
monitoring but at the same time keeps the team alert if major performance issues need to 
be addressed. In its simplest form, the incremental analysis can have a single mark during 
incident handling. This could be mid-time-point of the incident handling, i.e. after detection 
and initial containment and before full containment and recovery. A depiction of such 
scheme is presented in Figure 17.    
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Figure 17: Incremental PE Functional Model with a Single-Mark 
 
3.6.2 Assigning Roles and Responsibilities 
Discussion about role assignments could have been presented in earlier sections but 
was postponed to this part of the dissertation to provide a description of various activities 
before discussing the expected roles.  
There are various activities related to performance evaluation that need to be done 
prior, during and after incident handling. It is impractical to assume that all of the above 
duties will be carried by a single individual as this involves high overhead and will result 
in poor execution. From the management point of view, this is also undesirable because it 
gives the impression that performance is the responsibility of an individual not the whole 
team; and it tends to view performance evaluation as a separate activity instead of an 
integrated activity within the CIR life cycle. However, it is reasonable to assume that the 
management of the performance evaluation activities will be coordinated by an individual. 
This individual will be referred to as: “computer security incident response performance 
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officer (CSIRPO)”. For simplicity, it is assumed here that the CSIRPO is a CSIRT member 
other than the CSIRT leader. 
 
Figure 18: CSIR Performance Officer Responsibilities  
The CSIRPO collaborates with four main bodies within an organization: the CSIRT 
leadership, the higher management, the quality office and technical teams. A summary of 
main responsibilities of CSIRPO is outlined in Figure 18, and a collaboration chart is 
presented in Figure 19.  
 
Main responsibilities 
 Propose PE system for CSIRP and oversee all relevant planning activities 
 Monitor CSIRT performance during incident handling and provide 
briefings to CSIRT leadership 
 Supervise performance metric development by technical teams 
 Collaborate with Quality Officers for quality assurance, enforcement of 
policies and continuous performance enhancement 
 Submit final PE report with recommendations 
Interact with Higher Management to 
 Define PE Goals & Aspects 
 Approve CSIRPE model 
 Approve PE Analysis Results and 
recommendations 
Works with Technical Teams 
 Verify developed PMs  
 Collect proper PM measurement 
 Review sub-teams and individual 
performance 
Collaborates with CSIRT leadership 
 CSIRP planning & budgeting 
 CSIRT meetings during incident 
handling 
 Preparing post-media briefing 
Collaborates with Quality Office to 
 Align CSIRPE with the 
organization quality system 
 Approve PIs 
 Ensure quality assurance 
 Enforce quality measures 
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Figure 19: Collaboration Chart for CSIRPO and other officers 
There are some basic features that should be satisfied with whoever is to be selected 
for the “performance officer” role. A list of these features is provided in Table 32. In small 
CSIRTs, the performance officer can be the same as the leader of the core CSIRT, while 
in larger CSIRTs, it can be one of the sub-teams leaders. In both scenarios, the performance 
officer is not hired for the sole purposes of performance evaluation, as it would be more 
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practical and cost-effective to assign that role to an existing CSIRT member who would 
have other tasks related to incident handling.  
 Feature Rationale 
1 
Understands the organization’s 
quality assurance policies and 
procedures 
To design PE framework that is aligned 
with the organization’s quality assurance 
system 
2 
Understands the management 
structure of the CSIRT 
To properly delegate tasks among the 
CSIRT members, avoid redundancies, and 
avoid conflict of powers 
3 
Participates in the preparation or 
review of the CSIRP 
To be able to integrate PE within the CSIR 
documentation and implementation 
4 
Values the need for PE within 
CSIR 
Viewing PE as an additional unnecessary 
burden is detrimental to having an effective 
design and inspiring team members 
5 
Has some leadership role within 
the CSIRT 
To be empowered to recommend, and if 
necessary to enforce, changes 
6 
Has basic understanding of the 
technical aspects of CSIR 
To help design effective performance 
metrics that have practical impact 
Table 32: Desired Qualifications of the Performance Officer (CSIRPO) 
3.6.3 Integrating CSIRPE into CSIRP 
The method of integrating a CSIRPIE module into a CSIRP depends on two factors: 
the type of CSIRP and the type of CSIRPE. As discussed in Section 2.1.4, a CSIRP can be 
design to reflect the organizational perspective, to be action-oriented, to facilitate 
maintainability or use a mixture of the three approaches. The selection of the document 
structure will influence how CSIRPE will be embedded in the document. Also, the 
complexity of the developed CSIRPE module will influence the level of details that will 
be presented in the CSIRP.  
 198 
 
Transcending these variances, any CSIRP for a CSIR capability that uses a PE 
module need to at least include the following five elements: 
1- A list of PE goals/objectives that outline how a CSIRPE is expected to serve 
the mission and the organizational goals  
2- How does the CSIRPE relate to the overall quality framework of the 
organization?  
3- A higher-level description of the CSIRPE module and its components 
4- Which aspects of the CSIR system will be subject to evaluation?  
5- What are the key performance indicators?  
There are two basic questions on how the above five points combined with the other details 
of the CSIRPE need to be presented in the CSIRP: 
1- Should the CSIRPE be presented in a separate section in the CSIRP, or should 
its details be integrated across the existing sections?  
2- Which information should be presented in the basic CSIR document, and which 
details should be compiled in a separate appendix? 
Answering the above two questions requires drawing a balance between making 
clear presentation of the objectives and mechanisms of performance evaluation, and 
making sure that this information does not distract a reader from the understanding the 
main CSIR components. For instance, it is expected that details about performance metrics 
and analysis and validation techniques would be put in an appendix.  
In Table 33, a checklist for information that needs to be included in a CSIRP, 
whether in the basic document or in the appendices, is presented. The checklist can be used 
for updating an existing list or as a guideline when preparing a new one.  
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# Checklist Item 
1 
Does the CSIRP has a listing of the PE goals or a description why CSIRPE is 
used? 
2 Does the CSIRP has a summary of the CSIRPE module?  
3 
Does the CSIRP describe how the CSIRPE fits into the organization’s quality 
framework? 
4 
Does the CSIRT structure include a CSIRPO? If not does the document assign a 
primary owner for PE? 
5 
Does the CSIRP describe which aspects of CSIR would be subject to 
performance evaluation? 
6 Does the CSIRP outline the performance indicators and identifies the KPIs? 
7 Does the CSIRP has formal definition of all PIs and PMs? 
8 Are the PIs aligned to goals, and PMs aligned to PIs? 
9 
Does the CSIRP outline when PM readings should be collected and analyzed 
(i.e. functional model)? 
10 
Does the CSIRP include a section about the analysis techniques that will be used 
to analyze the PM results? 
11 
Does the CSIRP outline a mechanism for validating performance analysis 
results? 
12 Does the CSIRP outline when and how PE results will be reported? 
13 
Does the CSIRP outline mechanisms for documenting and maintaining PE 
results? 
14 
Does the section on the review phase of the CSIR life cycle include PE analysis 
in the lessons learnt and the enhancement process? 
Table 33: Checklist for CSIRPE integration into a CSIRP  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
The objective of this chapter is to formulate a list of performance indicators (PIs) 
that CSIRTs can apply to measure performance and generate performance metrics. Because 
organizations define their goals in various ways, it is practically difficult to generate a 
confined list of performance indicators that is applicable to all environments. Therefore, 
this chapter focuses on developing performance indicators that measure the major CSIR 
activities and are more likely to be applicable to a “conventional” CSIR environments.  
The PIs presented in this chapter were selected through the following criteria: 
1- Provide a broad coverage of the CSIR activities, by generating enough PIs that 
correspond to each phase of the CSIR cycle. Several PIs are also presented to 
measure the overall performance. 
2- Satisfy the major CSIR requirements set by the NIST standard [1] and the 
CERT document [2] 
3- Satisfy the incident response requirements set by the National Response 
Framework (NRF) [110] and National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
[109] 
4- Capture the major recommendations of works that investigated some aspects of 
CSIR effectiveness like [61] [74] [9] [97] [52]   
For each performance indicator, a definition is proposed that is relevant to how 
CSIRTs operate. A classification of the PI is provided based on its scope. This is followed 
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by a brief summary of design and interpretation considerations for using the PIs. An 
example or two is provided concerning possible performance metrics that can be derived 
from each PI.  
The chapter is composed of three sections. The first section discusses methods of 
classifying CSIR PIs. The second section inspects guidelines of how an organization should 
select its PIs from the provided list. The last section, which composes most of the chapter 
content lists provides the definition and detailed information about fifty PIs. The list of PIs 
is ordered alphabetically.  
4.1 Classifying Performance Indicators 
Four possible classification schemes could be used to categorize CSIR performance 
indicators. The first scheme considers the value of the PI to the organizational goals by 
distinguishing Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) from regular PIs. This scheme was 
discussed in Section 3.4.4 and is integrated in the framework design. However, this scheme 
is contextual and PIs will be classified differently depending on where there are deployed.  
The second scheme considers the measurement method, i.e. qualitative or 
quantitative. Despite the wide use of this scheme, it is incompatible with the design of the 
proposed framework. It is suitable for frameworks that treat PIs and PMs interchangeably; 
while this project treats PIs as a higher level measurement tool from which PMs will be 
derived. Performance Indicators are designed to be generic such that various tools could 
be used to measure it, which can be qualitative or quantitative or contain a collection of 
both. Therefore, both the first and second approaches are not appropriate for a general 
classification of PIs that is neutral to the environment.   
The third approaches considers the scope of the PI. Performance indicators can be 
classified as generic or specific. Generic PIs focus on the overall performance of the CSIR 
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system, while specific PIs introspect a specific performance component of the system. A 
general method to identify these specific components is to map it to the CSIR life-cycle. 
Using this perspective and using A2.1, specific PIs can be further broken into the following 
categories: [preparation, identification, containment, eradication & recovery, analysis]. 
Note that PIs concerning the “analysis” category can be considered as PIs for measuring 
the effectiveness of CSIR performance frameworks, which is not the focus of this project. 
Therefore, developing “analysis PIs” is limited for the purposes of this project.  
The fourth categorization scheme is derived from the discussion of S.6 about 
viewing performance in terms of CSIRP or CSIRT. A performance indicator can inspects 
the CSIR design and preparation, i.e. activities before the occurrence of an incident. These 
PIs are classified as CSIRP PIs, because the CSIRP is the main reference for readiness. On 
the other hand, PIs that inspect the execution of a CSIRP can be considered CSIRT PIs. 
These performance indicators are mainly interested in measuring performance during the 
incident handling.  
Different methods for categorizing PIs are possible to develop. For example, the 
CSIR Balanced Scorecard model presented in Section 5.3. can be used to classify PIs based 
on the stakeholder perspective. However, the classification of PIs in this chapter will be 
limited to the third and fourth schemes due to their simplicity and potential applicability to 
a wide range of CSIRTs.  
Finally, the above classification schemes should not be treated as hard 
classification techniques. The schemes are considered soft as there is a large intersection 
between various categories. Therefore, categories will be selected based on the relevance 
strength whenever there is an intersection.   
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4.2 Selecting Performance Indicators  
Out of the large pool of PIs presented in the following section, a CSIRT would 
eventually settle on a small selection of PIs.  This suggests that there needs to be guidelines 
on how many and which PIs to select.  
It is noted in [135] that having a small number of metrics has been proven to provide 
practical advantages, as it is difficult to focus on more than five to seven indicators at the 
same time. However, the authors note that this applies to PIs focusing on strategy, while 
PIs focusing on process can be in hundreds. The NIST document on information security 
performance measurement suggests using ten to twenty metrics [189]. The threshold of 
twenty is also endorsed by [190].  
Selecting which performance indicators to use depend on multiple factors, like: 
1- CSIRPE Specifications: The specifications of the developed CSIRPE module 
impact the selection of PIs, as some PIs might be incompatible or infeasible to 
measure. For instance, a CSIRPE that relies on quantitative measures (D.7 = 
“Quantitative) will exclude all PIs that cannot be measured quantitatively. 
Another example is when a CSIRPE is scoped to measuring the execution 
effectiveness (D.8 = “CSIRT”) is not fit to use PIs that are classified under the 
“preparation” category.  
2- CSIRT Structure: For instance, using the sufficiency PI is incompatible with a 
distributed CSIRT that relies on external entities. Also, a small size CSIRT, e.g. 
composed of two or three individuals, might not be best to implement PIs 
concerning communication and team dynamics.  
3- CSIR Goals: The goals of the CSIR, outlined in a CSIRP, determines areas of 
CSIR that are of high importance to each specific CSIRT. For example, a 
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CSIRT order to pay high attention to the protection of classified data would be 
interested in using PIs like Confidentiality, Containment Effectiveness, and 
Shielding Effectives; compared to a CSIRT that focus on ensuring the 
availability of digital resources which may be more interested in PIs like: 
Availability and Continuity. Some PIs are only applicable to special situations like 
attacking host identification which only applies to when prosecution is needed.  
4- PI Interdependency: As a general rule, in order to make reasonable assessment, 
the analysis need to read results of several PIs at the same time [7]. This is due 
to the fact that PIs demonstrate high interdependency, in which performing well 
accordingly to one PI would normally result in performing well according to 
other  
To expand on the above last point about PI interdependency, it is noticed that PIs relate to 
each other in the following ways: 
1- Inclusive: a PI can be generic such that several PIs are considered its 
subcategories. For instance, The Containment Effectiveness PI includes the 
following PIs: Confinement Effectiveness, Shielding Effectiveness and 
Mitigation Effectiveness.   
2- Complementary: Several PIs can measure components of a specific aspect. For 
instance, the Comprehensiveness and Completeness PIs measure different 
aspects of CSIRP effectiveness. However, both PIs compositely constitute the 
overall effectiveness of the plan, and thus are better to be analyzed together. 
3- Contentious: some indicators attempt to measure aspects of performance that 
are tension with other PE aspects. For instance, the Conformance and Flexibility 
PIs demonstrate opposite objectives.  
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4- Influence: Some PIs influence the results of other PIs. For instance, 
Containment Effectiveness impacts the Stability PI. Another example, detection 
effectiveness PI impact the result of containment effectiveness. 
5- Exclusive: The situation in which PIs are independent of each other, and could 
be analyzed separately. For example, the consistency PI is exclusive to the 
Availability PI.  
From the above discussion, I agree with the recommendation of selecting few, i.e. 
ten or less, performance indicators. However, these indicators should be considered the key 
performance indicators (KPIs) that focus on the main PE aspects as defined by the 
designated CSIRT. At the same time, several other PIs can be used for the purposes of 
enhancing performance and improving the functionalities of the CSIR as needed. These 
PIs can be used as needed, and can be consigned to sub-teams in the CSIRT to evaluate 
their own activities. 
With regards to which PIs to select, a CSIRT would start by selecting PIs that are 
exclusive to each other. Then, based on the defined goals, outlined PE aspects the team 
expand by adding PIs that are relevant to each other depending on the needs. For instance, 
a CSIRT that have just prepared a CSIRP might use several PIs that measure the 
effectiveness of the plan. These PIs can be used for the following years until the plan and 
its update procedures has reached a maturity state. If the team later finds out, for example, 
that the detection phase is ineffective, then several PIs under the category of 
“Detection/Identification” could be introduced.  
In summary, a CSIRT needs to have static and dynamic list of PIs. The static list 
constitutes of few generic KPIs that offer comprehensive assessment of the CSIR 
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capability. On the other hand, the dynamic list constitutes of PIs that are deployed for 
several used based on the enhancement requirements of the CSIR.        
4.3 CSIR Performance Indicators 
PI.1.  Accuracy 
Definition 
The proximity of predictions and estimations made by the CSIRT 
during incident handling to actual or reasonable range of values 
validated post-incident  
Category Identification CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This PI measures the effectiveness of the CSIRT’s decision making 
capability under uncertain conditions 
There are two domains for measuring accuracy: 
1- Accuracy of estimations made during the incident response 
to measures validated during post-incident analysis 
2- Accuracy of predictions prior-to-incident with actual events 
during the incident 
The first domain is the main focus of the Accuracy PI as the second 
domain is more concerned with preparedness PIs.  
When deriving PMs from this PI, there are two methods to define 
accuracy: 
1- Compare against actual values (e.g. incident classification) 
2- Compare against a reasonable range of values (e.g. 
estimation of number of compromised records – it is 
difficult to get exact number at the early stages of the 
response). 
Another consideration when defining accuracy PMs,  
1- Does the PM measure level of proximity (i.e. how far from 
actual values), or 
2- Was acceptable accuracy achieved (e.g. was the 
classification accurate? Yes or No)  
PM Examples 
Let incident severity be classified in the range: [𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛]   
Accuracy of incident classification = | 𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 − 𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙|   
Relevant PIs Identification Effectiveness 
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PI.2.  Adaptability 
Definition 
The ability of the CSIR capability to effectively adjust to the change 
of needs or to changes of incident circumstances  
Category Generic CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
For meaningful application of this PI, the environment should be 
dynamic (i.e. contains several non-static factors). 
When designing adaptability PMs, the following two design factors 
need to be considered: 
1- Does the PM considers adaptability to predicted conditions, 
unpredicted conditions, or both? 
2- What is being measured? Is it the adaptability inputs (e.g. 
member training), the adjustment process (e.g. how did the 
team adjust), or both 
When analyzing adaptability PMs: 
- It is more reasonable to record the ability of the team to 
adjust to a list of changes more than attempting to measure 
the “degree of adjustment”  
- Is failure to adapt a result of poor preparation or inability to 
adjust to some other factors? 
PM Examples 
Prior to defining adaptability PMs several descriptive PMs need to 
be defined with regards to adaptability dimensions and levels. For 
example,  
 adaptability to scalability changes (e.g. [100, 1000, 
10,000] infected hosts) 
 adaptability to incident dimensions (e.g.  [incident 
severity, incident scale, incident type]) 
Adaptability PMs would measure differences or ratios along 
multiple adaptability scales [191].  
For measuring individual ability to adapt in changing 
environments see [192] 
Relevant PIs Flexibility, scalability, survivability 
 
PI.3.  Attacking Host Identification (AHI) 
Definition The ability of the CSIRT to accurately identify the attacking host(s) 
in a timely manner 
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Category Analysis CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
It is a desirable outcome of incident handling to identify the 
attacking host. However, as indicated by NIST [1] this should not 
be the focus of responders.  
Examples of situations that require using this PI: 
- The incident results in request for legal investigation 
- The technical requirements for recovery or containment 
procedures require identifying the attacking host 
- The incident is targeting government data or assets, 
especially critical infrastructure.  
Ability to identify attacking hosts is an indicator of good detection 
and analysis capabilities of the CSIRT, but the reverse is not 
necessarily true 
This PI is applicable when root-cause analysis is used. However, it 
only measures a specific aspect of root cause analysis, not the 
effectiveness of the whole analysis process. For example, the root 
cause of an incident can be determined to be a DDoS and resolving 
the issue does not require knowing much about the identity of the 
attacking host. However, legal prosecution requires more specific 
details 
To measure effectiveness of the attacking host identification: 
1- Level of data collected (e.g. does the data identify the 
perpetuators? Does the data allow for legal prosecution? Is 
there information about associated individuals/groups? 
2- Is the information accurate? (how much confidence does the 
analysis provide?) 
3- Is it done in a timely fashion? (data is provided when it was 
needed, e.g. when making media release or court 
testimony). 
4- Was the identification process cost effective?  
PM Examples 
AHI confidence:  
a probability is calculated about the confidence of results of AHI 
process, based on collected facts.  For instance, if the attacker is 
confirmed to be from a specific subnet that contains 10 hosts, then 
the probability of each is 0.1. (Note: A CSIRT needs to present 
facts, not make judgements. The first is objective and the second 
is subjective). 
Relevant PIs Root-Cause Identification  
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PI.4.  Availability 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIR to conduct a response that prevents and 
minimizes the unavailability of service-providing resources  
Category Eradication & Recovery CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The above definition considers a CSIRT’s ability to protect 
availability. The above PI can be redefined to mean the 
availability of the CSIRT itself. Such definition would make the 
PI a sub-category for the reliability, capacity and preparedness PIs 
This PI is more generic than the continuity PI. For instance, 
business continuity can still be achieved with the unavailability of 
some resources.   
Unavailability can be either due to the incident itself, or to a 
decision taken by the CSIR for prevention or remedial purposes. 
Performance metrics need to distinguish between the two.  
Availability is normally measured by time percentages. However, 
it is more reasonable to couple that with business outputs, e.g. 
number of customers, loss [193] 
Several levels of availability can be defined based on factors like 
quality of service or number of users 
PM Examples 
availability  = 
𝐴𝑆𝑇−𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑆𝑇
× 100 
AST= agreed service time, DT = down time ( see ITIL v3 [194] 
[195]) 
Relevant PIs Survivability, Continuity 
 
PI.5.  Capacity 
Definition The boundaries of the CSIR system that define the maximum 
potential outcomes and quality for the offered services 
Category Preparation CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The above definition need not be confused with how the term is 
used in some CSIR publications which used “incident response 
capacity” and “incident response capability” interchangeably [60] 
[31] [136]. 
It is desirable to have high system capacity as it reflects good 
preparation and grants higher confidence in the response system. 
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High capacity systems are also expected to offer faster responses 
and more adaptability to incident changes. It was practically proven 
that offering effective and efficient response requires sufficient 
capacity [111] 
The Capacity PI is mainly defined in terms of descriptive metrics, 
which can be mapped to performance metrics.  
Some benefits for using capacity PMs include 
1- Recognizing when the IR system reaches its maximum 
capacity. In such case, seeking additional or external 
support is necessary 
2- It can be used in developing preventive measures. For 
example, if networks are working under near maximum 
capacity, then the likelihood of a successful DoS is high. [1] 
Some of the factors that could be used in defining capacity PMs: 
1- number and availability of responders and support staff 
2- Competency and readiness of responders 
3- Type and number of equipment and software 
4- Type and quality of CSIR offered services.  
Some limiting factors to capacity include jurisdictions, budget and 
company size.  
PM Examples 
Example 1: Defining maximum response capacity (𝑅𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) in 
terms of reliability probability is explained in [103] 
Example 2 [111] [109]:  
1- Identify CSIR resources 
2- Record the capacity of each resource 
3- Identify CSIR services 
4- Map each service to the resources 
5- The capacity of each service is the minimum capacity of the 
associated resources 
Relevant PIs Preparedness, Utilization, Scalability, flexibility 
 
PI.6.  Communication Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of the CSIRT to establish communication links that 
enable efficient transmission of data 
Category Generic CSIRT 
 211 
 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Communication effectiveness can be assessed from the following 
different angles. Note that the above definition emphasizes the first 
two, but it could be re-defined as appropriate: 
1- Are there established communication links and what is their 
reliability? 
2- How much resources and overhead does the 
communications cost? 
3- What is the impact of CSIR communications on incident 
handling decisions and actions 
4- What is the value of the content of communications in terms 
of correctness and being timely? 
Some features of effective communication: 
1- Accessible: to all those involved or affected by the incident 
[110] 
2- Coordinated: enables different responders to learn about 
updates and taken actions throughout the CSIR life cycle 
3- Low Redundancy: no unnecessary repeated messages are 
exchanged 
4- Resilient: withstand and continue to perform after damage 
absence of resources 
5- Low Overhead: messages provide concise content that 
serves the purpose of the communication exchange.  
6- Confidentiality: observed whenever required 
Although low redundancy is a desirable feature, this should not be 
confused with the need to establish alternative or back-up methods 
of communication as a measure of preparedness [109] 
Communication effectiveness might be impacted by the level of 
trust established between various parties [136] it also may be 
impacted by the level of competency [79] 
The assessment of communication effectiveness can focus on inter-
communication between CSIRT members, intra-communication 
with constituencies within the organization, and communicating 
with external agencies and/or the public 
PM Examples 
The following report discusses some generic metrics for assessing 
communication effectiveness in incident response [196]. Examples 
include: financial investment in communications capabilities, 
capacity of mass notification, frequency of updating contacts and 
communication links, and compliance with communication 
requirements (e.g. encryption).  
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Several works suggest the need to test and assess the 
communication between those responsible for patch management 
and the CSIRT. See [74] [1]. 
Relevant PIs Partnership Effectiveness, Team Cohesion 
 
PI.7.  Competency 
Definition The sufficient mastery of the knowledge, skills and abilities 
needed to perform CSIR tasks. (adapted from [61]).  
Category Preparation CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The difference between competency and readiness: 
- Competency: focuses on knowing in terms of technical 
information and necessary skills 
- Readiness: focuses on applying the acquired knowledge and 
skills 
Competency could be defined in terms of competency levels. For 
instance: 
1- Minimum competency [74]: knowledge and skills for 
performing basic CSIR activities 
2- Quality competency: needed to perform diverse CSIR 
activities with quality outputs 
3- Advanced Competency: needed to perform advanced and 
complex CSIR activities 
CSIRT members need not only be competent with current practices 
and tools, but also with new technologies, potential threats and 
trending solutions.   
There are several scales for competency. For instance: 
- Individual vs. Team: Is the team as a whole competent as 
well as each individual? 
- Technical vs. non-Technical: Do all  CSIRT technical and 
non-technical members (e.g. support teams) demonstrate 
competency  
PM Examples 
Continuous Professional Development [7]: What type and how 
frequent are CSIRT members offered professional development 
programs?  
See the CERT publication “Competency Lifecycle Roadmap: 
Toward Performance Readiness” [61] 
Relevant PIs Readiness, Preparedness 
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PI.8.  Competitiveness 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to deliver services in a quality level similar 
to, or higher than, the quality level offered by its peers 
Category Generic CSIRT/CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This PI offers a mechanism for comparing the performance of the 
team to that of its peers. 
Competitiveness can use: 
1- Absolute measures: comparing performance against 
expected quality as defined by standards and best industry 
practices 
2- Relative measures: comparing performance against 
performance of other peer institutions over similar incidents 
In business settings, this PI is normally measured in terms of 
financial metrics [197]. However, for CSIRTs this should focus on 
effectiveness metrics 
This indicator is best used when benchmarking is adopted as an 
analysis method 
Using this PI helps an organization Identify performance areas 
which are potential for enhancement 
Using this PI requires minimum normalization at two levels: 
1- Institutional Level: a CSIRT is compared to one of similar 
size and capability, 
2- Incident level: comparison is performed over incidents of 
similar category 
PM Examples Depends on which areas are selected for peer-comparison 
Relevant PIs Compliance, Conformance 
 
PI.9.  Completeness (of CSIRP) 
Definition 
Preparing a CSIRP that addresses all essential aspects of incident 
handling in terms of policies, procedures and support.  
Category Preparation CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Completeness is an indicator for preparedness and readiness 
For each IR activity, there needs to be some outlined policies or 
procedures for handling, and how and where to seek support  
 214 
 
A CSIRP does not necessary need to have pre-prepared solutions. 
it only needs to have instructions on how to approach all 
possibilities 
There are two time frames for measuring completeness: 
- Prior-IR Completeness: can be assessed over the 
completion of all of the planned activities produced in the 
design phase. 
- Post-IR completeness: if during incident handling the 
CSIRT is faced with a procedural issue that has no 
guidance in the CSIRP then it is a sign of incompleteness. 
Completeness has another two dimensions: the completeness of 
the documentation of incident handling and the completeness of 
performance analysis 
CSIRP completeness is integrated into the NFP Unpredictability 
platform presented in Section 5.5 
PM Examples 
Prior-IR completeness: 
- Break a CSIRP into components 
- Translate each component into actions needed for 
completion 
- Define completion status levels or percentage scale for 
completion 
- Assess the completion of each activity and 
validate/approve by higher management      
See the list of metrics outlined in [74] 
Relevant PIs Comprehensiveness, Preparedness, Readiness 
 
PI.10.  Compliance 
Definition 
The degree of conformance of CSIR processes and procedures to 
standards and regulatory specifications 
Category Generic CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
CSIR Compliance has three aspects: 
1- Ensuring that the outlined CSIR processes and procedures 
of the CSIRP is in conformance with CSIR standards 
2- Ensuring that an incident handling is in conformance with 
(non-CSIR) legal and organizational standards and 
regulatory policies 
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3- Ensuring that CSIR is in compliance with organizational 
policies 
There are no formal CSIR standards. However, awaiting formal 
standardization, the NIST [1], CERT [2]  or SANS [30] 
documentations can be treated as standards.  
Examples of government and industrial standards that a CSIR might 
need to comply with include: ISO 27001 on Information technology 
and security [198] and the Health Privacy Rules (HIPAA) [199] 
PM Examples 
Compliance can be confirmed through certifications or external 
auditing 
Relevant PIs Conformance 
 
PI.11.  [CSIRP] Comprehensiveness 
Definition 
Issuing a CSIRP that outlines procedures for all categories of 
incidents 
Category Preparation CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Having a CSIRP that is capable of handling the various types of 
incidents is a sign of preparedness. 
The PIs Comprehensiveness and Completeness are complementary 
to each other. The comprehensiveness PI ensures that the CSIRP is 
applicable to a wide spectrum of incidents; while completeness 
ensures that there are detailed procedures for handling the defined 
spectrum of incidents.    
The term Comprehensiveness alternatively can be used to refer to 
the performing of comprehensive performance analysis. See the 
Documentation Effectiveness PI. 
Due to the variance and the continuous emerging nature of security 
incidents, it is impossible to outline handling details for every 
possible incident, Therefore, procedures should be outlined for 
every group of similar incidents.  
To achieve comprehensiveness, a “comprehensive” classification 
scheme is needed, i.e. is capable of mapping an incident to a pre-
defined category of incidents, which in turn are associated with 
handling procedures.  
The incident classification scheme may differ depending on the 
business sector (e.g. incidents in health sector can use distinct 
incident classification from financial institutions). For 
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classification of cyber incidents from the perspective of educational 
institutions see [200] and for nuclear agencies perspective see [79].   
Whenever an incident cannot be classified under the defined 
categories, a procedure should be outlined in a CSIRP on how the 
incident should be handled.  
PM Examples 
Comprehensiveness can be measured through exhaustive testing or 
simulation for different categories of incidents. For instance, the 
DHS NCCIC cyber security incident scoring system [201]could be 
used. A CSIRP need to contain enough information on how to 
handle each incident level.  
Relevant PIs Completeness, Documentation Effectiveness 
 
PI.12.  Confidentiality 
Definition 
The ability of the team to secure and maintain the confidentiality of 
the data in the system during incident handling 
Category Generic CSIRP/CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The above definition points to three aspects of confidentiality. 
When defining this PI in a specific environment, the designers need 
to specify which points are considered: 
1- The CSIRT preventing confidentiality compromise after incident 
detection 
2- The CSIRT mitigating and minimizing confidentiality 
compromise impacts 
3- Conducting a response that conforms with the confidentiality 
policies 
The usage of this PI presumes that an information security 
assessment was conducted in which: 
1- Digital data that needs to be retained confidential are 
identified 
2- The confidentiality level of each data is defined 
3- Security policies are implemented to maintain the 
confidentiality of the data.  
Confidentiality metrics could be defined using: 
1- Security metrics used in the CIA model 
2- Requirements set by privacy laws 
3- Liabilities defined in contracts 
4- Information security standard compliance requirements 
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PM Examples 
Root privilege count metric proposed in [190] can be adapted to 
measure how many root privileges were compromised, restored or 
modified during the response. The above metric provides an 
indication for potential level of compromise to confidentiality.  
Relevant PIs Availability 
 
PI.13.  Confinement Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to identify and isolate infected portions of a 
system and to prevent the negative impacts of the incident of 
spreading to the healthy portions  
Category Containment CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This PI is similar to the containment effectiveness PI; however, this 
PI is focused on preventing the spread, while containment is more 
generic and involves reducing harm and preventing escalation  
Ineffective confinement can indicate: 
1- Poor identification mechanisms for infected areas 
2- Poor isolation mechanisms 
3- Flaws in the security architecture, e.g. too many 
dependencies or inconsistencies. 
4- Team incompetency 
This PI is applicable when the infected parts of the system has been 
identified. Therefore, inputs from the identification phase would 
impact measurements of PMs derived from this PI.  
To measure confinement, it should be clearly defined how infected 
vs non-infected portions are identified. In that direction, it is 
possible to define levels of confinement depending the level of 
infection dripping to the healthy portions.  
PM Examples 
Confinement Strength Metric (CSM):  
1- Divide the system into “confinement zones”. The smallest 
zone (Z1) contain all portions confirmed to be infected. The 
largest zone (Zn) contain the entire system. The remaining 
zones are associated with probabilities of infection.  
2- Define infection levels through characteristics of the threat, 
in which fully infected is denoted by (Fn) and non-infected 
is denoted by (F0). 
3- A scoring table is to be developed over the values of Z and 
F. The highest score would indicate the least likely parts of 
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the healthy portion getting fully infected. The lowest score 
would indicate the highly vulnerable parts getting the lowest 
level of infection. 
4- Assuming that CSM = 1 means full strength, i.e. proper 
conferment; CSM is defined as 1 minus the score obtained 
from the scoring table defined in step 3. Higher values of 
CSM indicate relatively good confinement, while lower 
CSM values indicate poor confinement.  
Relevant PIs Containment Effectiveness, Shielding Effectiveness 
 
PI.14.  Conformance 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to execute a response that abides by the 
outlined procedures and processes in a CSIRP 
Category Generic CSIRT/CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
In an ideal scenario, a comprehensive and complete CSIRP is 
sufficient to guide responses to any incident. However, building 
such CSIRP is practically difficult, expensive and sometimes 
infeasible. This indicator targets both the effectiveness of execution 
and effectiveness of the CSIRP design 
Nonconformance could indicate: 
1- Failure or poor performance from the CSIRT 
2- Incorrect or inconsistent CSIRP design 
3- Incomplete CSIRP design and poor planning 
4- None of the above (i.e. it was to not conform, e.g. decision 
by higher management to overcome a policy or procedure)  
Conformance can extend to cover other procedures and policies 
followed in the organization, not only the CSIRP.  
Measuring conformance is only meaningful when requirements are 
defined. These requirements can be security or quality 
requirements. 
An organization can decide for zero tolerance for nonconformity or 
define a range of tolerance for nonconformity  
Since conformance is too generic, the definition of this PI can be 
scaled down to conformance to requirements that impact CSIR 
performance. 
It is best to interpret this PI along with the flexibility PI, as both 
PIs are contentious. 
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PM Examples 
The degree of conformance can be applied to some aspects like 
timetables. A PM would provide the difference between actual 
time and scheduled time 
A qualitative measure in the form of a checklist that assess the 
degree of conformance (e.g. minor, major and critical 
nonconformance). See ISO 9001 [202] and ISO 27001 [203].  
Relevant PIs Compliance 
 
PI.15.  Consistency 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIR to follow consistent procedures for 
detection, analysis and reporting of incidents [109] 
Category Generic CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Consistency is a desirable feature of CSIR because it reflects good 
design, enables comparative analysis and facilitates identifying 
performance obstacles. 
The CERT document considers consistency essential for CSIR [70] 
and several works echo the need for consistency in security metrics 
[123]. 
It remains challenging of how to ensure consistency in qualitative 
and subjective measurements [78] 
Automation is an effective tool for enhancing consistency [145] 
Consistency domains can be classified as:  
1- consistency of procedures (e.g. detection methods) 
2-  consistency of measurements (e.g. collection methods) 
3- consistency of reporting and notification 
PM Examples 
Designing quantitative PMs for consistency is non-trivial. Most 
common methods use a qualitative method of using a checklist that 
verifies that a specific procedure or data representation is consistent 
with the response or quality requirements 
Relevant PIs Conformance, compliance 
 
PI.16.  Containment Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to effectively prevent an incident from 
spreading, escalating, or causing further damage after its detection 
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Category Containment CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This PI can be considered the highest-level indicator for the 
containment phase. The PIs: Mitigation effectiveness, 
confinement effectiveness and shielding effectiveness are special 
of this PI.  
Containment effectiveness strongly impacts incident stability. 
Therefore, both PIs should be read together.  
Measuring containment effectiveness is sensitive to accuracy of 
and effectiveness of the identification / detection processes. 
Therefore, usage of multiple identification techniques is 
recommended before starting the containment process [1].   
Examples of factors that contribute to containment effectiveness 
include: 
1- Containment time  
2- Containment/mitigation rate/level 
3- Containment cost 
4- Degree of harm reduction (quantification of how much 
harm is saved through applied containment procedures) 
5- Containment robustness (maintain effectiveness despite 
change of circumstances) 
The above factors can be defined over a spectrum of containment 
levels, e.g. partially contained and fully contained.   
PM Examples See containment factor defined in Section 5.1.3. 
Relevant PIs 
Confinement effectiveness, shielding effectiveness, mitigation 
effectiveness, Stability  
 
PI.17.  Continuity Maintenance  
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to execute a response that maintains 
business continuity  
Category Generic CSIRP/CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The CERT document considers business continuity and disaster 
recovery planning as one of the services that a CSIR offers under 
the category of security quality management [2] 
Maintaining business continuity is a joint task between the CSIRT 
and business continuity planning team. [131]. Therefore, the 
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integration and communication between the two teams need to be 
effective [70] [198]. 
This PI is especially relevant to incidents that involve denial of 
service (DoS) attacks [1]   
One of the common mechanisms used to ensure business continuity 
during incident handling is called application whitelisting in which 
safe applications are permitted to run and all other applications are 
blocked [56].  
It is important that maintaining business continuity does not result 
in loss of digital evidence [204].  
PM Examples Impact of business continuity management on breach cost [4] 
Relevant PIs Availability, Survivability 
 
PI.18.  Coordination Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of various security and support teams in an organization 
to collaboratively execute a response that uses effective 
communication and reporting and efficient allocation of resources  
Category Generic CSIRP/CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
There are various levels of coordination [31]: 
1- Coordination among CSIRT sub-teams 
2- Coordination between CSIRT and security teams in the 
organization 
3- Coordination between CSIRT and support teams, e.g. 
logistics and human resources 
4- Coordination between CSIRT and management, e.g. 
executives 
Coordination must occur throughout the phases of the CSIR life 
cycle [74] 
Elements of effective coordination: 
1- Leadership, i.e. every task has a leading team to avoid 
duplication of efforts [2] 
2- Centralized point for information dissemination [167] 
3- Proper management of task interdependencies [104] 
4- Effective communication 
Preparedness contributes to better coordination among different 
teams  [109] 
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PM Examples 
A qualitative analysis of the CSIR system that involves inspecting 
1- Acknowledgement of shared goals and objectives 
2- task ownership (are there tasks with no owners? Are there 
duplicate owners for the same task) 
3- task process associated with sub-outcomes.  
Relevant PIs 
Partnership Effectiveness, Communication Effectiveness, Team 
Cohesion 
 
PI.19.  [Response] Cost 
Definition 
Amount of financial resources dedicated to responding to an 
incident 
Category Generic CSIRP/CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
CSIR Costs can be classified into four categories: 
1- CSIR Cost: Fixed Costs associated with establishing, 
maintaining and operating a CSIR  
2- Response Cost: Costs endured due to incident handling 
including detection, containment and recovery 
3- Incident Cost: Financial loss due to the incident 
4- Incident Maintenance Cost: financial resources needed to 
implement post- incident recommendations  
Although it is desirable to minimize response cost, this should not 
be on the expense of effective response. Other indicators like cost 
effectiveness strike that balance 
Cost can be actual or estimated (e.g. when averages are used) 
PM Examples 
Incident Cost estimation proposed by [205]: 
incident_cost = non_productive_cost + response_cost 
non_productive_cost = U*hup*V*DT 
response_cost = A*hap*V*RT 
U = number of affected users,          A = number of responders 
hup = average user’s page,              hap average responder pay 
DT = hours of downtime,                RT = response time 
V= overhead cost (vary from company to another) 
For another incident cost estimation scheme see: [200] 
Relevant PIs Cost Effectiveness 
 
 223 
 
PI.20.  Cost Effectiveness 
Definition 
The degree at which the CSIR capability was able to save on costs 
while achieving the same quality of outcomes [206]  
Category Generic CSIRP/CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This PI strikes a balance between the organizational need to 
decrease costs and the need to fulfill CSIRT quality requirements 
Cost can be compared to latest cost, average cost, or average cost 
obtained from a benchmark 
In order for cost calculation to be meaningful, cost needs to be 
compared to similar incidents in terms of severity level and 
delivered quality service level 
PM Examples 
Cost Saving per data record = V - L/N 
   N = number of compromised records 
   L = total loss due to data breach 
   V = average loss per record due to data breach 
         (benchmark value obtained from [4]) 
Relevant PIs Response Cost 
 
PI.21.  Detection effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIR to accurately detect incidents in a timely 
manner. 
Category Identification CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The two main elements of detection effectiveness are: 
1- Accurate identification of the incident (distinguish 
between events and incidents) and classify it under the 
correct severity scale 
2- Detecting the incident in a timely manner 
Other factors that could be used in defining detection effectiveness 
include: 
1- Intelligence capacity 
2- Detection cost 
3- Incident classification method  
4- Mechanism to distinguish between incident precursors 
(incident might happen in the future) and incident 
indicators (incident has occurred or is occurring) [1] 
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For the purposes of using this PI, incidents can be classified based 
on their detection complexity. An example of such classification 
is: 
1- Detectable attacks: attacks known to the CSIRT and 
relevant procedures are defined in the CSIRP 
2- Resolvable attacks: attacks undefined in the CSIRP, but 
solutions are available by consulting external entities.  
3- Zero-day attacks [56]: Attacks are unknown to the CSIRT 
and no solutions exist yet.    
PM Examples 
For precise measurement of detection time, the metrics defined by 
the VERIS project can be used [73]: 
1 First malicious action time (FMAT): Beginning of the 
threat actor's malicious actions against the victim. Initial 
compromise time : First point at which a security attribute 
(C/P, I/A, A/U) of an information asset was compromised. 
2 Data exfiltration time(DAT): First point at which non-
public data was taken from the victim environment. Only 
applicable to data compromise events. 
3 Incident discovery time(IDT): When the organization 
first learned the incident had occurred. 
Detection time = IDT - FMAT 
Relevant PIs Containment effectiveness, intelligence capacity.  
 
PI.22.  Documentation Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to provide consistent post-incident 
documentation that is comprehensive and provides effective 
traceability.   
Category Analysis CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This is a generic PI that can encompass several PIs like 
comprehensiveness, consistency and traceability.  
Documentation comprehensiveness can be defined by: 
1- Breadth: There is documentation for each activity taken 
during incident handling [31].  
2- Depth: There are detailed information recorded for each of 
the incident handling activities 
3- Coverage: documentation is not limited to technical steps. 
It includes support and secondary activities like legal, 
financial and media [7].  
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Consistency in documentation contributes to better traceability 
and allows for comparability and trend analysis 
Traceability is the ability to quickly access the documented data 
when needed.  
Other factors that contribute to documentation effectiveness: 
1- Clarity 
2- Simplicity 
3- Accessibility 
4- Conciseness (providing summaries for executives) 
Note that the above definition does not consider correctness as a 
factor for effectiveness. It is not required that all documented data 
be correct because there is a need to document mistakes and 
wrong decisions and actions for quality purposes.  
PM Examples 
There are several metrics developed by the Association of Clinical 
Documentation Improvement Specialists [207] that could be 
borrowed by CSIR. Examples include: review rate, query rate (e.g. 
number of queries before getting the right information) and 
quality/revenue impact.  
Relevant PIs Consistency, Comprehensiveness, Traceability 
 
PI.23.  [Response] Effectiveness 
Definition 
A generic indicator about the CSIRT’s ability to achieve its desired 
objectives and to reduce harm in a manner that is timely and uses 
minimum number of resources  
Category Generic CSIRT/CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The above definition considers efficiency to be part of effectiveness 
(See: Section 1.4.2), but a CSIRT may choose to separate the two.     
In the CSIR context, there are four factors that determine if a 
specific activity was “effective” 
1- Success level of achieving a goal/objective 
2- Amount of used resources (financial and nonfinancial) 
3- Response Time 
4- Level/amount of reduced harm 
Response effectiveness can also a collective indicator of the 
effectiveness of the various CSIR phases, i.e.: 
1- Preparedness Effectiveness 
2- Identification effectiveness 
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3- Containment Effectiveness 
4- Eradication/Recovery Effectiveness 
5- Analysis Effectiveness 
PM Examples Not Applicable 
Relevant PIs Goal Achievement, Response Time, Response Cost 
 
PI.24.  Eradication Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIR to eliminate the key components of the 
incident with speed and precision. (adapted from [29]) 
Category Recovery & Eradication CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
An effective eradication process involves: 
1- Fully deactivating the active components of the 
attack/incident 
2- Remedying the system and fixing the vulnerabilities that 
were exploited 
3- Removing the remnants of the incident that may cause the 
incident to reoccur.  
4- Conducting the above with speed and precision [92]   
Not all incidents would require distinct steps for eradication, as 
the steps might be included in the recovery [1]. An example is 
unauthorized access due to password obtained through social 
engineering.  
The two most common actions in eradication are patching 
vulnerabilities and disabling malware code (part of malware 
analysis processes [208]).  
PM Examples 
Since eradication processes are OS and application-specific, 
designing PMs that are applicable across incidents is not feasible.  
An example of a PM for eradication that involves vulnerability 
fixing is the patch dissemination speed discussed in [209]. 
Scalability and Accuracy are common PMs for measuring the 
effectiveness of malware analysis techniques [210].   
Relevant PIs Recovery Effectiveness, Mitigation Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 227 
 
PI.25.  Evidence Retention Effectiveness 
Definition The ability to extract and retain digital evidence according to the 
CSIR objectives  
Category Analysis CSIRT/CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Not only digital evidence is preserved for prosecution purposes, but 
also for conducting internal intelligence analysis.  
An “effective” evidence retention is one that is: 
1- Cost effective: use least amount of resources 
2- Authentic (legal effectiveness): the digital evidence 
demonstrates authenticity through following proper 
procedures 
3- Timely: availability of digital evidence data when needed 
4- Redundant: ensures that redundancy policies are followed 
to make several backups of evidence [15].  
PM Examples 
The NIST document (page 41) suggests two metrics for measuring 
evidence retention effectiveness: 
Data Retention Length: For how long is data (e.g. emails) are stored 
in the storage devices (e.g. 180 days) 
Storage cost: cost of storage devices and media used for storing 
evidence.  
Relevant PIs Forensics Readiness, Intelligence Capacity 
 
PI.26.  Flexibility 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIR system in terms of capacity and readiness to 
address and adjust to the variations in in incident conditions 
Category Generic CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The flexibility PI is a higher-level indicator that includes the 
following three PIs:  
1- adaptability  
2- scalability 
3- capacity (i.e. high capacity) 
The dynamic nature of CSIR environments makes flexibility a 
necessity (CERT [2]) 
Elements of flexibility include: 
1- Flexible policies and procedures [2] 
 228 
 
2- Adaptive performance of CSIRT members [97] 
3- The ability to expand and scale [111] 
4- Ability to handle any type and scale of incident [109] 
5- Ability to carry proactive and reactive measures 
Flexibilities can be mapped to uncertainties, as each uncertainty 
requires a specific flexibility [211]. 
Since flexibility deals with future uncertainty, then it cannot be 
measured accurately and approximation methods need to be used   
PM Examples 
A plan need to be tested/simulated for flexibility. The testing need 
to test flexibility at the micro-level (changing specific conditions 
of an incident) and at the macro-level (changing major conditions 
of the CSIR system). Qualitative assessment by experts can be 
used to report on the CSIRP’s flexibility.  
Relevant PIs Adaptability, Scalability, Capacity 
 
PI.27.  Forensics Readiness 
Definition The ability to conduct forensics investigations and extract digital 
evidence in a cost effective manner. (Adapted from [204]) 
Category Generic/Identification/Analysis CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This PI is defined in a manner to include all forensics activities. 
However, it can be broken done to several PIs. The “Evidence 
Retention Effectiveness” PI is derived from this PI but with more 
focus on evidence maintenance. This PI also intersects with the 
“intelligence capacity” PI when applying forensics techniques to 
extract intelligence information and artifact intelligence sharing 
[50].  
Elements of forensics readiness: 
1- The capacity to perform forensics investigations 
2- The competency to perform forensics activities 
3- The ability to extract and retain digital evidence 
4- Determine attacking host and incident root-causes 
5- Interaction with law enforcement and legal teams 
The benefits of having forensics readiness include: minimizing the 
cost of investigation, blocking attempts to cover internal malicious 
activities and reducing regulatory and legal disclosure costs [212]. 
PM Examples 
Metrics for various aspects of forensics readiness can be found in 
the following works: 
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1- For measuring the relevance of intelligence data to forensics 
readiness see the framework presented in [186] 
2- Cost-benefit analysis techniques for forensics activities are 
studied in [213] 
3- Value of digital evidence extracted from the cloud [214] 
Relevant PIs Intelligence Capacity, Evidence Retention Effectiveness 
 
PI.28.  Goal Achievement 
Definition 
A higher level and generic indicator about the extent of a CSIR’s 
achievement of its outlined goals.  
Category Generic CSIRP/CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Goals here refer to CSIR goals that are derived from the 
organization’s mission 
Achievement can be measured in several methods like: 
achievement percentage, threshold surpass, subjective assessment 
(e.g. surveys), or collective analysis (e.g. cost of achieving multiple 
goals). 
PM Examples 
The CERT publication of [19] provides a platform for evaluating 
the higher level objectives of CSIR related to the organization’s 
mission. The goals are investigated through assessment surveys 
focusing on mission drivers. Drivers are identified as factors that 
have strong influence on achieving a mission.   
Relevant PIs Response effectiveness 
 
PI.29.  Harm Reduction 
Definition 
The ability to reduce or eliminate harm and side-effects of an 
incident after its discovery 
Category Generic CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Harm endured due to incidents is normally measured in dollars or 
lives. In the context of CSIR it is normally the former (i.e. dollars) 
Estimating harm has similarities to estimating risk. However, risk 
assessment is more generic. Thus estimating harm can be a viewed 
as a focused analysis of risk assessment taking the particulars of a 
specific incident. In addition, risk assessment is performed prior to 
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the occurrence of incidents, while harm reduction measurement is 
done post incident.  
To fully quantify the damage of an incident is a challenging task, as 
highlighted in Chapter 2. However, works like [200] provide 
practical evidence that producing good approximations is possible. 
PM Examples 
Calculating how much a response was successful in decreasing 
harm needs three major estimations: 
1- How much actual loss was endured due to the incident  (Li) 
2- What is the worst scenario of the damage that would have 
resulted from the incident (Lmax) 
3- Had the CSIRT not responded, how much additional 
damage would have resulted? (Lavoided = Lmax – Li) 
To calculate (Lmax), simple risk assessment techniques that use 
multiplicative metrics of probability of events by the expected loss 
[190] can be used.  
The quantification of harm can be done through loss of revenue, 
loss of reputation and insurance deductibles [215] 
Relevant PIs Response Cost 
 
PI.30.  Intelligence Capacity 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIR capability to collect and analyze intelligence 
information about current and potential vulnerabilities and 
breaches in a manner that supports and enhances incident handling 
Category Detection/Containment CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
An intelligence capability of a CSIRT can be divided into two 
categories:  
1- Intelligence gathering and collection capability 
2- Intelligence analytics capability.  
Intelligence collection can be from external sources (e.g. public 
alerts, information sharing, other CSIRTs) or from internal 
sources (e.g. information gathered from internal networks).  
Intelligence analysis provides responders with situational 
awareness. It aims at knowing motivation, tactics and disruption 
methods used by attackers [29].  
An intelligence capability will also involve how a CSIRT some of 
its intelligence information with other external agencies, 
 231 
 
government or business [74]. Therefore, this metric could be 
linked to partnership effectiveness.  
Part of intelligence analysis includes artifact intelligence done 
through forensics analysis [186].  
According to a recent SANS survey [8], only one third of business 
implement intelligence gathering and analysis techniques.  
PM Examples 
Value of intelligence information can be qualitatively measured 
through several factors [24]:  
1- Robustness level of information assurance (IA) 
2- Controls allocated to the protection of collected 
information like: mission criticality, sensitivity and 
releasability and perishability.  
3- Potential impact of loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or 
availability of information  
A metric for measuring capacity of intelligence gathering is 
membership with intelligence gathering communities/groups [7]. 
For example: REN-ISAC for educational and research information 
[216] and infraGrad for sharing information between FBI and 
private sector [217].  
Relevant PIs 
Partnership Effectiveness, Intelligence Capacity, Attacking host 
Identification 
 
PI.31.  Mitigation Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability to execute ongoing and sustained actions to reduce the 
probability of, or lessen the impact of, an incident [183] 
Category Containment CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Mitigation is a higher level indicator that includes confinement/ 
containment and eradication see NIST [1] and NIMS [109]. Some 
works, include recovery processes in mitigation recovery [79]  
Mitigation is mainly concerned with actual threats, but it can also 
be used for potential risks [19] [24] [25] 
Mitigation strategies can be developed from analysis of incident 
data or from advisory/alert data [31] .  
Actions in the mitigation process include: 
- Applying threat/risk reducing controls 
- Applying countermeasures to the security violation 
- Neutralizing the propagation of the incident 
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- Changing/updating the security infrastructures, e.g. 
updating firewall filters, IDS signatures, and installing 
patches [74] 
- The ability to do the above through assistance of 
automated software [1] 
PM Examples 
The DHS publication [162] called researchers to develop baseline 
measurements for the fraction of infected machines at any 
moment. Mitigation can be measured through the reduction over 
time.  
The absolute/relative risk estimate metric [183] is used to compare 
the cost of a risk to the cost of mitigating it.  
Relevant PIs 
Confinement Effectiveness, Containment Effectiveness, Harm 
Reduction, Eradication Effectiveness 
 
PI.32.  Partnership Effectiveness 
Definition The extent a CSIRT builds associations with external bodies to 
exchange information and achieve common goals to serve the CSIR 
objectives 
Category Generic CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The CERT document [2] defines the following types of 
Partnerships: 
1- Education or training 
2- Out-of-hours coverage 
3- Technical expertise 
4- Cooperative work 
5- Other opinions 
6- Point of contact to other teams or experts 
Partnerships can also be established for project-based objectives, 
for sharing of information, or for long sustainable relationships. 
Any assessment should distinguish between these three types. 
Although assessment of partnership effectiveness can be performed 
by one of the parties, it is better to be collaboratively performed by 
all partners involved.  
Assessments of this PI would either focus on evaluating the level of 
achievement of the agreed upon goals or measure the gap between 
the intended and actual level of participation.  
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PM Examples 
A list of metrics for measuring partnership effectiveness for 
educational institutes are found in [218]. These metrics are generic 
and can be applied to CSIR.  
For assessing partnership that involves information sharing, the 
following metrics could be used [2]: 
1- Confidentiality and secrecy 
2- Appropriate use 
3- Disclosure 
4- Proper acknowledgements 
Relevant PIs Preparedness, coordination effectiveness 
 
PI.33.  Preparedness 
Definition A generic PI that encompasses CSIR activities performed before 
the occurrence of incidents which contribute to readiness, 
competency and efficient allocation of resources.  
Category Preparation CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Preparedness is the most effective tool to avoiding the risk of 
cybersecurity incidents and minimizing their negative impact on the 
business and information security [14]. 
Elements of preparedness include: 
1- Approving a complete and comprehensive CSIRP 
2- Deployment of detection and intelligence mechanisms 
3- Availability of software and hardware for containment, 
analysis and recovery 
4- Allocation of fiscal resources 
5- Establishing partnerships with external agencies 
6- Coordination between various internal bodies of the 
organization 
7- Ensuring the competency and readiness of the CSIRT 
members 
8- Adopting procedures for continuous enhancement and 
professional development 
9- Providing communication channels and situational 
awareness mechanisms 
Signs of unpreparedness include: 
1- Instability of the response 
2- Incapacity to respond 
3- Facing frequent “surprises” during incident handling 
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PM Examples 
The DHS publication of [103]  is dedicated to measuring the 
preparedness of CSIR  
Relevant PIs 
Capacity, Competency, Completeness, Comprehensiveness, 
Readiness, Flexibility, Reliability, Forensic Readiness, Partnership 
Effectiveness 
 
PI.34.  Response Public Impact 
Definition The ability to conduct a response that receives positive response 
from the public.  
Category Generic CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Not all incidents have “public” considerations. Some incidents are 
completely private to the organization with no impact to external 
entities. 
The term ‘public’ should be clearly defined. It could be simply 
defined to include all individuals/entities that are not part of the 
organization. Alternatively, it could be defined to include all those 
not participating in the decision making processes related to the 
incident handling (in this case, employees can be considered part of 
the public – this intersects with the Constituency Satisfaction PI).   
Measuring the public impact is challenging, but there several 
qualitative and quantitative measures that could collectively 
indicate how the public perceived the response: 
1- Media coverage: positive and negative.  
2- Post-incident surveys analyzed against pre-incident surveys 
3- Letters/emails to the organization 
4- Value of the shares in the stock market 
5- Post-incident sales compared to sales during similar seasons 
of previous years 
6- Customer retention.  
A response that is considerate of the public would do some or all of 
the following: 
1- Communicates with the public and responds to concerns 
2- Demonstrates transparency in communication 
3- Shows that the organization cares about the public concerns 
(e.g. leak of private data) as much as it cares for the 
organization’s reputation and financial status.  
4- Maintains the established trust with various partners and 
clients 
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5- Demonstrates compliance to best incident response 
procedures.  
Sometimes a team could have executed an effective response, but 
the public perceive it otherwise. This indicator should help in 
analyzing factors that contribute to such unfortunate incident side-
effect. 
Since all incidents come with undesirable consequences, it is 
expected that all incidents will be associated with some negative 
reception from the public. Therefore, it is better to focus on 
measuring the extent of this negative consequence compared to 
“how well” did the public perceive the response.  
PM Examples 
Customer satisfaction post-incident survey results compared to 
results obtained from pre-incident surveys.  
Relevant PIs 
Constituency Satisfaction, Harm Reduction, Communication 
Effectiveness, Transparency, Response Cost 
 
PI.35.  Readiness 
Definition 
The ability to apply a set of competencies to execute CSIR tasks 
(Definition adapted from [219] and [61]) 
Category Preparation CSIRP/CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Readiness and Preparedness are used interchangeably in most 
publications. The distinction is made in compliance with DHS 
terminology [219] [110] and other works like [29] 
Competency ensures understanding the tasks while readiness 
ensures the ability to carry out the tasks.   
Measuring readiness can be broken to measuring two main sub-
tasks [61]: 
1- Evaluate whether a specific task can be performed as 
required 
2- Evaluate whether competencies can be appropriately 
applied to tasks 
PM Examples See readiness assessment methods outlined in [61]. 
Relevant PIs Preparedness 
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PI.36.  Recovery Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to executes a response that fully recovers 
the affected systems in a quick and cost effective fashion.   
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Recovery means restoring the system/environment to its state 
before the occurrence of the incident but with the addition of 
preventive measures that disallow the incident from re-occurring.  
Recovery of affected systems can take long time. Therefore, it is 
better to divide the recovery process into phases. The phase that 
restores the basic operations should be “quick” while full recovery 
should be thorough and intrusive to ensure that all incident impacts 
are removed.  
The technical aspect of recovery includes the following: 
1- removing the malicious components of the incident and 
conducting a thorough scan for remnants of the system (this 
intersects with eradication) 
2- Restoring the system from backups and conducting a clean 
re-building of the environment.  
3- Applying measures to prevent the incident from re-
occurring (e.g. installing new equipment, vulnerability 
patching, enforcing new policies ..etc.)  
4- Conducting the above steps in quick and cost effective 
manner. 
Measuring recovery effectiveness can be divided into several steps 
each focusing on a separate activity of the above.  
A recovery process may include monitoring the system for a period 
of time for re-infection [140] [79].  
Measuring the effectiveness of recovery effectiveness can be 
conducted as a separate activity or as part of evaluating the 
effectiveness of implementing the business recovery plan [74].  
The restoration process can be measured as per the availability of a 
resource or per the availability of a service. 
PM Examples 
The metric recovery_time.  
The start of the time period could be: 
 The time of incident declaration or discovery 
 The start of the eradication/recovery phase 
The end of the time period could be: 
 The time the system is declared fully restored 
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 The time the system is fully restored and passed the re-
infection monitoring process 
Relevant PIs Eradication effectiveness, Mitigation effectiveness  
 
PI.37.  Reliability 
Definition The capacity of a CSIRT to operate in failure free mode  
Category Preparation CSIRP/CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Failures in the domain of CSIR can appear due to unavailability or 
incompetency 
The study of reliability includes the CSIRT members, tools, 
machines, support and other services.  
Should focus on critical aspects of the system whose 
absence/failure leads to failure of the whole CSIR system 
As reliability is normally expressed in probabilities, some aspects 
of the system can tolerate 97% reliability but others need to be 
fully reliable 
PM Examples 
If there are [x1 , x2 , … , xn] critical tools need for a successful IR, 
with probability of failure:  [p1 , p2 , … , pn] 
Then the reliability of the tools is: 1- max [p1 , p2 , … , pn] 
For a comprehensive study on how to measure reliability of 
incident response see [103] and for fault-tree analysis for 
reliability see [183].  
Relevant PIs Survivability 
 
PI.38.  Response Time 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to carry out CSIR activities in a quick 
manner 
Category Generic CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Almost all incident response time use response time performance 
metrics. Having a shorter response time is a generic sign of good 
performance. It may also demonstrate a sign of security maturity 
[220] 
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Response time can be used as a method for ensuring quality 
requirements are met. For example, it could be validated post-
incident if response time to offering a specific CSIR service 
exceeded the promised value [2].   
Since response time is critical, a CSIR needs to identify activities 
that could be performed offline, i.e. not during incident handling. 
Response time can also be geared towards some security services 
or hardware/software metrics [83] 
Response time may vary from incident to incident for several 
factors like [1]: 
1- Type of incident 
2- Incident Severity 
3- Existing service level agreements (SLA) 
4- Criticality of resources involved.  
Because of the diversity of the above conditions/factors, response 
time needs to be analyzed taking into considerations the totality of 
the incident. It is better to read it along with other PIs to formulate 
a correct representation of the response performance.  
PM Examples 
The VERIS project a list of response time metrics, like the first 
compromise time, discovery time and containment/restoration time 
[73]. 
The containment/restoration time (P4_RT) which measures the 
time span of the fourth phase in the CSIR cycle, can be broken into 
several time slots. The total time is a summative metric. 
P4_RT = CT + PRT + FRT 
CT = containment time 
PRT = partial recovery time 
FRT = full recovery time 
Relevant PIs Response Effectiveness, Goal Achievement 
 
PI.39.  Robustness 
Definition The ability of the CSIR capability to deliver the same level of QoS 
throughout various incidents and under various circumstances  
Category Generic/Preparedness CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
There are various definitions of robustness. The above definition 
considers the aspect not included in the definitions of other PIs. 
Examples of other usages of the term: 
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1- Robustness is defined in terms of reliability and 
correctness [24].  
2- Robustness of response is a synonym to response 
effectiveness [221] 
3- Robustness is defined in terms of flexibility, i.e. ability to 
adapt to unplanned activities [211]. 
4- Robustness is defined in terms of stability and ability to 
react to erroneous inputs to the system [155].    
PM Examples 
Comparative metrics that measure the delivered incident response 
quality of service across incidents. This could be used through 
metrics of other PIs like stability and flexibility.  
Relevant PIs Stability, Flexibility, Adaptability 
 
PI.40.  Root-Cause Identification 
Definition 
The ability to successfully identify the factors that cause the 
incident to occur .  
Category Identification / Analysis CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Although it is not always necessary for the incident’s root-cause to 
be known to executive effective handling, to be frequently unable 
to determine the causes is a sign of poor analysis capability [92].  
An incident may have a single or multiple root-causes, each can 
be direct or indirect 
Knowing the root-cause can help in: 
1- Guide the organization where to invest and allocate 
resources to prevent and mitigate future incidents [4].  
2- Decide if the incident involves criminal activity and hence 
reporting to law enforcement and legal teams 
3- Develop solutions to eliminate the root-cause [19] 
The root-cause can be: 
1- Poor infrastructure or lack of resources 
2- Poor defense mechanisms  
3- Improper on-going process or policy [79] 
4- Inadequate design of service objectives or levels [82] 
5- Human error or unaviodable factors 
Trend analysis is an effective mechanism for identifying root-
causes [74] 
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PM Examples 
The following while paper [222] proposes four metric for 
measuring the effectiveness of root-cause analysis: 
1- Does the event exceed the triggers for failures 
2- Completeness of implementation of corrective actions 
3- Meeting the success measure for implementing corrective 
actions 
4- Net return on investment for using root-cause analysis 
Relevant PIs Attacking Host Identification 
 
PI.41.  [Constituency] Satisfaction 
Definition 
The satisfaction degree of CSIR constituencies on responses 
conducted by a CSIRT 
Category Generic CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Constituency satisfaction can be used in one of two ways: 
1- Estimating the impact of an incident on its constituencies 
[200]. 
2- Measuring constituency consent on executed response 
Emphasizing “customer” satisfaction over “conformance” is a 
characteristic of Total Quality Management (TQM) [39] 
Although satisfaction is an indicator for overall quality level of 
performance [223], the results can be misleading. For example, 
results will be impacted by the level provided to the surveyed 
individuals, transparency of the CSIR process and the design of the 
survey form. Therefore, I recommend not relying only on survey 
tools unless it is supported with validation schemes.  
There needs to be a careful process for identifying constituencies 
and grouping them.  
The use of this indicator should be coupled with an analysis process 
to identify factors that lead to dissatisfaction of the constituencies.  
Satisfaction could be measured for individual incidents and over 
multiple incidents 
PM Examples 
The most common method for measuring satisfaction is through 
surveys and questionnaires  
Relevant PIs Goal Achievement, Harm Reduction 
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PI.42.  Scalability 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to deliver service, maintain service quality, 
or increase capacity in response to incident escalation 
Category Identification CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Scalability could be measured in terms of system outputs, inputs 
or both.  
Scalability is correlated to how incident escalation is defined, e.g. 
incident size, severity, cost …etc.  
Scalability can appear as [224]: 
1- Scaling up: enhancing current resources 
2- Scaling out: adding more resources 
There are three types of scalability: 
1- Ability to respond despite the quality dimensioning 
proportional to incident escalation.  
2- Ability to maintain delivered quality despite incident 
escalation 
3- Ability to effectively increase the capacity of the response 
system 
PM Examples 
Descriptive metrics need to be used to define scalability zones  or 
levels [225].  
For type 1: Use two thresholds: maximum capacity and minimum 
acceptable quality level. Then use a binary metric to evaluate if 
the CSIRT is prepared to respond within that boundary. This 
should be validated post-incident. 
For type 3: Introduce metrics that measure how the change from 
one capacity level to another is done effectively. Examples: 
upgrade time and cost effectiveness  
For using stress testing for measuring the scalability of software 
and security tools see [226] 
Relevant PIs Capacity 
 
PI.43.  Shielding (Protecting Critical Assets) Effectiveness 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIRT to protect uninfected critical resources and 
assets from the impacts of an incident 
Category Containment CSIRP 
 242 
 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Shielding effectiveness as defined above is related to containment 
effectiveness PI, but is different in two aspects: 
1- It is focused on critical assets, while containment is generic 
to all assets 
2- It is mainly proactive measures, while containment is 
mainly reactive 
A critical resource/asset could be infected or uninfected.  
If infected: 
1- Isolate the resource in order not to infect other resources 
2- Mitigate and minimize damage 
3- Execute quick and effective eradication and recovery 
If uninfected: 
1- Shield the resource to prevent infection 
2- Ensure continuity of functionality with minimum 
interruption 
PM Examples 
A matrix with the list of critical resources over the CIA 
requirements (confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) could be 
constructed. The grid is filled with timestamps about when each 
asset is declared “protected”.  
PM metrics are constructed to provide analysis over the grid. For 
example, time to declare all assets available, number of records 
protected.  
The above metrics could be coupled with confidence ratings, e.g. 
fully protected, partially protected, unprotected.  
Also, a scale for the level of “criticality” of the asset could be 
assigned.  
Relevant PIs 
Containment Effectiveness, mitigation effectiveness, confinement 
effectiveness 
 
PI.44.  Stability 
Definition The ability of a CSIRT to prevent an incident from unexpected 
escalation and to maintain the response in a controllable state  
Category Identification CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This PI detects scenarios when the response reaches non-stable 
states. Analysis of the results can help the team develop solutions 
that enable future stable response.  
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Instability, as defined above, can, but not limited to, appear in two 
forms: 
1- Unexpected escalation 
2- Reaching non-controllable state 
There needs to be prior definition of what constitute “unexpected 
escalation”. For instance, sf an incident is forecasted to escalate and 
the CSIRT develops a response that takes that into consideration, 
then this does not reflect instability. On the other hand, the 
unavailability of a staff or a resource (which could have been 
avoided by better preparedness) can cause a sudden escalation 
which complicates the response procedures.     
There needs to be metrics or precursors to identify when a response 
is considered “uncontrollable” like high variety in the incident 
severity, contradicting decisions, unreasonable expenditure …etc.   
The main activities that impact stability are the actions taken right 
after incident declaration, i.e. the end of the detection phase and 
during the containment phase. Therefore, the stability PI is strongly 
related to the Containment Effectiveness PI, but the two are not 
identical. An incident could be stable but the containment 
procedures are ineffective, and vice versa.  
PM Examples 
A metric that measures the variance of the incident classification 
during the response life cycle. See Section 5.1.1.  
Relevant PIs Containment Effectiveness, Detection Effectiveness, Accuracy 
 
PI.45.  Sufficiency [or Self-Reliance] 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIR to execute a response without seeking 
external assistance.  
Category Generic / Preparation CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
A CSIR that demonstrates sufficiency is an indicator for 
competency, reliability and good capacity 
Assistance and support to the CSIR can come from internal support 
teams or from external entities. The internal teams are considered 
secondary assets to the CSIR; therefore using them is not a sign of 
poor performance. However, seeking external assistance “might” 
indicate poor preparedness.  
Not all external assistance indicate insufficiency. For example, 
exchange of information between entities is genetic to the work of 
CSIR. Assistance from law enforcement might also be necessary. 
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Therefore, insufficiency should be defined in terms of technical and 
logistical support that could have been prevented through proper 
prior planning  
Insufficiency can result from: 
1- Insufficient competency and staff training 
2- Insufficient tools and instruments 
3- Insufficient planning budget 
4- Insufficient support services 
PM Examples 
A simple binary qualitative metric can be used by asking: “did the 
team seek external assistance”. This can be broken into several sub-
questions each corresponding to a component of the response cycle. 
This helps identify areas in the CSIR that might require 
enhancement.  
Insufficiency can be quantized by measuring the impact of external 
assistance on the success of the incident handling. One possible 
method to do this is through finding the ratio between the cost of 
external assistance to the overall incident response cost.  
Relevant PIs Capacity, Reliability, Competency 
 
PI.46.  Survivability 
Definition 
The ability of a CSIR capability to preserve essential services in the 
system despite the presence of compromise (adapted from [227]) 
Category Generic CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
The above definition considers survivability as a special case of the 
availability PI. Availability is more general and focuses on offering 
service, while survivability focuses on completing a mission or 
ensuring that a specific system cycle is not interrupted. Also, 
availability can be defined based on quality levels, while 
survivability focus on availability of a resource while offering the 
minimum acceptable QoS.  
Aspects of the system that need to survive need to be identified, like 
network connection, database access, and some critical assets. 
Another dimension of survivability is the ability of the CSIRT to 
complete its own mission during incidents [162].  
PM Examples 
Tools for measuring network survivability during compromising 
incidents are outlined in [227] 
Relevant PIs Reliability 
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PI.47.  Team Cohesion 
Definition Ability of a CSIRT to execute a response in which every team 
member effectively collaborate with the rest of the team to achieve 
the outlined goals (adapted from [228]) 
Category Generic CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Depending on the nature of the CSIRT, cohesion can be defined 
between individuals, i.e. team members [97], or through 
organizations [109].  
There are three PIs that focus on evaluating the effectiveness of how 
various parties collaborate to achieve the CSIR goals. The Team 
Cohesion PI focuses on members of the CSIRT, the Coordination 
Effectiveness PI focuses on the various groups within the 
organization and the Partnership Effectiveness PI focuses on 
collaborations with external entities.  
Factors in which team cohesion could be defined through [228] 
[97]:  
 Members attraction to the team/group (feeling proud to be 
part of the team) 
 Trust between team members 
 Communication between parties 
 Interaction inside and outside assigned tasks.  
Team cohesion evolves over time, so measurement should be done 
over a relatively long period of time.  
PM Examples 
A qualitative approach of conducting surveys or interviews with 
team members to measure cohesion in multidimensional fashion: 
(see [228]) 
Relevant PIs 
Communication Effectiveness, Coordination Effectiveness, 
Partnership Effectiveness 
 
PI.48.  Traceability (Documentation Effectiveness) 
Definition The ability of a CSIR to document its actions in a manner that 
permits accessible reachability to their sources 
Category Analysis CSIRP 
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Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
This PI measures one aspect of the analysis phase effectiveness, 
namely the documentation and reporting.  
Benefits of having good traceability include: 
1- Provides means for validation and verification of data and 
analysis results. 
2- Saves the team’s time during incident handling by 
reaching to relevant data in a timely manner 
3- Gives opportunity to easily use/apply holistic and trend 
analysis techniques 
4- Facilitates demonstrating compliance 
Aspects of CSIR traceability include: 
1- Traceability from measurements back to the goals [78] 
2- Traceability from actions back to policies (ISO 27001 
[198]) 
3- Traceability from analysis results back to data 
4- Data provenance, i.e. source of information [24] 
5- Trace performance problems and failures to their sources 
[135] 
6- Traceability of digital evidence through forensics 
processes [204] 
7- Traceability of actions/decisions to individuals 
PM Examples 
A metric can be developed to count the number of broken links 
from the source to the source. In situations when data is linked 
directly to its source, a simple count over number of searches can 
demonstrate overall traceability. In situations that involve multiple 
links from source to destination, the distance needs to be measured 
from the broken link to the source and to the origin.  
Relevant PIs Documentation Effectiveness 
 
PI.49.  Transparency 
Definition The feature of conducting CSIR activities, reporting results and 
disseminating incident information in honesty and openings.  
Category Analysis CSIRP 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
Some benefits of having transparent incident response:  
1- Contributes to CSIR sustainability [178] 
2- Minimizes the probability of surprises and enhances risk 
assessment [183] 
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3- Establishes trust between various parties, especially external 
bodies [51] 
4- Provides means for validation and verification 
5- Better customer/constituency satisfaction 
Elements of transparency: 
1- Transparency in definitions of authority and autonomy [51] 
2- Transparency in sharing of information [81] 
3- Transparency in data collection and analysis methodologies 
4- Transparency in assessment of risks and caused damage 
In the above definition, “honesty” means reflecting what actually 
happened. This leads to transparency being contentious with the 
need for confidentiality. Balance can be reached by outlining in a 
CSIRP what information is to be exchanged and how.  
The transparency and consistency PIs are related to each other, as 
enhancing one normally leads to enhancing the other.  
Assessing transparency would require assessing the level of 
disclosure, accuracy and clarity 
PM Examples 
The following study [229] suggests using the following four 
metrics for measuring transparency in the context of 
organizational management (which can be customized to CSIR): 
1- Involvement 
2- Feedback 
3- Level of details 
4- Ease of finding information 
Relevant PIs 
Consistency, Communication Effectiveness, Accuracy, 
Traceability, Documentation Effectiveness 
 
PI.50.  Utilization 
Definition 
A generic indicator concerning the degree at which a specific CSIR 
resource or service is used against its capacity.  
Category Generic CSIRT 
Design & 
Interpretation 
Considerations 
High utilization of resources can lead to better response time [149], 
indicate better resource allocation and management, and make more 
cost-effective responses.  
Reaching full utilization is an indicator of reaching system capacity 
which can possibly cause performance bottlenecks.  
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Utilization is an indicator for measuring the effectiveness of the 
response process not the outcomes [230].  
Some resources are “used-as-needed”. Under-utilization of these 
resources is not an indicator of poor performance, especially if the 
unavailability of this resource is critical to CSIR incident handling 
Utilization is also applicable to how responder time and experience 
is being applied [15]. Good utilization would be reflected in 
assigning tasks to responders with the proper experience.  
PM Examples 
Backup_utilization (BU) = ABT / BC 
 backup_capacity (BC): total time (in minutes) needed to 
backup the full system using full utilization of resources 
 actual_backup_time (ABT): actual time (in minutes) 
consumed for backuping the full system during incident 
handling 
The BU metric is applicable whenever the recovery process 
requires backing-up the full system before applying new updates, 
e.g. vulnerability patches.  
PM2: Average team member utilization (ATMU): 
 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑈 =  
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐻𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
N = total number of CSIRT members 
Hx = Available hours of member x 
hx = actual hours of member x used in incident handling 
Relevant PIs Cost Effectiveness 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
FRAMEWORK SUBCOMPONENTS 
 
This chapter builds on the proposed PE framework presented in Chapter 3 by 
providing a variety of models and methodologies with more emphasis on implementation 
considerations. Several concepts which were presented in an abstract form in the previous 
chapter are investigated in this chapter for their potential operational characteristics. The 
detailed practical aspects presented herein complement the higher level design concepts 
presented beforehand. However, the themes of generality and flexibility are maintained to 
allow deriving a diverse range of implementations that suit various environments.  
The chapter presents five modules. The first module is a comprehensive theoretical 
framework for building performance evaluation systems for CSIR. The second module is 
an integrated model for analyzing and validating performance evaluation results. The third 
module presents a multi-perspective stakeholder analysis of CSIR. The fourth and fifth 
models address the challenges of CSIR complexity and unpredictability.  
5.1 The Universal PE Framework (CSIR-UPEF) 
The Universal Performance Evaluation Framework (UPEF) is proposed as a 
CSIRPE framework that encompasses all of the desirable features of various frameworks. 
It is an idealistic super-framework that outperforms all other CSIRPE frameworks. It is 
also the most generic in the sense that all CSIRPE frameworks can be derived from it.   
The main feature of UPEF is that it is capable of effectively and accurately 
assessing the performance of any CSIR. The UPEF is unboundedly scalable, has 
unrestricted access to resources and can be deployed to any CSIRT, environment or 
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incident. It also conducts comprehensive assessment, produces accurate measurements, 
and uses a comprehensive list of performance analysis technique, performance indicators 
and performance metrics. A list of all of the desired features of the UPEF is provided in 
Table 34.  
# Feature Description 
D.1 CSIRT Type 
Can be used to evaluate any type of CSIRT, e.g. 
centralized, distributed, coordinated or customized 
D.2 Evaluator Type 
The framework is equally equipped to be used by any 
type of evaluator (e.g. self-evaluation by CSIRT, 
internal auditors, or external auditors) 
D.3 Number of Incidents 
Can be used to analyze performance to a single 
instance of incident handling or to a collection of 
incident handling instances 
D.4 
Incident 
Concurrency 
Can be used to evaluate performance of response to 
incident occurring simultaneously or in spaced 
intervals.  
D.6 Benchmarking 
It can be interfaced with any internal or external 
benchmark 
D.8 CSIRP Scope 
Measures both the effectiveness of the CSIRP design 
and the performance of the CSIRT 
A1.1 CSIR Environment Can be used unrestrictedly in any environment 
A1.2 Team Structure 
Can be used to evaluate a CSIRT composed of any 
number of members 
A1.3 Incident Complexity 
Can evaluate response to incidents of any degree of 
complexity 
F.4 Functional Model 
Contains performance monitoring capabilities, is 
able to provide partial results at any instance of the 
incident cycle, and produces comprehensive analysis 
at the end of the incident 
S.5 CSIRPE Overhead 
It involves no overhead in the collection of PMs and 
analysis results are produced instantly with no post-
incident overhead. Also, there is no overhead 
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imposed on the team to design or maintain the 
CSIRPE.  
PI.x 
Performance 
Indicators 
Has the capability to use and produce results for all 
PIs defined in Section 4.3.   
PI.1 Accuracy 
Provides measurements in optimal accuracy, i.e. full 
precision 
Table 34: Features of the Universal PE Framework (UPEF) 
The UPEF is theoretical, i.e. unrealistic to implement. However, it is an effective 
design and analytical tool for understanding and evaluating the performance of CSIRTs. 
The author found the UPEF to be useful in developing several components of the CSIRPE 
framework proposed in this dissertation, due to the complexity nature of the problem. 
Below is a brief discussion of how UPEF could be used in the design and analysis of 
CSIRPE frameworks.  
The idealistic approach of the UPEF can be mapped to one of the methodologies 
used for understanding and developing security metrics through idealistic analysis [162]. 
For instance, in [190] seven idealistic dimensions of security were used to derive security 
metrics. These dimensions include perfect knowledge of the system, and the attacker 
knowing nothing about the control system, the system has no vulnerabilities and the 
security team is capable of instantly detecting an attack and restoring the system. These 
dimensions are then used to derive operational metrics, or real world measures of these 
ideals. The UPEF adopts a similar approach.  
There are several advantages for the conceptualization of UPEF.  
Framework Generator:    
Since UPEF provides the most theoretically generic CSIRPE framework, all other 
frameworks could be generated from it. While developing the CSIRPE framework of this 
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project, I found that there were two theoretical approaches to conceptualizing and defining 
CSIRPE frameworks.  
The first approach is to build a very simplistic model and gradually add parameters 
to expand the model. Any simplistic model is expected to be unrealistic as it will fail to 
capture the complex parameters of the problem. The careful expansion of the model 
through realistic considerations should eventually lead to partial capturing of some 
practical performance aspects of the system. This approach views performance bottom-up, 
i.e. starting from measuring system components to the overall performance.  
The main advantage of the simplistic approach is its practicality. Most organizations need 
to start their performance systems small and then grow. It also seems to be the most 
commonly used approach in the works focusing on measuring security. Indeed, the SAC 
Complexity model proposed in Section 0 suggests using this approach due to its 
practicality.  
However, the reductionist nature of the approach raises concerns about the validity 
of measurements and most importantly its practicality [93] [34], which is a counter result 
to the initial goal. In addition, from the design perspective, in order to build a simplistic 
model the designers need to generate a long list of assumptions. Since the CSIR 
environment is very complex, it is very easy to overlook some parameters which might be 
necessary for producing meaningful performance analysis.  
The second approach starts from unrestricted and unbounded framework and 
gradually add delimiters to bring it from the theoretical to the practical domain. It is a top-
down approach that focuses on the overall system performance down to the system 
components’ performance.  It is appealing to higher managers who are interested in 
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strategic planning and generic performance indicators. It is also appealing to researchers 
who endeavor to study the various aspects of the complex CSIR system. 
The UPEF adopts the second approach which suits the concept of developing 
general frameworks compared to specific models. Each of the UPEF features defined in 
Table 34, when modified, can be used to generate a different type of CSIRPE framework.  
CSIRPE Design Tool:    
The UPEF could assist a CSIRT interested in building a performance system  in 
three different ways. First, it gives the designers a perspective on the various possibilities 
to build a CSIRPE. Second, it outlines the desired features of CSIRPE, despite being 
theoretical. Consequently, it helps in setting the PE goals and setting the design parameters 
introduced in this project. 
Several adopted emergency incident management frameworks set goals that seem 
unrealistic, demonstrating similarities to the features of a UPEF. For example, the National 
Response Framework (NRF) [110] aspires that frameworks be designed to handle any 
emergency situation, regardless of the scale, scope or number of simultaneous incidents; 
which is realistically very difficult to establish.   
Another design benefit that comes with UPEF is its basic structure that can assist 
software developers interested in developing a CSIRPE generic software solution. These 
solutions are generic and comes with customization properties to meet specific client needs. 
It will also provide insights to those developing simulation and automation modules for 
CSIR.  
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Analytical Tool:  
The UPEF has several benefits to bring forward to CSIR performance analysis. It 
could be used as a baseline for comparing the benefits and shortcomings of various PE 
frameworks. It also could be used as a tool to measure the gap between the optimal and 
practical characteristics of PE frameworks. With the absence of benchmarks, UPEF can 
also be used as a tool to set optimal values for performance metrics and compared measured 
results against it. The aforementioned gap analysis would assist in identifying operational 
factors that deviate performance evaluation from being perfect. These factors could be then 
subjected to further PE analysis.  
5.2 The Integrated Analysis & Validation Model (IAV) 
The Integrated Analysis & Validation Model (IAV) is a generic model for using 
analysis and validation schemes in the process of CSIR performance measurement. The 
model is generic in two perspectives. The first is its use of a variety of techniques that 
makes it applicable to various CSIR environments. It is not necessary that a team uses all 
techniques, as the model can be customized based on the CSIR goals and needs. The second 
perspective is that the proposed techniques are derived from distinct paradigms that could 
generate performance results from different perspectives.  
The term ‘integrated” suggests that the model is interfaced with the CSIR modules 
across different phases. It also stresses the need to view performance analysis as an 
integrated process in the CSIR life cycle instead of treating it as a separate activity applied 
post-incident.  
A higher level design of the IAV model is presented in Figure 20. Starting from the 
top of the chart, the CSIRPE design and planning activities would produce a CSIR 
performance evaluation framework. When incidents occur, the collected data is input into 
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the analysis schemes, which produce performance results. These results are used as input 
to the validation schemes. The right-side of the chart displays a performance evaluation 
database (PED), which acts the main repository for storing incident and analysis data. The 
PED is queried by the design and planning activities for enhancement recommendations, 
and also by the analysis schemes for performing comparative or trend analysis.  
 
Figure 20: Higher-level Design of the IVA Model 
The left-side of the chart displays the validation schemes box, which is fed by the 
performance results. The validation schemes target, the CSIRPE framework through 
validating its design and its performance. Note that there is a double edge arrow between 
the analysis schemes and the validation schemes boxes to highlight the fact that some 
techniques are used for analysis and validation purposes at the same time.  
CSIRPE Design & Planning 
CSIRPE Framework 
Incident Data 
PE 
Database 
(PED) Validation 
Schemes 
Analysis Schemes 
Performance Results 
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The detailed component structure of the IAV model is presented in Figure 21. The 
analysis scheme box is broken into three major interconnected components. The first IAV 
analysis component is called the Component Analysis which targets focused performance 
analysis into the separate parts of the CSIR system. These techniques normally use 
comparative methods, like benchmarking or performing gap analysis to compare current 
performance to expected, ideal, or best industry results. For instance the performance 
pertaining to the detection/identification phase can be investigated through benchmarking 
the PE results to that of other peer-institutions (benchmarking) or to an expected/ideal 
values (gap analysis). The same applies to the other phases of the CSIR life cycle. Overall, 
this component inspects performance of a specific part of the CSIR system independent 
from the other parts.    
The second analysis scheme component is the deficiency analysis component which 
focuses on identifying sources and causes that negatively impact performance. Example 
techniques include bottleneck analysis and root-cause analysis. Notice that the targeted 
analysis scheme intersects with the deficiency and component analysis components. Notice 
also that both components interacts with the PED in bi-directional manner, and feed the 
feedback system validation scheme.  
The third component is holistic analysis which inspects the performance of the 
CSIR system as a whole. Example of holistic techniques include assessment of goal 
achievement and performing analysis from different stakeholder perspectives. In addition, 
the trend analysis technique inspects the overall system in terms of positive or deficient 
performance over historical windows. The predictive analysis scheme can be used as a 
method for holistic analysis, validation or both.   
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Figure 21: Detailed Design of the Integrated Analysis & Validation Model (IVA) 
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There are five components to the validation scheme box. Starting from the top, the 
boot-strapping method is used to validate the design and planning activities by continuous 
interaction with higher management or constituencies. The compliance module validates 
the structure of the CSIRPE in terms of its policies and procedures. The feedback system 
synthesizes incident and performance data to produce practical recommendations for 
enhancement. Finally, the heuristic method inspects the level of confidence of the accuracy 
of performance results.  
The IAV can be customized in three different ways: 
1- Basic Design: a CSIRT might choose to have a basic or advance application of 
analysis and validation schemes. The detailed design presented in Figure 21 
presents an advanced design that does not suit most CSIRs. In its most basic 
form, a CSIRT need only to use a single analysis technique and the feedback 
system as a validation scheme (see Figure 33 in Appendix A). The basic design 
can be then gradually enhanced by introducing other  
2- Expansion: The IAV model is not limited to the modules presented under each 
component. A team may opt to add its own customized analysis or validation 
schemes while maintaining the overall structure of the model. For example, a 
team may choose to use a different comparative technique. In that regard, a new 
box needs to be added within the ‘Component Analysis’ box, while maintaining 
the other parts of the model.  
3- Interaction: The interaction between various components of the IAV can be 
modified without affecting the overall functionalities of the model. In its basic 
design, only the presence of the PED and the feedback system is necessary for 
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conducting analysis and validation schemes. If a new scheme is introduced, it 
only needs to connect directly or indirectly to the PED or the feedback system.  
As demonstrated above, the IAV model can be viewed as an elastic skeleton of how 
analysis and validation could be used in CSIR performance measurement.  
5.3 The CSIR Balanced Scorecard Model 
The objective of the CSIR Balanced Scorecard model is to adapt the concept of 
stakeholder analysis, see Section 3.5.2,  to the discipline of CSIR. The name of the model 
borrows the term balanced scorecard from a widely used multi-perspective performance 
analysis technique used in the industry [134]. The model shifts attention from the uni-
perspective of analyzing performance by financial indicators to a wider inclusion of 
stakeholder perspectives. The aforementioned model uses the perspectives of: financial, 
customer, internal, and innovation and learning. Following the same spirit, the CSIR 
Balanced scorecard model presented in this section, attempts to build a method of 
analyzing CSIR performance from multiple perspectives.  
The first question that arises is: who are the stakeholders of CSIR? The answer to 
that can be found in several works have identified the stakeholders for CSIR [29] [68] [92]. 
From these works and through analyzing the stakeholders interested in assessing the 
performance of CSIR, five groups can be identified, each representing a different 
perspective: 
1- Organizational Stakeholders: include executives, managers and administrative 
staff. This group is interested in a response that restores and minimizes interruptions 
to business operations. The group is also interested in a response that conforms to 
the organizational policies and procedures.   
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2- Financial stakeholders: include investors, shareholders and financial executives. 
This group is interested in a response that is cost effective and guards against 
financial loss.  
3- Technical Stakeholders: include the CIO, CSIRT, security team, network team, 
helpdesk and other IT support staff. The focus of this group is conducting a 
response that utilizes available software and hardware tools and protects the CIA 
(confidentiality, integrity and availability) of the system. 
4- Client Perspective (Information Stakeholders): include customers and contractors 
whose main concern is the protection of their private information and the fulfilment 
of their contractual terms.   
5- Community Stakeholders: focus on the public safety at large and the implications 
of the incident on various dimensions like: legal, law enforcement, social, media 
…etc. It is also interested in information sharing and raising community awareness.  
A graphical representation of the above five perspectives is found in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22: The CSIR Balanced ScoreCard Model 
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Using the list of performance indicators compiled in Section 4.3, example of PIs 
that can be used in analyzing each of the above five stakeholder perspectives is presented 
in Table 35. 
Stakeholder Sample PIs 
Organizational 
Stakeholders 
Competitiveness, Adaptability, Flexibility, Goal Achievement, 
Compliance, Conformance, Consistency 
Financial 
Stakeholders 
Response Cost, Capacity, Cost Effectiveness, Business Continuity, 
Utilization, Sufficiency 
Technical 
Stakeholders 
Detection Effectiveness, Containment Effectiveness, Accuracy, 
Eradication Effectiveness, Root-cause Identification, Stability 
Information 
Stakeholders 
Confidentiality, Availability, Constituency Satisfaction, Shielding 
Effectiveness, Transparency , Documentation Effectiveness 
Community 
Stakeholders 
Harm Reduction, Intelligence Capacity, Partnership Effectiveness, 
Attacking Host Identification, Evidence Retention 
Table 35: Performance Indicators for the CSIR Balanced Scorecard Stakeholders 
 
5.4 The SAC Complexity Model 
The SAC model is mainly adapted from field of complex systems, but similar 
approaches are also used in supply chain management. The two main applications of the 
field of complex systems are the biological systems and engineering systems. A complex 
system is defined as “system made of a large number of microscopic components 
interacting with each other in nontrivial ways” [231]. Performance evaluation of CSIR can 
be viewed through the aforementioned definition of complex system where the microscopic 
components are the activities performed by the CSIRT or the data portions that need to be 
analyzed. In that regard, the field of complex systems poses as a potential rich resource for 
researchers interested in developing PE models for CSIR.  
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It is noted in [232] that performance evaluation techniques for complex systems 
can be classified into two categories. The first category uses measurements, benchmarking 
and prototyping and is suitable for evaluating existing systems; while the second category 
uses modeling and is suitable for evaluating systems before their actual implementation. 
Through this classification, CSIRPE would fall under the first category. However, due to 
the fact that finding and fixing errors in complex systems before they are deployed is much 
economical than fixing errors afterwards [233], the complex systems field paid more 
attention to the second category. Therefore, the consultation with the complex systems field 
needs to be selective to the extent of benefit to CSIRPE.  
The suggested model is abbreviated by the “SAC Complexity Model” referring to 
the three strategies that are used in deriving the model. The three strategies are; 
Simplification, Approximation and Cascading.  
The feature of simplicity is considered an essential element of many incident 
response systems [111]. The strategy of simplification suggests that in order to measure 
the PE of an IR system, the system should be analyzed and divided into singular or small 
activities that can be subject to analysis independent of the overall system. This strategy is 
intuitive, simple to implement and is backed by research findings. For example, [103] 
suggests simplification as a method to identify the failure modes of a complex system. The 
authors found that treating each failure mode independently provides a good approximation 
of the system performance, despite the simplification. 
A sample of how simplification could be applied to the field of CSIR is shown in 
Figure 23. The diagram uses the hybrid model (See Table 2) and presents a possible 
simplification of the identification phase. The identification phase is broken into three main 
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activities: incident detection, initial assessment and incident declaration. Incident detection 
includes the analysis of events and precursors and documenting the initial reporting; while 
incident declaration involves, assigning a severity scale and following proper procedures 
of reporting the incident. Focusing on the initial assessment activity, it could be further 
broken down into three activities (See Table 3), functional impact assessment, information 
impact assessment and recoverability impact assessment. If a specific CSIR environment 
uses advanced methods for impact assessment then the three assessments can be further 
broken into simpler activities.  
   
Figure 23: Sample of Simplification of the Identification Phase 
Once the CSIR system is simplified into “simple” activities, each could be subject 
to independent effectiveness assessment. This starts by asking: “Does the CSIRT conduct 
functional impact assessment effectively?”, as an example. The advantage of this 
simplification is to enable identify performance issues at the micro-level.  
The second principle, i.e. approximation, is stimulated by a lesson learnt from other 
disciplines that tackled the issue of IRPE that suggests that attempts to precisely measure 
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the system will either fail or produce an analysis platform that is impractical.  Therefore, 
the strategy of approximation here invites CSIRTs to view PE in non-precise terms. It also 
suggests that CSIRT should seek to analyze the CSIR system in a manner that identifies 
issues that impact performance more than attempting to develop performance metrics with 
scales that are sensitive to minor changes. This is backed by the analysis provided in [116] 
that performance measurements today are about the tradeoffs between quality and available 
resources in replacement of the original theory of measurements that emphasizes accuracy, 
precision and objectivity.  Another study [137] highlights that approximation is normally 
needed for feasible use of benchmarking. 
The cascading strategy suggests that after performing analysis on singular 
activities, several activities can be combined for another analysis. The process will 
continue until reaching the overall performance of the system. This cascading process been 
recommended as an effective method for the design of performance indicators and metrics 
[135]. In this referenced work, cascading is performed vertically and horizontally. Vertical 
cascading is when performance metrics are gradually cascaded up to satisfying a specific 
strategy. Horizontal cascading applies vertical cascading but across various strategies or 
domains of analysis.  
This cascading strategy is also frequently used in the field of supply chain 
management (SCM). For example, a model presented in [107] [108], divides the analysis 
into four types, each corresponding to a phase within the supply chain. The first type is 
called functional measures and focuses on analyzing specific functions in the process. The 
second type is called “internal supply chain measures” and analyzes a combination of 
several functions in the production process. The third type is called “one sided integrated 
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measures” and analyzes the overall system from one perspective like a specific customer 
or supplier. The fourth perspective is called “total chain measure” and analyzes the system 
through the inputs of the three previous steps. The four types of this ordered method of 
analysis are depicted in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24: Depiction of the four types of ordered analysis for SCM. Source: [107]. 
There are several challenges to the application of the above SAC model. First, the 
simplification process which ignores the strong correlation between the various system 
components might render the performance analysis unrealistic. To overcome this, the 
approximation strategy might need to be also applied by making estimations of the values 
of various factors that might impact the performance analysis. For instance, measuring the 
effectiveness of “impact assessment” is not a simple process of assessing how the outlined 
procedures are being executed. The analysis is influenced by who does the analysis, the 
reliability of detection mechanisms, the rate of false alarms, correctness of outlined CSIRP 
procedures, and documentation effectiveness of previous similar events. Therefore, some 
estimation of these factors could be recorded to reflect how much confidence is displayed 
by the PE analysis of that specific component.  
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A second challenge comes from the fact that compositing several components for 
analysis is non-trivial [162]. Therefore, although the SAC model suggests the use of 
approximation, this should not be done without guiding procedures of how approximation 
is to be applied. These procedures should demonstrate some basic level of objectivity and 
uniformity. In addition, the cascading should be done carefully such that coherent parts of 
the system are aggregated together.   
5.5 The NFP Unpredictability Platform  
The NFP Unpredictability Platform is a tool for understanding and analyzing 
unpredictability for the purposes of conducting performance evaluation in the context of 
CSIR. The platform is based on three incident response principles: non-deterministic 
decision making, flexibility and preparedness. In this section, the three principles of the 
NFP unpredictability platform will be translated into policies and operational guidelines 
for responders.  
The first principle (N) recommends that each CSIR be equipped with a capability 
that allows for effective decision making in nondeterministic environments. Whether the 
CSIRT decides to follow a simple-informal process or a validated analytical model 
borrowed from decision making theories, the capability should have three main features:  
1- Decision makers are provided with timely and correct information. This has been 
highlighted as one of the critical issues for responders operating in challenging 
environments [97].  
2- Available data is analyzed and summarized to decision makers in the form of 
probabilities of possible events along with risks associated with potential decisions 
[129].  
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3- Available data is analyzed for forecasting purposes and decision makers have 
outlined procedures of how to enforce proactive measures [110].  
The above three steps are graphically modeled in Figure 25.  
 
Figure 25: NDDM Component of the NFP Unpredictability Platform 
The principle of flexibility (F) has been highlighted in NIMS [109], NFR [110], 
CERT [61] and in other publications [97]. This principle intercrosses with the principle of 
preparedness (P), as both aim at ensuring that the CSIR capability is able to respond to 
unpredictable situations. The term flexibility is used here in contrast to rigidity. A CSIRT 
can be trained to handle unexpected scenarios, but if the CSIR system, e.g. policies and 
procedures, is inflexible then there is little that can be achieved. The same is true if an 
organization has a flexible response system but the team is incompetent to address “out-
of-script” situations.  
The flexibility principle can be translated into three main policy/strategy elements: 
empowerment, scalability and adaptability. Empowerment means granting sufficient 
executive powers to responders to initiate and implement solutions with minimum chains 
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of command. A balance should be made such that executive powers do not exceed pre-
defined scopes, do not override specific policies, or contend with higher executive 
decisions. This concept is expressed in the national response framework (NRF) by 
entrusting local authorities to respond within their jurisdiction without the need to report 
to state or federal teams. Therefore, whenever assistance is needed, there needs to be a clear 
chain of command on how decisions are made among various parties [110].  
The concept of scalability focuses on the CSIR capability able to respond to 
incidents of various magnitudes. Normally non-Scalable response systems are also 
inflexible. To be flexible, an organization needs first to define its response capacity. Then, 
there needs to be mechanisms to recognize when the capacity is over-reached [111]. In 
such scenarios, the CSIRT needs to immediately seek external assistance. It has been 
highlighted by [66] that failing to do so is considered one of the ‘seven deadly sins’ that a 
CSIRT can make.  
Besides scalability, the system should be adaptable. Adaptability means the 
capability of responding to the change of needs [109]. Adaptability intersects with 
scalability when responding to the escalation of incidents. However, adaptability stands 
out when reliability issues arise or when there is a need for corrective measures. To 
overcome reliability issues, the CSIR system should avoid dependence on single-point 
resources or tools by outlining in the CSIRP alternatives and secondary options and 
contacts. Also, it is common in IR that responders would need to perform ad-hoc planning 
as needs arise [99]. There needs to be outlined and disciplined procedures for how this 
could be achieved.   
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The principle of preparedness (P) is more particular than the generic requirement 
for CSIRTs to be prepared through having the proper competency and the preparation of a 
CSIRP. Preparedness here means the ability to respond in stressful and unpredictable 
situations. This is a joint result of having a complete CSIRP and competent CSIRT.  
To reduce unpredictability, the CSIRP should have details about the variance of 
response steps to different security incidents. The plan also needs to be complete in terms 
of policy and support. The presence of such guidelines will facilitates the process of 
responding to the unexpected events. Otherwise, the team’s efforts will be diverted from 
developing solutions to also finding “proper” processes of how to implement them.  
The CSIRT’s competency require that the team gets proper training in terms of 
problem solving and collaboration during difficult scenarios. The various modules 
presented in are a good resource serving this aspect of competency [97].  
Another aspect of CSIRT’s competency is the for need of effective integration and 
partnership as highlighted in [109]. Integration here refers to coordination between various 
internal bodies of the organization, while partnership refers to coordination with external 
entities. A well-qualified CSIRT can be hindered during incident handling by the 
ineffectiveness, inefficiency or even unavailability of services and support expected from 
other departments in or out of the organization. Therefore, the effectiveness of these links 
should be regularly evaluated to avoid surprises during the response handling.  
A summary of the action points pertaining to flexibility and preparedness are available 
in Table 36. 
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Strategy/Policy 
Category 
Action Items 
Executive 
Empowerment 
(F) 
Define authority categories and domains with clear delegations of 
executive powers relevant to CSIR  
Inspect authority channels to omit overlaps and redundancies   
Trust responders with autonomy to implement and execute 
necessary measures within predefined boundaries 
Scalability (F) 
Evaluate and record the capacity of the response system 
Outline procedures to recognize when the system capacity is over-
reached and how to execute the process of seeking external 
assistance 
Adaptability 
(F) 
Outline procedures for how to respond to incident escalation 
Outline procedures for how to respond to unavailability of staff, 
tools and support services 
Enhance  procedures for how to take corrective measures during the 
incident handling 
CSIRP 
Completeness 
(P) 
Ensure that the CSIRP has outlined procedures for handling 
different types of security incidents 
Ensure that the CSIRP has outlined descriptions and contacts of 
various support services 
CSIRT 
Competency 
(P) 
The CSIRT is trained to operate and coordinate under stressful and 
non-predictable conditions 
Establish effective integration channels between various bodies 
within the organization 
Establish effective partnerships with external bodies who might be 
involved in the CSIR activities 
Table 36: Flexibility and Preparedness in the NFP Unpredictability Platform  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, several techniques will be used to analyze and assess the framework 
presented in the previous chapter. The first section, analyzes various aspects of the 
framework through hypothetical scenarios. three scenarios are presented in which the first 
demonstrates how to construct a simple PE system through the development process 
presented in Chapter three. The second scenario demonstrates how performance analysis 
could impact technical decisions by CSIRTs through the use of performance metrics. The 
third scenario involves the analysis of the notion of response time in the context of CSIRT.  
The second section provides the expert feedback on the framework. Four experts 
were interviewed to discuss issues and challenges relevant to CSIRPE and provide a 
holistic assessment of the framework components presented in this work.  The third section 
demonstrates how the framework displays the three characteristics of being 
comprehensive, flexible and industry compatible.  
5.1 Scenario Analysis 
5.1.1 Scenario I: Confronting Incident Instability 
Objectives: 
To demonstrate how to design a simple PE system for measuring a component of the CSIR 
system. The scenario focuses on analyzing response stability and provides an alignment of 
goals/aspects with PIs and PMs. In addition, an example is provided of how several PMs 
can be derived from a PI. A quantitative approach is used for the definition of PMs.  
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Background: 
HumanDev is a semi-government organization that works with government agencies 
and the private sector to recruit new college graduates for available work 
opportunities. The organization maintains two large databases, one for college 
graduates and one for potential employers. The two databases are connected through 
a software portal called Connect, from which HumanDev Staff can create a profile 
for each client, find suitable work vacancies and later monitor the work progress of 
each client.   
Due to several breaches targeting private personal data stored in the databases, 
HumanDev invested in contracting with a CSIR capability. This CSIR serves several 
departments in the government ministry that HumanDev reports to and maintains a 
unified CSIRP across the ministry.  
Incident Details:  
For several incidents, it was noticed that the team would declare an incident on a 
specific severity level, but then it escalates to higher levels. In some instances, it was 
recorded that the severity level would be updated several times during the incident 
handling. During a meeting between senior members of HumanDev and the CSIRT, 
it was acknowledged that responses suffer from instability issues. A committee was 
tasked with analyzing the previous responses to come up with a list of 
recommendations to improve the response stability. The committee was also tasked 
with formulating a mechanism for evaluating the stability of future responses.   
Analysis: 
The above scenario is confirmed to have issues with incident response stability, 
which frequently arise in the field of IR [101]. Although it is sometimes expected for an 
incident to escalate or de-escalate after its declaration, the observation found in the above 
scenario suggest that incidents would escalate in uncontrollable fashion or would be 
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frequently re-classified during incident handling which indicate signs of ineffective 
response.  
There are several factors that could lead to response instability. Examples include: 
1- Inaccurate detection and classification of the incident 
2- Incomplete or inadequate containment procedures 
3- Ineffective execution of the CSIRP 
4- Poor communication or coordination between team members  
The analysis of the scenario will focus on the performance evaluation side. A 
simplified partial PE system is proposed using the process flow of the CSIRPE framework 
presented in Chapter Three.  
 The first phase of developing the PE system is to specify the design parameters and 
general strategies. Assume that the “Basic Environment” settings are used as specified in 
Table 45.  
 Using the second phase, since this is a simplified problem space either the definition 
of a PE goal or a PE aspect would be sufficient. A sample goal statement would be: “to 
develop mechanisms to measure the stability of the incident response system”. 
Alternatively, the following PE aspect could be used: “Incident Response Stability”. In this 
specific scenario, the derivation of PIs would be similar regardless of which method is 
used. For simplicity, the aspect “IR stability” will be used.  
 The next step would be to define performance indicators that map to the IR stability 
PE aspect. Five indicators are selected, see Figure 26. The PIs are defined as presented in 
Section 4.3. Note that the first PI focuses on measuring the overall system stability, while 
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the other four PIs map to the four potential causes of instability as mentioned at the 
beginning of this analysis.  
 
Figure 26: Scenario I: Selection of Performance Indicators 
Using the PI Template presented in Table 49, the Stability PI is formally defined as 
the following: 
Name Stability 
Code STPI 
Description 
The ability of a CSIRT to prevent an incident from unexpected 
escalation and to maintain the response in a controllable state 
(See PI.44) 
Classification Generic 
Priority KPI 
Goals & Aspects PE Aspect: “IR Stability” 
PMs Escalation: STPI.(E) 
Fluctuation: STPI.(F) 
Table 37: Scenario I: Definition of the Stability PI 
The next step, which is the start of phase III, is to design performance metrics. Two 
PMs will be defined for the Stability PI. The same procedure could be applied to the other 
PIs (For an example of an Accuracy PM see Scenario II, and see Scenario IV for an 
example of containment effectiveness PM). 
There are various methods to measure the system stability. Focus here would be to 
monitor the classification of the incident, across the severity scale, from the time the 
IR Stability
(PE Aspect)
Stability
System Stability
Accuracy
Detection 
Effectiveness
Containment 
Effectiveness
Containment 
Eff.
Conformance
CSIRP 
Execution
Communication 
Effectiveness
Team 
Coordination
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incident is declared to the time of full recovery. Two metrics will be used, one focusing on 
measuring the escalation of the incident, and the other on capturing the fluctuations 
(escalation or de-escalations) of the incident state. Both metrics will use quantitative 
methods.  
Let the severity scale be: 
𝑺 = {𝑺𝟏, 𝑺𝟐, … , 𝑺𝒏} 
Where S1 represents the least severity level an incident could have and Sn the highest.    
Let the severity state of the incident throughout the incident handling life cycle be 
represented through the following vector: 
𝑺𝑺 = [𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅, 𝑺𝑺𝟏, 𝑺𝑺𝟐, … , 𝑺𝑺𝒌] 
Where 𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 is the severity of the incident upon declaration, and the rest of the states 
represent the fluctuations in the severity level during different milestones of executing the 
incident response plan. 
In an ideal and stable response, the value of SS vector would only contain 
𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅 or in addition to other values such that all the other subsequent values of 𝑺𝑺𝒊 
are smaller than 𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅. In that specific case, it means the incident gradually de-
escalated. This could be represented mathematically as: 
𝑺𝑺𝒋 ≤ 𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒆𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅     ∀𝒋: 𝒋 ∈ 𝑺𝑺 
The first performance metric which measures the incident escalation is defined in 
the following table, which uses the PM Template of Table 50.  
Metric Name Escalation Metric 
Code Escalation: STPI.(E) 
Description 
A performance metric to record the occurrence of incident 
escalation and its extent against a pre-defined severity scale.  
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𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐼 . (𝐸) = 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 
Where 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max {𝑆𝑆} 
Classification Performance metric  
Measurement  Quantitative 
[Conditions] There needs to be a pre-defined severity scale S of incidents that 
contain at least three severity levels.   
[Attributes] Severity Scale 𝑆 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛} 
Interpretation When no escalation occurs the value of STPI.(E)=0, 
Because: 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 
A higher value of STPI.(E) represent higher magnitude of 
escalation.  
PIs The stability PI: STPI 
Table 38: Scenario I: Definition of Incident Escalation Performance Metric 
The second performance metric, the fluctuation PM, records the changes of the 
incident state, not necessarily the escalation. For instance, if 𝑺𝑺 = [𝑺𝑺𝟑, 𝑺𝑺𝟏, 𝑺𝑺𝟑, 𝑺𝑺𝟒], it 
represents an escalation of one level, i.e. from SS3 to SS4. However, it is noticed that the 
incident de-escalated, then went back to the declared level, then escalated before it was 
finally contained. This fluctuation is not captured through the escalation PM. The following 
table represents a formal definition of the metric: 
Metric Name Fluctuation Metric 
Code Fluctuation: STPI.(F) 
Description 
A performance metric to record the changes in the incident 
severity level through its cycle.   
𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐼 . (𝐹) = ∑ 𝑟𝑗
𝑘−1
𝑗=0
 
Where 𝑟𝑗 {
0
𝑆𝑆𝑗+1 − 𝑆𝑆𝑗
     𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑗+1 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑗 
   𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑗+1 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑗
∀ 𝑆𝑆𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 
Classification Performance metric  
Measurement  Quantitative 
[Conditions] There needs to be a pre-defined severity scale S of incidents that 
contain at least three severity levels.   
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[Attributes] Severity Scale 𝑆 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛} 
Interpretation When no fluctuation occurs the value of STPI.(F)=0, 
Whenever there is an occurrence of escalation, or a de-escalation 
followed by an escalation, the value of the PM gets incremented 
by a magnitude equal to the difference between the two states.   
PIs The stability PI: STPI 
Table 39: Scenario I:Definition of Incident Fluctuation Performance Metric 
For the analysis of the PM readings, the following remarks could be made: 
1- A simple internal benchmark that compares the stability of the current incident 
to previous incidents within the organization would be sufficient. 
2- If the PM results show that instability remains a matter of concern, then a trend 
analysis of several responses should be conducted to identify patterns and 
common causes 
3- If there is interest to compare the stability of responses with external bodies, 
e.g. other ministry departments, then it would only be meaningful if the severity 
scales are very similar in terms of their classification mechanism and the 
number of defined severity levels. If there is a disparity between the two 
classification systems, then it would be feasible to compare the presence of 
instability by recording the occurrence of escalation or fluctuation, i.e. positive 
values for the escalation and fluctuation metrics.  
4- The occurrence of escalation is more likely to happen compared to fluctuation 
which could occur due to very poor incident handling or within highly dynamic 
environments. Therefore, the escalation PM should be maintained for longer 
period, even when stability is maintained; while the fluctuation metric could be 
applied for a period of time until the fluctuation issue is diminished.  
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5- It is noticed that when both metrics have the same positive value, then it 
indicates the occurrence of an escalation. However, if a fluctuation occurs then 
the value of the fluctuation metric would be higher than the escalation metric. 
Therefore, both metrics should be analyzed collectively for better 
understanding of the system stability.     
Conclusion:  
The above scenario addressed a CSIR system with a specific performance issue, 
namely stability. Through the use of the CSIRPE framework development process, the 
issue was addressed through a simple process structure that provided guidance to how the 
issue should be controlled and measured. The process started from goals to indictors to 
performance metrics and finally to analysis recommendations. In summary, the scenario 
demonstrated how CSIR PE issues could be addressed in a systemized manner through the 
use of the CSIRPE framework.   
5.1.2 Scenario II: Enhancing Incident Declaration Strategy 
Objectives: 
To demonstrate how performance analysis can impact incident response strategies. The 
scenario involves a situation in which both financial and non-financial performance metrics 
are to be used. The scenario applies several performance analysis techniques like trend 
analysis, gap analysis and predictive analysis.  
Background: 
FastRescue is a computer security incident response team that serves a large business 
corporation. The core team is composed of five highly talented security professionals, 
and is partnered with several logistics and support teams inside and outside the 
corporation to provide as-needed assistance during incident handling. The team 
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operates in a relatively high budget. However, the FastRescue services had been 
viewed positively by the executives who are convinced that despite the high operating 
costs of FastResecue, the financial and management disadvantages of not using such 
CSIRT would have caused the corporation more damage.    
Scenario Details:  
In the past year, the corporation was undergoing financial difficulties that require 
making several cuts to the various departments. A committee consisting of the CIO 
and a group of risk assessment analysts was formed to review potential cuts to the 
operation costs of FastRescue.  
During the assessment, the committee noticed that the team follows a response 
strategy in which every incident is declared at the highest severity level (Degree Five) 
and is gradually decreased to the actual severity level. This strategy ensures that no 
incident is ever declared below its actual severity level. The committee is evaluating 
whether such strategy is cost-effective.   
Analysis: 
The above scenario involves a situation in which financial objectives seem to be in 
tension with CSIRT objectives. In order to conduct performance evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the top-down approach of incident declaration, several financial and 
security performance metrics need to be deployed. The committee would need to conduct 
a trend analysis on data from previous incidents;  in addition to predictive analysis on how 
eliminating the above strategy would impact the cost effectiveness of the incident response. 
In order to achieve the above, the trend analysis time domain was defined between 
2012 to 2016. The committee defined four PIs from which a total of nine PMs were derived, 
see Table 40. The definition of these PIs is as defined in PI.21, PI.19, PI.20 and PI.38 
respectively.  
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Performance 
Indicator (PI) 
Performance Metric (PM) 
Name & Code Code Brief Description 
Detection 
Effectiveness (DE) 
Incident Classification 
Accuracy 
ICA Was the incident declared on the 
correct severity level? 
Detection 
Effectiveness (DE) 
Time to Confirming 
Incident Classification 
TCIC 
How long did it take to approve or 
disapprove the initial incident 
classification? 
Response Cost (RC) 
Hourly Average 
Operating Cost 
HAOC 
What is the average incident 
operating cost per incident 
(depending on incident 
classification)? 
Response Cost (RC) Average Loss AL 
Average financial loss due to 
incident handling (despite the use 
of CSIRT) 
Cost Effectiveness 
(CE) 
Predicted Loss PL 
Predicted average financial loss 
per incident due to cyber incidents 
(without CSIRT intervention) 
Cost Effectiveness 
(CE) 
CSIRT Cost 
Effectiveness 
CCE Average financial savings per 
incident due to the use of CSIRT  
Cost Effectiveness 
(CE) 
Detection Inaccuracy 
Cost 
DIC 
Average financial loss due to 
inaccuracy of initial incident 
classification 
Cost Effectiveness 
(CE) 
Incident Classification 
Strategy Cost 
ICS-
CE 
Cost effectiveness of incident 
classification strategy (top-down 
approach) 
Response Time 
(RT) 
Average Response 
Time 
ART 
Average incident response time, 
from incident declaration to 
incident resolution, depending on 
incident severity 
Table 40: Scenario II: List of Performance Indicators and Metrics 
 For the purposes of this scenario analysis, only the ICA and TCIC PMs are defined, 
see Table 41 and Table 42. The remainder of the PMs, which are mainly financial metrics, 
could be defined in a similar manner.  
Metric Name Incident Classification Accuracy 
Code DEPI.(ICA) 
Description 
A performance metric to compare the actual severity level of an 
incident to the initially declared level: 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐼 . (𝐼𝐶𝐴) =
𝑛 − |𝐴𝑆 − 𝑆| − 1
𝑛 − 1
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Where S is the incident severity level upon incident declaration, 
AS is the actual incident declaration as confirmed later during 
incident handling, and n is the total number of severity levels (in 
this scenario 5 levels) 
Classification Performance metric  
Measurement  Quantitative 
[Conditions] There needs to be a pre-defined severity scale S of incidents that 
contain at least two severity levels.   
[Attributes] Severity Scale 𝑆 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛} [In this scenario n = 5] 
Interpretation If the actual and declared severity levels match, then the value of 
ICA would be 1, meaning full accuracy.  
If the declared value is on the edge side of the scale, and the actual 
is on the other edge, then the value of ICA would be 0, i.e. no 
accuracy.    
PIs The detection effectiveness PI: DEPI 
Table 41: Scenario II: Definition of Incident Classification Accuracy 
To be more thorough in defining the above performance indicators, several 
descriptive metrics (See: M.1: Metric Type) are needed.  These descriptor PMs could be 
defined using the same above PM template, with the exception that under the 
“Classification” field, the value would be “Descriptor Metric” instead of “Performance 
Metric”. A list of these descriptive metrics along with a brief definition is presented in 
Appendix A: Table 52.  
Metric Name Time to Confirming Incident Classification 
Code DEPI.(TCIC) 
Description 
A performance metric to measure the time in hours from the 
moment an incident is declared on a specific severity level to the 
time that level is confirmed or approved to be otherwise.  
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐼 . (𝑇𝐶𝐼𝐶) = 𝐶𝑇 − 𝐷𝑇 
Where DT is the timestamp of declaring the incident, CT is the 
timestamp of approving the severity level of the incident and the 
above subtraction is time subtraction 
Classification Performance metric  
Measurement  Quantitative 
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[Conditions] There needs to be a pre-defined severity scale S of incidents that 
contain at least two severity levels.   
[Attributes] Severity Scale 𝑆 = {𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛} 
Escalation: Yes/No (did the incident escalate) 
Interpretation The above metric is suitable when gradual incident classification 
strategies are used, like the top-down approach.  
If an incident classification is validated only during post-incident 
analysis, then this PM should not be used.  
When using this PM, a CSIRT should be aware to the fact that 
incidents may escalate. In such scenario, the above time 
measurement might not be representative of actual events.   
PIs The detection effectiveness PI: DEPI 
Table 42: Scenario II: Definition of the TCIC Performance Metric 
The committee started by collecting data about the number of incidents per year, 
categorized by the severity level, see Appendix A: Table 53. Then a break-down of the 
fixed (Appendix A: Table 54) and operation costs (Appendix A: Table 55) associated with 
incident handling was recorded. Incident response fixed costs would normally include 
CSIRT members’ salaries, software licenses, equipment, continuous professional 
development budget and contractual obligations. For simplicity, the fixed costs are 
minimized to the core team salaries, broken over the period of the five years. Similarly, a 
summative figure related to the operation costs of the core, logistics and support teams is 
used for the representation of operational costs. The calculated costs were averaged based 
on the severity level of incidents, per each hour of incident handling.  
Next, the analysts conducted a financial and risk assessment to investigate the 
overall cost effectiveness of the organization’s use of the CSIR capability, see Appendix 
A: Table 56. For each incident, two financial estimates were made. The first is the actual 
financial loss caused by the incident despite the use of CSIR, while the second is a predicted 
figure of how much loss would have been endured if there was no CSIR. The difference 
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between the two numbers, averaged over each category of incidents, represents the cost 
effectiveness of using the CSIR capability.  
The third step was to analyze the technical incident data for time stamps. Two main 
time stamps were analyzed: the total response time and the time it took to approve or 
disapprove the initial severity level of the incident, see Appendix A: Table 57.  
The final step is to analyze the cost effectiveness of using the top-down approach 
to incident declaration. To achieve this, two main compound performance metrics were 
used. The first metric, Detection Inaccuracy Cost (DIC), measures how much unnecessary 
cost was endured due to classifying an incident on a higher severity level compared to its 
actual level. This could be calculated through analyzing the data (over the severity scale) 
of the ICA and TCIC PMs, along with the hourly operating cost and the total number of 
incidents under each incident category. Note that when an incident is actually on the highest 
scale (degree five), then there would be no inaccuracy cost, because the CSIRT is operating 
in its full capacity. On the other hand, when an incident is of the lowest severity level, the 
inaccuracy cost would be high due to the fact that the team has used too many unnecessary 
resources at the early stages of the response. The obtained data for the DIC PM is presented 
in Appendix A: Table 58.  
The second performance metric targets assessing the current incident declaration 
strategy against other possible strategies. A proposal was made to limit the incident 
classification period to a maximum of three hours, in which the capacity of the CSIR is 
boosted through providing additional financial, technical and logistical support. An 
estimation was made about the expected increase in the financial resources based on the 
statistical occurrences of incidents over the severity scale. This estimation is coupled with 
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a risk assessment of the expected financial loss endured if the CSIRT fails to adequately 
classify the incident during the three hour period. The addition of both figures summarizes 
the financial costs of the new proposal. This is compared with the detection inaccuracy cost 
currently endured due to the top-down incident declaration approach. The difference 
between the two numbers represent the cost effectiveness of using the top-down incident 
declaration approach. 
The results of the above two PMs are presented in Appendix A:Table 59. As the 
data displays, the financial benefits of using the top-down approach by FastRescue are far 
more than the condensed identification proposal. Indeed, in this specific scenario, 
abandoning the above strategy would have costed the company an amount similar to the 
cost of doubling the size of the CSIRT.  
Conclusion: 
The above scenario analysis demonstrated how a variety of performance metrics 
and indicators could be grouped to solve an issue pertaining to performance. The scenario 
involved a tension between financial and technical objectives. The reckoning that the 
adopted top-down approach of incident declaration might be costly is reasonable. However, 
an objective analysis through the use of performance metrics proved otherwise. This asserts 
one of the foundations in which the framework of this project is built upon, namely the use 
of performance analysis would lead to objective decision making. The quantitative analysis 
using the performance metrics provided means for making decisions that are based on 
operational data compared to relying on speculations and subjective analysis. In this 
specific scenario, the performance analysis had an impact on the technical functionalities 
and response strategies of the CSIRT. Had the PE analysis recommended the disapproval 
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of this strategy, significant changes would have been applied to the CSIRP and the overall 
execution of the incident response activities.  
5.1.3 Scenario III: Analyzing Response Time 
Code Performance Metric 
AT Analysis Time 
CT Compromise Time 
CST Classification Time 
CTT Containment Time 
DAT Detection Analysis Time 
DCT Declaration Time 
DET Data Exfiltration Time 
DT Detection Time 
DVT Discovery Time 
EHT Enhancement Time 
ERT Eradication Time 
FMAT First Malicious Action Time 
FRT Full Recovery Time 
HT Incident Handling Time 
ICF Incident Containment Factor 
ICT Initial Compromise Time 
MT Monitoring Time 
PRT Partial Recovery Time 
RT Response time 
Table 43: List of Performance Metrics for Scenario III 
Objectives: 
To analyze the notion of response time in the context of CSIR. The scenario will 
demonstrate how the principles outlined in the SAC complexity model can be used in the 
development of performance metrics.   
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Background: 
SecureLab is a small but dynamic CSIRT that operates in higher education 
institution.. The SecureLab team is part of a larger CSIRT, SecureEd that covers all 
types of security incidents in the institution. The SecureLab team is focused on 
responding to security incidents targeting the institution’s 36 educational computer 
laboratories. Most of the incidents handled by SecureLab are worms and viruses that 
spread across the network subnets, mainly due to students’ attaching external devices 
like flash drives.  
Scenario Details: 
In response to claims of slow responses, SecureEd is interested in developing a 
mechanism to measure the response time for incidents defined within the scope of 
SecureLab. The current mode of operation consists of three main steps:  
1- SecureEd detects, classifies and then pass incident handling to SecureLab 
2- SecureLab works on the containment, eradication and partial recovery 
3- SecureEd works on full system recovery, incident analysis and closing the incident.  
The objective of measuring the response time is to identify elements of the incident 
response that might contribute to the ineffectiveness of the response      
Analysis: 
Measuring response time is a common performance measure across various 
disciplines. The definition of response time vary depending on the general specifications 
of the environment in each discipline. Even within each discipline, there are various 
methods to define response time depending on the specific characteristics of the underlying 
environment. Failure to recognize this variance of methods may lead to incorrect analysis 
emerging from inconsistent comparisons.  
The principles of the SAC complexity model will be applied to the above scenario 
to develop a mechanism for measuring response time that suits the environment of 
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SecureLab. Measuring response time will be divided into measuring the time of completing 
simple activities (the principle of Simplicity), which will be aggregated together to measure 
more complex activities (the principle of Cascading). In addition, the principle of 
Approximation will be used in defining some time-slots within the overall response-
timeline.  
Using a top-down approach, the response-time can be divided into three main time-
slots, see Figure 27: 
1- Detection Time (DT): The time it took to detect and classify the incident by 
SecureEd before its passed to SecureLab.  
2- Incident Handling Time (HT): the time it takes SecureLab to contain, eradicate 
and partially restore the system until it is passed back to SecureEd.  
3- Incident Analysis Time (AT): the time it takes SecureEd to completely restore 
the system, formulate recommendations and close the incident.  
From the above description, the incident response-time (RT) can be defined as the 
following: 
𝑹𝑻 = 𝑫𝑻 + 𝑯𝑻 + 𝑨𝑻 
Note that the above break-down of incident response time is analogous to the 
general definition found in the transportation field, which defines the response time into 
the following three main time-slots [117]: 
1- Elapsed time from incident occurrence to detection 
2- Elapsed time from the point at which the IR team is called out until its arrival on-
scene and completes the response activities.  
3- Elapsed time to normal traffic flow restoration.  
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Each of the three timeslots (i.e. DT, HT and AT) need to be subject to further 
simplification. The following paragraphs investigates each time-slot independently.  
 
Figure 27: Scenario III: Response Time Components 
Detection Time (DT): 
The detection time can be divided into two main time-slots. The first is the time an 
incident is active in the system before it was detected by SecureEd; and the second is the 
time period starting from the time an incident is reported/discovered to the time it is 
classified, declared and passed to SecureLab. The first time-slot will be referred to as: 
Compromise Time (CT) and the second as Detection Analysis Time (DAT).  
To further break-down the Compromise Time (CT), the time-slots defined by the 
VERIS project [73]  will be used, which are:  
1 First malicious action time (FMAT): Beginning of the threat actor's malicious 
actions against the victim. Port scans, initiating a brute-force attack, and even 
physical recon, are a few examples. This is only relevant to intentional and 
malicious actions. 
2 Initial compromise time (ICT): First point at which a security attribute (C/P, I/A, 
A/U) of an information asset was compromised. 
3 Data exfiltration time (DET): First point at which non-public data was taken from 
the victim environment. Only applicable to data compromise events. 
Response Time 
(RT)
Detection Time 
(DT)
Incident Handling 
Time (HT)
Incident Analysis 
Time (AT)
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Note that the FMAT, ICT and DET could be interpreted differently depending on 
the nature of the incident. Such discussion is beyond the scope of this scenario. Overall, 
the FMAT could be viewed as the preparation time of the malicious event, i.e. breach 
activities before the actual security exploitation; the initial compromise time (ICT) is the 
timeframe when security has been compromised, despite the fact that no harm has 
occurred; and the data exfiltration time (DET) is the time when harm is endured before the 
detection/reporting of the incident. Using the above, the three components are treated as 
time periods instead of timestamps.   
 
Figure 28: Scenario III: Detection Time (DT) Components 
The Detection Analysis Time (DAT) can be broken into three time events: 
1- Discovery Time (DVT): The timestamp of the first reporting of the incident, i.e. 
when SecureEd learnt about the incident. 
2- Classification Time (CST): The timestamp the incident type and severity is 
confirmed.   
3- Declaration Time (DCT): the timestamp when the incident is declared and passed 
to the SecureLab team.  
Based on the above definitions the following equations are to be used for calculating 
the Detection Time (DT): 
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𝐷𝑇 = 𝐶𝑇 + 𝐷𝐴𝑇 
𝐶𝑇 = 𝐹𝑀𝐴𝑇 + 𝐼𝐶𝑇 + 𝐷𝐸𝑇  
𝐷𝐴𝑇 = 𝐷𝐶𝑇 − 𝐷𝑉𝑇 
Figure 29: Calculation of Incident Detection (DT) Time 
When analyzing the above DT metric, having a long compromise time (CT) would 
suggest that the environment has poor detection mechanisms or weak security measures 
that would permit a threat to remain undetected for a long time. Ideally, an incident should 
be detected as soon as it is present in the system, i.e. the value of CT is 0. However, this is 
practically infeasible. Some studies [234][67] suggest that responders should be available 
24x7; however, this imposes several practical challenges and might only be applicable to 
governments or very large organizations. Therefore, there would be always a time period 
between the detection of the incident and the actual execution of the response. It is obvious 
that an effective response would require minimizing this time period. 
On the other hand, the detection analysis time (DAT) depends mainly on the 
readiness of the CSIRT and its effectiveness in executing the CSIRP. Ideally, a team should 
spend very minimum time in classifying the incident and declaring it. But rushing this 
could result in inaccurate understanding of the incident and consequently inadequate 
response measures. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there will be a time-period 
from when an incident is discovered until it is classified and declared. In an effective 
environment, an incident should be declared as soon as it is classified, i.e. (DCT-CST = 0). 
Yet, the logistics of classifying the incident and handing it to the appropriate team (in this 
scenario, the SecureLab team) would require some time. One of the performance aims of 
the CSIRT should be to minimize this time period.  
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Incident Handling Time (HT): 
The incident handling time (HT) represent the overall time spent by the team 
SecureLab in responding to the incident. Applying the simplification-cascading process to 
this time-period can yield the following three main time-periods (Figure 30): 
1- Containment Time (CTT): The time-period taken to prevent the incident from 
spreading beyond its initial infected area.  
2- Eradication time (ERT): The time-period to fully remove the malicious components 
from the system.    
3- Partial Recovery Time (PRT): the time-period taken to restore the basic components 
of the system to their initial state.  
The incident handling time (HT) would be an additive metric of the above three 
metrics, i.e. 𝐻𝑇 = 𝐶𝑇𝑇 + 𝐸𝑅𝑇 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇 
The containment, eradication and recovery steps have many interconnected 
activities. In addition, each step would involve a series of actions that would vary 
depending on the type of incident. Therefore, defining time-periods that would separate 
each step is not intuitive.   
 
Figure 30: Scenario III: Incident Handling Time (HT) Components 
To overcome the above challenge, instead of measuring the time it takes a CSIRT 
to execute specific activities, timestamps could be recorded when specific response 
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indicators have taken place. For instance, the partial recovery time (PRT) could be 
recorded based on the fulfillment of one or more of the following response indicators:  
 A computer lab is partially functioning such that all software required for 
conducting a course session are running, despite some auxiliary software (e.g. 
browsing or media players, printing software) being unavailable 
 Instead of focusing on software and applications, recoverability could be measured 
based on availability of services. For instance, backup or alternative applications 
could be launched until the original applications are restored.  
 A specific number of computers in a lab are fully restored. For instance, at least 
half of the computers in a classroom are fully restored enabling classes to take place 
(each two students could share a computer).  
The above response indicators are quantitative metrics that rely on simple counting 
methods. This does not necessarily apply to all response indicators. For instance, the 
containment and eradication phase do not represent exclusive activities. It is a common 
practice to get eradication activities initiated while the final steps of the containment phase 
are still on-going. For such situations, it would be better to use heuristic response indicators 
that rely on estimations instead of actual measurements. This is where the principle of 
Approximation from the SAC model is applied. 
A detailed example is provided below of how the containment and eradication 
phases could be distinguished. Instead of waiting for full containment before declaring the 
start of the eradication process, the CSIRT can make an estimation of when the containment 
process is considered satisfactory to apply eradication measures. This is done through 
observation some threshold metrics that estimate the containment achievement, e.g. 80% 
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of containment is completed. In the example below, the metric containment factor is 
defined. When the CSIRT has exceeded a pre-defined threshold, i.e. specific containment 
factor value, the line  between eradication and containment could be drawn.  
Containment Factor Performance Metric 
Whenever an incident happens, one of the objectives of the CSIRT is to isolate this 
incident and prevent it from spreading to other points in the network. This is especially 
important when incidents involve self-replicating or network spreading worms, or 
distributed denial of service attacks DDoS attacks. The incident containment factor (ICF) 
performance metric aims for measuring the success of the response team in blocking the 
affected parts of the organization from infecting the healthy parts.  
Within a specific environment, a security incident might be global or local. A global 
incident happens when everyone in that environment gets infected by the incident. Most 
organizations have security infrastructure empowered with some security policies to 
decrease the likelihood of such incidents. Yet, it is not infrequent for an organization to be 
subjected to a global incident. The occurrence of a global incident is a serious indicator 
that the environment lacks basic defensive mechanisms and the whole security 
infrastructure should be subject to scrutiny. In local incidents, part of the environment is 
infected while other parts of the same environment remain healthy.  
Note that the above understanding of global and local incidents as described above 
is similar to the understanding provided in [235] which is different than how the terms are  
used in the CERT document [2] which defines a global incident as one that involves 
interaction with external entities like law enforcement, while local incidents remain 
internal within an organization.   
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Let the infected areas of the environment be identified through a descriptive metric 
called incident locale. There are various methods to define the locale, depending on the 
type of incident and nature of the environment. In most scenarios, the locale could be 
defined in terms of either region or population. The region locale is the portion of the 
network, physical or virtual, that is infected by the incident. These portions can be 
identified as number of hosts connected to a local switch/router, number of hosts within an 
IP range or within a specific subdomain, or number of departments within an organization. 
The population locale represents the number of users or clients affected by the incident. In 
some scenarios both locales should be defined, while in others only one is needed for a 
meaningful description of the incident. This definition of locale can be easily incorporated 
into VERIS [73] under: Incident description  Assets  Variety.  
Let N denote total number of hosts in an environment. And let 𝑵𝑫 represent number 
of hosts in a region or population infected by the incident as recognized by the 
detection/identification phase. Note that if 𝑵𝑫 is very high then that may suggest weak 
detection mechanisms and could be used along with the compromise time (CT) metric to 
trigger a review of the adopted detection tools and mechanisms. The value of 𝑵𝑫 can also 
help in determining the severity of an incident during the initial assessment.  
Isolating and preventing an incident from spreading can be mapped to keeping the 
number of infected hosts after declaration close to 𝑵𝑫 as much as possible. The incident 
containment factor (ICF) performance metric measures the team’s effectiveness in 
achieving this. Note that in order for the ICF to produce correct conclusions, the value of 
N should be large enough. The ICF metric is defined as below: 
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𝑰𝑪𝑭 =  {
𝟎                                         𝑵𝑫 = 𝑵
𝟏 − 
(𝑵𝒇 − 𝑵𝑫)
𝑵
        𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
 
Figure 31: Definition of Incident Containment Factor (ICF) Performance Metric 
where 𝑵𝒇 is the total number of hosts infected prior to containment. The term (𝑵𝒇 −  𝑵𝑫) 
represents number of hosts infected after declaration and before full containment. In the 
best scenario, when no hosts were infected in addition to 𝑵𝑫, the value of 𝑵𝒇 =  𝑵𝑫  and 
the ICF will be 1 which means the incident is not spreading which is an indicator of 
containment. In the worst scenario, if only one host was initially infected and the whole 
network gets infected, the value of ICF will be approximately 0, because the value of N is 
large. For the special case where the whole network was initially infected, the containment 
factor equals to 0. 
Since threats have various compromise techniques, the team should be careful not 
to assume that if an incident stops spreading then that it means it is contained. Instead the 
team should rely on the application of containment measures like blocking traffic from 
specific ports as indicators of containment. Again, the application of these measures do not 
necessarily guarantee full and effective containment, but they do represent a reasonable 
approximation of that.  
The above definition assumes that all hosts/users in the environment are of equal 
importance. In practice, this is not the case as hosts/users vary in their importance and 
impact on business operations. One way to reflect this in the containment factor is to use 
weighted values according to the following definition: 
Let the environment holds the set of hosts: 
𝑯 = {𝒉𝟏, 𝒉𝟐, … , 𝒉𝑵} 
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Let the set of infected hosts before declaration be: 
𝑯𝑫 = {𝒉𝟏, 𝒉𝟐, … , 𝒉𝑫 } 
Let the set of infected hosts after declaration and before containment be: 
𝑯𝒇 = {𝒉𝟏, 𝒉𝟐, … , 𝒉𝑭 } 
Let the importance (weights) of every hosts be represented by:  
𝑾 = {𝒘𝟏, 𝒘, … , 𝒘𝑵} 
Where 𝒘𝒊 represent the weight of the host 𝒉𝒊 ∈ 𝑯 
The containment factor is defined as: 
𝑰𝑪𝑭 =   {
𝟎                                                                                    𝑯𝟎 = 𝑯
𝟏 −  
[∑ (𝒉𝒋 ∗ 𝒘𝒋)]
𝑭
𝒋=𝟏 − [∑ (𝒉𝒌 ∗ 𝒘𝒌)]
𝑫
𝒌=𝟏
∑ (𝒉𝒊 ∗ 𝒘𝒊)
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏
        𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒘𝒊𝒔𝒆
 
Figure 32: Definition of Weighted Containment Factor Performance Metric 
In either case, whether the CSIRT decides to use the standard or the weighted 
definition, the end of the containment period could be decided by reaching a specific value 
on the containment factor.  
Incident Analysis Time (AT): 
When the SecureLab completes its task, the incident is passed back to SecureEd to 
finalize the incident, formulate recommendations and declare the end of incident response 
cycle. This can be divided into three main time-slots: 
1- Full Recovery Time (FRT): the time period it takes the CSIRT to fully restore the 
system to its initial state; probably with enhanced security measures. 
2- Monitoring Time (MT): A specific grace period which a CSIRT allocates to ensure 
that the incident is not reoccurring. The same period could also be used to monitor 
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the impact of introducing new enhancements to the environment as per the 
recommendation of the post-incident analysis.  
3- Enhancement Time (EHT): The time-period the CSIRT spends in formulating a list 
of lessons learnt and recommendations. Some of these recommendations relate to 
enhancing incident response and others for improving the environment security. 
This time period can be further divided into two sub-timeslots. The first is the time 
the team spends in conducting post-incident analysis until a list of 
recommendations are produced. The second timeslot is spent in implementing these 
recommendations, e.g. updating the CSIRP and enforcing new security policies. 
It is noticed that the MT and EHT are not disjoint as it is expected that both times 
will have an overlap.  
The Big Picture: 
Now that the notion of response time has been deconstructed into several 
components, these components need to be reconstructed again into a summative figure 
which is commonly referred to as the incident response time (RT). A CSIRT would need 
to consider the following issues: 
1- When does the response time start? Does it start with the discovery time (DVT) 
or the declaration time (DCT)? Should the compromise time (CT) be 
considered? 
2- When does the response time end? Does it end after full recovery time (FRT), 
or should some monitoring time (MT) and enhancement time (EHT) be 
considered? 
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3- What does long or short time-periods for the above metrics indicate about the 
response, the CSIRP and the system security?  
4- Does the SecureEd team need to use all of these time-periods, or should some 
of them be summed together? 
5- Which metrics can tolerate high values and which ones should the team attempt 
to minimize?  
6- From the implementation perspective, who is responsible for recording each 
time-stamp? Is this done manually or through automation?  .  
Conclusion: 
This scenario analyzed one of the main concepts of performance evaluation, which 
is incident response time. The scenario demonstrated how the construction of performance 
metrics could be achieved through the SAC complexity model, which is built on the 
principles of simplicity, approximation and cascading. The response time indicator was 
deconstructed into the measurements of simple activities. Despite the fact that these 
activities were simple, their measurement was not always straightforward. Although the 
scenario analysis is generic can be applied to different CSIRT settings, as the major 
components of the response time (RT) is the same across environments, it remains a matter 
of design how to define the boundaries of the time and which time-periods should be 
highlighted.   
5.2 Expert Feedback 
5.2.1 Methodology 
The objective of consulting CSIR experts is not to provide survey results on where 
practitioners stand with regards to various issues raised in this dissertation. Instead, experts 
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are consulted for their perspective on these issues based on their professional experience . 
Therefore, each expert’s view point might not necessary be the mainstream industrial view.  
Four experts were selected in a manner that reflects experience and diversity. All 
four experts have more than ten years of experience and have substantially engaged with 
incident response, though in various contexts. The first expert comes from a law 
enforcement background, the second from corporate and business background, the third 
from legal investigations and digital forensics background, and the fourth from system 
administration and computer security management background. All four experts have 
technical experience in CSIR. In addition, the second and third experts have CSIR 
leadership and management experience.  
Each expert was interviewed separately. The shortest interview took two hours and 
a half and the longest took four hours and a half. Upon the request of the interviewees, their 
feedback was recorded anonymously.  
Each interview covered the ten themes listed in Table 44.. However, the length and 
depth of discussion varied depending on the interviewee experience and interest in the 
topic.  
The following sections provide an overview of the main opinions expressed by each 
expert, followed by a holistic reflection on the collective feedback. Several components of 
the framework were revisited or modified as per the feedback of the experts. Whenever 
such modification was made, a citation to the interview was made.  
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# Theme Sample topics 
1 Need for CSIRPE 
Is there a need for CSIRPE? Does the rewards exceed the 
overhead? How is it expected to enhance CSIR? 
2 Current Practices 
How are CSIRT evaluated? Is it done in a systematic way? 
Does the evaluation focus on pre or post-incident 
evaluation? 
3 
Multidisciplinary 
Survey 
How is CSIR different than other disciplines? Should other 
disciplines be visited for guidance? Why? 
4 Challenges 
What are the obstacles to developing a CSIRPE? Is it 
feasible from the first place? Comments on the complexity 
and unpredictability modeling  
5 
CSIRPE framework 
features 
Defining: comprehensiveness, flexibility and industry-
compliance. Overall comments on the framework four-
phases and ten components 
6 
Parameters & 
Strategies 
Comments on the list of parameters and strategies 
7 
Performance 
Indicators & Metrics 
What are the main indicators for effective incident 
response? Qualitative vs quantitative methods.  
8 
Performance 
Analysis 
Comments on the analysis methods. Who are the 
stakeholders for conducting the PE analysis? 
9 
Performance 
Validation 
Comments on the validation methods. Why do security 
metrics suffer from practicality and validity issues 
10 Overall Comments 
Who would be interested in this research? How do you 
view the value and need of this work? Issues of concern 
and recommendations for enhancement.  
Table 44: Expert Feedback Survey Themes 
5.2.2 Expert 1 Feedback 
Expert 1 [7] is a senior digital forensics and incident response investigator offering 
consultancy services to state police. (S)He has ten years of experience in that role. The 
expert received training from several leading industries in the field of digital forensics and 
from the government bodies. The expert is notable for his/her contributions in the area of 
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forensics and incident response to incidents involving mobile phones and mobile 
computing devices.  
The expert expressed high interest in the research topic acknowledging the need for 
evaluating CSIR capabilities. Two comments were made with regards to that. First, the 
need for evaluating CSIR is well-established industrial reality in which the main driving 
force being liability and insurance. Second, such research direction is mainly beneficial to 
organizations (i.e. the team as a whole) not individuals (i.e. team members). Therefore, this 
type of evaluation would face reluctance or resistance, but the benefits would speak for 
themselves after several years of implementation.   
Commenting on the current industrial practices with regards to CSIR evaluation, 
the expert noted that such evaluations exist but in scattered forms across different 
evaluation schemes. For instance, different components of CSIR are evaluated under 
security resiliency, vulnerability assessment, disaster recovery plan, business continuity 
plan and risk assessment. The more technical evaluations are done in ad hoc fashion by 
smart people. 
It was affirmed by the expert that current evaluation practices focus on the 
preparation more than the post-incident execution. Using the expert’s words: “makes sense, 
but not good”. It makes sense because companies engage in continuous preparation, while 
post-incident analysis is less frequent. However, it is “not good” for two reasons. First, 
most preparation evaluation schemes are not comprehensive. The expert noted that only in 
six instances at the national level (mostly military) there was a full team simulation, i.e. 
engaging CSIRT with all support teams, e.g. legal and logistics. This makes preparation-
phase evaluation incomplete or ineffective. Second, these evaluations tend focus on 
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preventive measures more than actual evaluation of the team performance. Thus, 
enhancement recommendations are biased towards the technical preventive side.  
Several components of the framework were considered by the expert as “too 
advanced” for the current industrial needs. Examples include: the PE monitoring functional 
model, the predictive analysis method, validation methods and concurrent incident 
handling. When asked that some of these components are derived from the NIMS and NFR, 
the answer was that cybersecurity response is not well-integrated into these national 
frameworks posing several inconsistencies. This goes back to the fact that these 
frameworks were not initially designed for cybersecurity response. When consulted if these 
components should be omitted from the framework, the expert suggested keeping them for 
research purposes.  
The multidisciplinary survey was well-received by the expert. There is much to 
learn from the other disciplines, speaking from the experience of working with police 
departments. The expert noted that the only exception is that cybersecurity threats do not 
pose immediate threat to human life. It was added: “but eventually it will”. The expert saw 
“no industrial cry” for such multidisciplinary study. However, those working at the state 
and national levels, like NIMS and NFR, would be directly interested in this type of 
research.  
When asked to comment on how a framework would be considered comprehensive, 
flexible and industry-compatible, the expert provided the following answers: 
1- Comprehensive: a framework that leads to an end point that is useful, i.e. there 
is a process that produces an output that could be used in the industry.  
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2- Flexible: a framework that permits responders to develop their own customized 
solutions (derived from the higher principles/policies). It is also one that does 
not seek high granularity in measurements 
3- Industry-Compatible: a framework that is derived from the NIST and CERT 
documents. The SANS document was considered insignificant.  
When requested to provide a list of the most important performance indicators to 
evaluate CSIR, the following six indicators were suggested: detection effectiveness, 
response time, intelligence capacity, professional development, partnership effectiveness 
and documentation effectiveness. The expert emphasized that indicators should be 
analyzed in a compound fashion in order to produce reasonable results. It was also noted 
that qualitative methods are suitable for enhancing the team performance, while 
quantitative measures are useful for improving the CSIR capability at the enterprise level.  
Finally, the expert noted that large companies and research agencies like RAND 
would be highly interested in the research findings of this project. The expert expressed 
eagerness to actual implementation of the proposed framework.  
5.2.3 Expert 2 Feedback 
Expert 2 [66] [92] is a senior manager information security leader who leads a 24x7 
global team of security professionals and senior management in breach preparedness 
assessment and incident response to high stakes breaches. Extensive experience in 
managed security services (MSS) and security & risk consulting (SRC) across twelve client 
industries. Areas of expertise include incident response investigation, vulnerability 
assessment, penetration testing, ISO 27000 series and digital forensics investigations.  
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As the interview started, the expert was quick in asserting two observations about 
the topic. First, conducting this research is necessary for businesses, noting that current 
performance evaluation practices are “sparse and varying”. Second, conducting this type 
of research is difficult because executives do not like this type of research. It provides 
evidence for lack of security and preparedness. In other words, despite this topic being 
necessary there is clear reluctance in the industry about pursuing it. 
 To support the need for evaluating CSIRTs, the expert gave three examples. The 
first is the catastrophe of the Catrina Hurricane. If no one is interested in the performance 
of responders, why was there a public cry!, the expert noted. The second example was cited 
from the findings of the Ponemon survey on incident cost [4]. Part of the survey 
conclusions is  that decreasing the time to detect would lead to a reduction in incident cost. 
The third example, when an organization needs to higher an external CSIR capability. In 
such scenario, defining SLAs is not possible without clear performance metrics. These 
examples provide practical and empirical evidence for the need of evaluating the 
performance of CSIRTs.   
With regards to the multidisciplinary survey, the expert remarked that: “we like to 
think we are special and different; but we are not”. This is because, at the end of the day, 
most performance metrics go back to one main factor: return on investment. This explains 
why most organizations quantify performance in financial metrics, which might not 
necessarily useful for team enhancement.  
According to the expert, the main challenge to evaluating CSIRT is that: “we do 
not know exactly what are the objectives of CSIR”. In other response systems, the main 
objective is to protect lives which is not applicable to CSIR. When asked to define these 
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objectives, the expert replied with reducing costs, ensuring business continuity and 
maintaining the CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) of the data. Interestingly, 
these objectives are similar to the three CSIR objectives defined in Section 3.4.2.  
With regards to the complexity and unpredictability of CSIR performance 
evaluation, the expert acknowledged both factors to be a challenge, but they should not 
stop organizations from building systems. To minimize the impact of these factors, the 
expert suggested focusing on defining goals and outcomes of the evaluation instead of 
focusing on the processes and activities which are complex and vary from one incident to 
another. The expert liked the fact that the framework presented in this project considers 
goals to be the highest design stage from which the other framework components are 
derived from. The expert noted though this might seem intuitive, it is not how many in the 
industry operate.  
After being presented with the performance evaluation framework of this project, 
the expert made the following comments: 
1- It is a practical and desirable that the framework is “selection-based”, e.g. there 
are list of parameters, strategic issues and analysis methods to select and 
customize. This reflects the flexibility of the framework 
2- The expert was reserved in describing the framework as “comprehensive”, 
preferring to call it “holistic”. The term ‘comprehensive’ seem to have a 
negative association in the industry to describe plans that are not-well defined 
that attempt to achieve too many things but have little benefit.  
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3- The structure and presentation of the framework is geared towards responders 
and technical teams, and need further ‘translation’ is needed if it is to be 
presented to executives and managers.  
4- Noting that the industry is full of false and outdated performance metrics, the 
expert was pleased to see a systematized approach to the definition of PMs. 
5- Out of the framework components, the list of performance indicators along with 
their definitions and interpretation guidelines, would be of most interest and 
immediate need to CSIRT practitioners.  
6-  CSIR performance systems should center around the plans (CSIRPs) more than 
the (CSIRTs), due to the dynamicity nature of teams (e.g. the team now is 
different than the team after few hours when the shift changes).  
7- Although the NIST and CERT documents are a good place to start, most 
organizations end up having capabilities with features that drift from those 
outlined in the two documents. Therefore, the expert argued that there needs 
not be much emphasis put on compliance with these two documents.  
8- The framework seems to address too many issues for a responder to read. It is 
suggested that the framework be broken into several concise documents each to 
be handed to professional organizations to review (e.g. auditing or 
cybersecurity companies) and publish in their online platforms. 
The above feedback provides excellent points about how the industry would receive 
and interpret the proposed framework. Nevertheless, some of these points (e.g. Points 3, 7 
and 8) are not feasible to apply considering that this project has some academic elements 
to the research topic. Finally, the expert hoped that such research direction would close the 
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gap between business executives and technical responders through giving both parties clear 
outline of success measures.  
5.2.4 Expert 3 Feedback 
Expert 3 [15] has 20+ years of experience as a computer forensic examiner, 
instructor and manager for a large US federal law enforcement agency, with a focus on 
financial crimes and seizing/recovering digital evidence from a wide variety of data 
systems and media. The expert also has 13+ years in academia at the University level 
teaching computer forensics to undergraduate and graduate students. In addition, the expert 
has four years in the US Army in a military law enforcement and has published numerous 
whitepapers and been a frequent presenter in the computer forensic industry in the past 20+ 
years.  
It was highlighted at the start of the interview that the expertise comes from incident 
response that involves criminal investigations. Incident responders in similar positions 
operate in environments that have standardized procedures to be followed, cost-free, and 
focus on evidence extraction, analysis and presentation for prosecution purposes. Overall, 
the expert described him/herself as a forensics responder noting that the field of digital 
forensics intersects with CSIR but has the advantage of being a decade older than CSIR.  
The current performance evaluation practices were described by the expert as: 
“depends on the perspective of the team leader”, suggesting its subjective nature. The 
expert adds that with specific topic (i.e. CSIRPE) there is not much guidance in the industry 
about how to approach the topic. However, due to the publicity and liability issues related 
to cyber-incidents, the need for developing PE metrics is arising. The expert notes that 
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CEOs are now personally responsible for impacts of cyber-incidents, creating a higher-
management need for conducting and maintaining evaluation systems.  
Three challenges were highlighted. First, the field of CSIR, being a branch of 
computer security, highly depends on policies. Since policies are continually changing, it 
is expected that so will evaluation systems. Second, there is an administrative burden 
associated with performance evaluation. This burden is normally thrown on the technical 
team, who struggle to see the benefits of this “extra administrative task”. This creates 
resistance to the development and implementation of evaluation systems. Third, 
requirements and expectations vary depending on the jurisdiction. This makes developing 
unified performance models a difficult task. 
When asked if the above three challenges makes developing CSIRPE models 
infeasible, the answer negative. The expert replied: “whenever there are standard 
procedures, measuring performance is possible”. Despite the field of CSIR having too 
many variations, there are essential procedures that are common across these environments.  
An important observation was made by the expert with regards to a common short-
coming of performance evaluation systems in the industry. Several companies conduct 
surveys, and also provide analysis. But, does this analysis gets translated into actions and 
enhancements? The expert finds this to be commonly lagging and foresees this as a 
challenge for CSIR performance evaluation. In the military and criminal investigations, 
this does not seem to be an issue, because the standard model of operation considers “post-
action report” as an essential component of the review system. Referring back to the 
criminal investigation environment, the expert notes that making post-incident review is 
well-integrated in the process, despite lacking more guidance on the PE aspect.  
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The expert views the multidisciplinary survey of specific interest to DHS and 
similar government-like agencies. Incident response under these agencies involve several 
teams of different backgrounds. When such interaction occurs across teams, which may be 
collaborating in the same incident, creates a need to study how performance of these teams 
contributes to the overall performance of the response.  
Speaking about indicators for good incident response performance, the expert 
highlighted the following five indicators: 
1- Effectiveness of Team assignment: Was the right person, in terms of 
competency and experience, being assigned the right task during incident 
handling? 
2- Evidence Retention adequacy: how is evidence stored and maintained and are 
there redundancy measures being taking? 
3- Effectiveness of training programs: there is a need to continually attend new 
training programs. A cost-effective model would to be to send one member for 
professional training who in return would train the other members of the team. 
4- On-site analysis capacity: how much of the response was conducted on-site 
compared to bringing machines to the office (i.e. off-site) for analysis.  
5- Information Sharing: Were the lessons learnt from the incident shared with the 
internal and external communities? 
According to the expert, a comprehensive CSIRPE should have two main features. 
The first is covering all the phases of the CSIR life cycle and second involving all parties, 
e.g. CSIRT members, managers, technical teams, support teams …etc. With regards to 
compatibility, the expert was satisfied with the selection of NIST and CERT, giving slight 
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preference towards the NIST document. Nevertheless, the expert downplays strict 
observance to these two documents, because the industry of has tens of CSIR operating in 
a NIST-variant environments which are not necessarily what the original NIST document 
has outlined.  
The final comment made by the expert was: “this is an important and growing field. 
If you have not done this type of work, someone else would have done it. It is going to take 
time to accept PE, but soon it will be mainstream”.    
5.2.5 Expert 4 Feedback 
Expert 4 [174]  is a cybersecurity expert with extensive experience in the areas of 
system administration, networking, secure programming. He/she has eleven years of 
experience of working with digital forensics teams and contributes to research in the areas 
of information security and incident response. The expert is notable for his/her 
contributions in vulnerability patching across various operating systems platforms.  
Throughout the interview, the expert voiced strong skepticism to the concept of 
CSIRT performance analysis. The expert believes that the process is infeasible, involves 
unnecessary overhead and have little practical benefits. Therefore, the interview focused 
on unwrapping factors which the expert’s skepticism is founded on.  
According to the expert, there are three main reasons for objecting to the research 
theme of performance analysis: 
1- Computer security incidents are very diverse and each incident has its own unique 
characteristics that make it stand in difference to other incidents. In other words, it is 
very rare to have two incidents which are identical. Even when incidents display 
similarities, their environments are different. Because of this diversity, incident 
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response is also expected to be different. Consequently, there are two possible 
approaches to designing performance systems: either design unique measurement 
method that suits every incident, or design a generic system that is inapplicable to the 
spectrum of incidents.  In either case, it is infeasible to design performance metrics 
that will allow comparisons or benchmarking. Since performance analysis is mainly 
based on trend analysis and benchmarking, it is infeasible to apply to CSIR. 
2- Just as there is no standard method to find solutions to cyber security threats, there 
would be no standard method for measuring the performance of those who develop 
unique solutions to the incidents. The expert notes that the higher-level goals could 
be similar, but the underlying processes and procedures are different and most of the 
time non-systematic. Viewing incident response as a spectrum starting from higher-
level management and goal-oriented tasks, to the more specific technical procedures, 
performance analysis seem to be applicable to the management side of the spectrum 
not the technical one. Since CSIR is mainly technical, then there is little to expect out 
of evaluating its performance.  
3-  Even when it is possible to design performance metrics that are applicable to a group 
of incidents, the expert thinks that it is unreasonable to infer performance aspects 
from analyzing the PM data. The expert questions: “why do we infer that a short 
response time reflects good performance?” A slower response time that produces 
more sustainable solutions could be better to an organization. Based on this simple 
example, the use of response time metric can be misleading to the organization. The 
same criticism is applied to performance metrics that are derived from cost.  
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Although the above expert feedback has no direct contributions to enhancing the 
proposed framework, I believe it is important to have proper understanding and serious 
discussion of the presented viewpoint. This viewpoint represent legitimate concerns that 
are shared with a sector of computer security professionals in the industry. Even among 
researchers, this is an extension of the on-going debate about the usefulness of introducing 
metrics to the field of computer security [34] [42].  
To answer the first concern on the diverse nature of computer security incidents, it 
could be acknowledged that security incidents indeed pose some differences. However, the 
claim that such differences hurdle the development of performance systems could be 
disputed. The diversity argument seem to focus on the technical aspect of the response, 
while ignoring that CSIR is an organic body of several response activities both technical 
and non-technical. The management of the response, coordination between team members 
and with outside parties, analysis from several technical point of views, and assessing 
damage, cost and risk are all essential aspects of CSIR. For the sake of argument, let the 
technical solutions be unique, there still remain strong similarities in the non-technical side 
of incident handling that could be subjected to uniform methods of performance analysis.  
The technical uniqueness of incidents could also be disputed. Even when incidents 
use innovative techniques to compromise, strong similarities could be found in the 
objectives, tactics and potential remedies. For instance, looking at incidents from the CIA 
model, each incident will target one or a combination of the three security properties: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. It is difficult to argue against the fact that many 
incidents could be detected in similar mechanisms, which are technical in nature. For 
instance, computational hashing algorithms are used for verifying the integrity of data. The 
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application of these algorithms in detecting a system compromise, which is a technical 
aspect of CSIR, could be subject to evaluation in terms of detection effectiveness. Another 
technical example is that most if not all incident responses involve some aspect of 
analyzing system and network logs. The effectiveness of the tools used in this process can 
also be subject to performance analysis.  
A third example, which could also be used to address the second argument about the 
difficulty of systemizing CSIR technical aspects, comes from the current maturity state of 
the field of forensics analysis. Forensic professionals use standardizes methods to collect, 
preserve and analyze digital evidence. Most incident handling involve some involvement 
of the digital forensics which could be subject to performance analysis at least from the 
perspective of readiness and conformance.  
Overall, it seems that some objections to CSIRPE can be rooted in having different 
or more narrow understanding of performance analysis, its methods and application 
domain. It is true that some technical aspects of the response might not be applicable to a 
large pool of incidents; however, this does not mean that this is true about all technical 
aspects of CSIR.  
With regards to the third argument about the disassociation of PM measurement 
and performance effectiveness, the argument could be valid if PM readings are analyzed 
independently. However, the CSIRPE framework presented in this project ensures that 
performance metrics are only designed through a process that maps PMs to PIs back to 
goals. In addition, it was argued that PMs should be analyzed collectively when drawing 
conclusions about the performance. This means that PM readings are analyzed in the 
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context of a higher structure of performance (goals indicators  metrics) and are 
inspected along with other metrics (e.g. the Cascading principle in the SAC model).  
In its early stages, the CSIR field suffered, and it continues to be a challenge to 
some extent, to convince higher management of the need to establish a CSIR capability 
despite the strong acknowledgement and recommendation of the security professionals to 
establish and maintain such capability. The case seem to be reversed in the case of 
performance evaluation. As the interviews reflect, managers and executives seem to be 
interested enough in evaluating the effectiveness of the CSIR capability, while resistance 
may come from security professionals dealing with the technical aspects of the response. 
The fourth expert feedback is a sample of such expected resistance.  
5.2.6 Summary of Expert Feedback 
When analyzing the four expert interviews in a collective manner, several common 
themes and recommendations could be highlighted. Despite the interviews being limited 
in terms of number of interviewees, considering the long experience of the experts it could 
be argued that these common themes reflect the industry perspective, at least partially. The 
following points summarize points of agreement among at least three out of the four 
experts: 
1- Interest in the topic of CSIRT performance evaluation is proportional to the rank of 
the individual associated with CSIR. More interest is expressed by those holding 
managerial positions compared to those conducting “lower-level” technical or 
support tasks. The interest is also proportional to the organization size where larger 
companies are more likely to adopt performance frameworks. Therefore, 
individuals with the highest interest in CSIRPE are those holding higher executive 
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positions in environments that deploy a large CSIRT. The least interested group of 
individuals are technical responders operating in a small CSIRT.  
2- Unexpectedly, the experts downplayed the importance of designing a CSIR 
performance framework that is strictly compatible with the CSIR industry 
standards. The experts acknowledged the importance of building on the NIST and 
CERT outlines, however, the vast variations that exist in the industry suggest that 
more generic methods, not necessarily NIST/CERT adherent, are more useful.  
3- The plan, not the team, should be the focus of the performance evaluation of the 
CSIR. As more governments and businesses have working CSIRPs, CSIR teams 
can be viewed as experienced staff that execute a plan. This is contrary to the past 
decade experience in which CSIRT experts were viewed as the origin of plans.  
4- The current status of PE indicators and metrics for CSIR can be described as scarce 
and disorganized. The experts concurred that the list of PIs provided in this 
dissertation is probably the most notable contribution of the project. The list is 
expected to be well received by the industry, as it is timely and fulfills an existing 
need.  
5- The overall structure and process flow of the framework developed in this project 
was approved by the first three experts. The level of details provided for each step 
was satisfying. Comments of enhancement concentrated on simplifying the 
framework for business settings as some aspects were considered too advanced for 
the current industrial needs.  
6- Building on the above point, there is a clear gap between how the industry and 
academia treat the topic of CSIR performance evaluation. The industry is 
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demanding simple and operational models. On the other hand, academia seem to 
retain substantiate attention to rigorous models, validation schemes, and 
mathematical models (e.g. quantification); which are of little interest to the 
industry.    
7- Despite the multidisciplinary survey being academic in nature, the experts viewed 
that direction of research very positively. The experts acknowledged the uniqueness 
of CSIR but disregarded the claim that it is too unique to borrow solutions from the 
other disciplines. The NIMS and NRF were specifically highlighted as immediate 
beneficiaries of the survey results.  
8- Despite the challenges that face the evaluation of CSIR, the experts believe that 
these challenges are not strenuous enough to consider developing CSIRPE systems 
infeasible. However, the experts called for careful consideration of various factors 
and expected the process to take relatively long time before having operational 
models.  
5.3 Evaluating Framework Features 
5.3.1 Comprehensiveness 
To the extent of the large number of works surveyed in this dissertation, there is no 
clear definition or outline of the characteristics of a “comprehensive” performance system. 
Therefore, to demonstrate the comprehensives of the proposed CSIRPE, the term 
“comprehensive” is analyzed over the common usages of the term in several resources like: 
[96] [7] [92] [79] [74].  
It could be argued that the developed CSIRPE framework exhibits 
comprehensiveness from four angles: development, component, aspects and perspective.   
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Development:  
The CSIRPE framework provides a complete process of development starting from 
the early stages of defining goals and strategies to the final steps of implementation and 
integration. This provides a comprehensive development guide to responders compared to 
a non-comprehensive framework that would introspect a partial system development.  
Component: 
The CSIPRE framework unrestrictedly targets the various components of the CSIR 
system. For instance, the framework encompasses the five-phases of the CSIR life cycle. 
A framework that focuses on the PE analysis of some phases, e.g. detection or containment 
could be viewed as non-comprehensive from that perspective.  
Aspect 
The CSIRPE framework does not limit performance to specific aspects, e.g. 
reliability or readiness. Instead, it views performance comprehensively by allowing for a 
holistic analysis that encompasses the various performance aspects.  
Perspective 
The CSIRPE framework views performance from the perspective of the plan 
(CSIRP) and the team (CSIRT) (see S.6: Reference Analysis Point). It also considers the 
viewpoints of various actors, like the organization (e.g. 3.4.2 Defining Performance Goals, 
S.2: Quality Control), the technical team (e.g. D.1. CSIRT Type, V.1. Operational 
Validation, 3.6.1 Functional Models) and the management (3.6.2 Assigning Roles and 
Responsibilities, V.3 Bootstrapping).  
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5.3.2 Flexibility 
Arguing for flexibility will based on the understanding of the concept as in NIMS 
[109] and the discussion provided in PI.26: Flexibility. The CSIRPE arguably demonstrates 
flexibility from three angles: incident, design and environment.  
Incident Flexibility 
The CSIRPE framework could be used to evaluate responses to different incidents, 
indifferent to their type, scope and severity. Unlike a performance system that is focused 
on a specific type of incidents, e.g. DoS incidents, the framework focuses on analyzing 
responses regardless of the nature of incident which gives it a flexible domain of 
applicability. Note that the restrictions made in A1.1 (Civilian Environment), A1.3 
(Incident Complexity), and A2.5 (Sequential Handling) have little practical implications as 
they avoid special situations that are unlikely to occur in conventional CSIR.  
Design Flexibility 
The framework grant PE designers a large domain of design possibilities and 
options. For instance, the selection of PIs and analysis techniques is left to the designers 
based on its defined goals. Another example is the IAV model (Section 5.2) which allows 
a CSIRT to select performance analysis methods that suit their capacity and environment. 
The design parameters and strategies also provide a pool of options for each CSIR to 
customize to its needs.  
Environment Flexibility 
The framework is compatible for use with various CSIR environments, regardless 
of the CSIRT type and capacity (as long as there is a team of responders, see A1.2). It also 
does not presume the presence of specific policies/procedures (other than A1.7) or the need 
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for having a pre-established quality control unit. This means that a CSIRT can use the 
framework to construct different PE models for different environments.  
5.3.3 Compatibility 
The CSIRPE framework is constructed in a manner that is in compliance with the 
NIST [1] and CERT [2] documents, which are the two most commonly used CSIR industry 
standards. Since both documents do not address how performance evaluation should be 
administered, compliance here means that the CSIRPE framework is not in conflict with 
any of the requirements set by them. In numerous occasions, the CSIRPE framework would 
address direct requirements set by either document.  
Below is a set of two examples, each containing eight examples, that demonstrates 
computability with the NIST and CERT documents. 
Compatibility with NIST 
1- The definition of events and incidents  (Section 1.4.1) is consistent with the 
definitions provided in NIST (page 6) 
2- The NIST document defines eight policy elements of any CSIR. The seventh 
element is “Performance Measures” (page 8). The document does not outline 
procedures for how that could be achieved. The CSIRPE framework can be 
viewed as a guideline of how to design and implement this seventh policy 
element.  
3- The three selections for the design parameter: D.1 CSIRT Type is based on three 
types defined by NIST (page 13): centralized, distributed and coordinated. The 
term “customized” was used instead of “coordinated”, but was defined to 
included coordinated in addition to other structures.  
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4- The NIST recommends the use of both objective and subjective assessment of 
incidents (page 40-41). This is adopted in the CSIRPE by allowing for both 
quantitative and qualitative assessments (D.7: Measurement Type, and M.3: 
Quantifiability)  
5- Assumption A1.4 on Incident Handling Services is borrowed from an 
assumption made by the NIST (page 23) which focuses the functionality of 
CSIRTs to incident handling compared to ensuring system security.  
6- The definitions and considerations set by the NIST were used in the definition 
of several performance indicators like: PI.3, PI.16 , PI.21, PI.25 PI.31.  
7- The use of the performance evaluation database (PED) in the IAV is inspired 
by the recommendation set by NIST (page 3) on: “maintain and use a 
knowledge base of information” 
8- The strategy of using automation as a mechanism for decreasing overhead (S.5: 
CSIPRE Overhead) in incident handling is highlighted by NIST (page 51) as a 
recommendation.  
Compatibility with CERT 
1- Section 2.6 of the CERT document on Quality Assurance (page 42) is the 
category at which the CSIRPE framework would fall. In this section, there is a 
call for setting quality requirements and measurement mechanisms, which is 
what the CSIRPE attempts to achieve. A similar reference to quality is also 
made in page 22 when depicting the CSIRT service and quality framework.  
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2- Assumption A2.2 (Member Dedication) is consistent with CERT (page 18) 
which assigns incident handling responsibilities to CSIRT members with little 
overlap with the other non-incident handling security tasks.   
3- The definitions and considerations set by the CERT were used in the definition 
of several performance indicators like: PI.17, PI.18 , PI.26, PI.32 and PI.38.  
4- The first theme of the three suggested PE objectives (see Section 3.4.2) on 
business continuity and growth is derived from the emphasis put in the CERT 
document for aligning CSIRT goals with the organizations business continuity 
plan (page 33).  
5- The element of simplicity for performance evaluation systems as highlighted in 
the SAC Complexity Model (Section 5.4) is explicitly highlighted in the CERT 
document in page 46. 
6- The stakeholder analysis as presented in the CSIR Balanced Scorecard Model 
(Section 5.3) is consistent with the CERT document call for “Constituents’ view 
on Quality” (page 48).  
7- The flexibility element of the NFP Unpredictability Platform (Section 5.5) was 
designed in accordance to the requirements set by section 2.7.1 of the CERT 
document (page 50) on “The Need for Flexibility”.  
8- Both the trend analysis and targeted analysis (Section 3.5.2) are referenced in 
the CERT document in pages 26 and 81 respectively.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary of Contributions 
Contributions made by this project can be summarized in the following six points: 
First, the project produced an end-to-end process for developing performance 
evaluation frameworks for computer security response systems. Although the process is 
designed for the field of CSIR, the general structure and basic details of the development 
process are generic and could be applied to various incident response fields. 
Second, the study laid out a map of the various issues associated with the study of 
performance evaluations of CSIR. These issues are presented in the form of design 
parameters, strategies and challenges. The study does not claim to provide a solution for 
these issues. Instead, the study identifies these issues, provides proper description, 
summarizes work done towards addressing that issue and proposes basic recommendations 
that are compatible with CSIR environments. 
Third, the project presented a multidisciplinary survey of how various incident 
response disciplines addressed the problem of team and plan performance evaluation. The 
value of this survey to the field of CSIR is equipping researchers with lessons learnt from 
these fields to avoid reinventing the wheel when constructing CSIRPE models. The survey 
provides evidence that incident response disciplines have much in common in terms of 
challenges, processes and measurement techniques. This calls for further advancement in 
that direction of research.   
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Fourth, the project presented a framework for evaluating CSIR capabilities. The 
framework can be viewed as a fusion pot of tens of models, techniques and findings of 
performance measurements. The framework took the skeleton of CSIR life cycle and 
activities and embarked it with tools that could be used for evaluation. These evaluation 
tools neither violate the basic CSIR processes nor confine the usage of tools. This design 
flexibility allows for customization which suits the diverse status quo of CSIR 
implementations.  
Fifth, a list of fifty performance indicators for assessing computer security incident 
response capabilities was formulated. The list covers the assessment of the major parts of 
the response system and also the overall system performance. Each indicator was defined 
and associated with interpretation considerations and examples of potential derived 
performance metrics. The list gives CSIR practitioners a large repository of PIs to choose 
from, and saves the effort of defining them and laying out the design considerations.  
Sixth, the study made the first step in paving the way towards the implementation 
of performance evaluation models in CSIR environments. Currently, there are no 
implemented systemized approaches to CSIRPE and it was infeasible to deploy the 
proposed framework in real environments. However, the study analyzed a wide list of 
implementation considerations and made close contact with the industry through 
integrating the expert feedback into the design and analysis of the framework and through 
proposing several hypothetical scenario analysis that envision how the framework would 
function when it is deployed.      
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6.2 Summary of Findings 
The major findings of studying the development of frameworks for performance 
evaluation of computer security incident response in this project are summarized in the 
following ten points: 
First, the discipline of CSIR had undergone several advancements in the past two 
decades. It could be argued that the field has reached a satisfying maturity in terms of 
defining processes and procedures. The technical development of breach preventive and 
countermeasures is a continuous process, but it is happening now within well-established 
CSIR capabilities and through a wide network of national and international information 
sharing.  
Second, inspecting the evolvement of the CSIR discipline, it is not surprising that 
attention to systemized approaches of performance evaluations has only started to flourish. 
This is supported by several external factors that pushes the industry to adopt organized 
methods of performance analysis, like liability, insurance and SLA contracting. There are 
enough indicators that the industry acknowledges the need for conducting CSIRPE. 
Examples include, the explicit call by the NIST document for developing PE measures and 
the recent abrupt increase in the number of publications, blogs and white-papers that 
address issues of effectiveness and PE measurement. However, the urgency and depth of 
this need may vary depending on the maturity levels of various CSIR capabilities.  
Third, discussion so far about CSIR effectiveness could be characterized by being 
too generic, non-systemized and have narrow scope of performance domain. It was also 
noticed that the discussion was concentrated on the preparation phase especially in 
evaluating the effectiveness of a CSIRP. This study recognized the need for having 
systemized approaches to CSIRPE that provide holistic and focused performance analysis 
 326 
 
of the CSIR system, be equipped with performance measurement tools, and establishes 
balance between pre-incident and post-incident performance evaluation.  
Fourth, the multidisciplinary survey of performance evaluation systems for various 
incident response systems reveals that there are many commonalities across disciplines. 
Despite these similarities, there are little efforts to share experiences across these fields and 
attempts to build common models of analysis remain scarce. The perception that incident 
response disciplines are very distinct from each other need to be challenged, and more 
research should be directed towards understanding the similarities and differences between 
various IR systems.  
Fifth, the complexity of incidents, the large variance in threat techniques, and the 
unpredictability nature of the response are the main challenges that face responders. This 
suggest that evaluating the performance of the response require PE systems that are 
sensitive to the uncertainty nature of incident handling, demonstrate reasonable 
simplification and are flexible enough to allow application across the domain of incident 
types and severity levels.  
Sixth, the field of security metrics suffers from lack of validation, debatable 
practical benefit, and unreasonable quantification techniques. Since CSIR performance 
metrics are built on security metrics, these challenges are passed to the development of 
performance metrics. Also, despite the several attempts across disciplines to quantify 
performance measurements, the vast majority of metrics remain qualitative, with the 
exception of financial metrics which are relatively easier to quantify. Based on this, 
overcoming the subjectivity nature of qualitative measures is another consideration for the 
design of CSIRPE measures.  
 327 
 
Seventh, the development of performance evaluation systems for CSIR can be 
broken into four higher-level phases. The first phase defines the generic framework of 
evaluation by setting the design parameters and outlining the strategies of evaluation. The 
second phase defines the core of the PE model by defining goals performance aspects and 
derive the approporiate performance indicators. The third phase focuses on specifying the 
measurement mechanisms by deriving performance meterics and selecting analysis and 
validation techniques. Finally, the fourth phase inspects the operational characteristics of 
the CSIR system and integrates the PE model with the implementation requirements of the 
environment.  
Eighth, developing the framework for evaluating CSIR suggests that CSIRPE is 
both a science and an art. It is scientific from the perspective of following systemazed 
approaches and applying obective performance analysis techniques. On the other hand, the 
artistic aspect is manifest in how the PE system is developed and configured and how PIs 
are selected and used.  
Nineth, there is a tension between the organizational and techincal needs that drive 
performance evaluations. Organizations are interested in more cost-effective responses that 
ultimately contribute to better return-on-investment. However, techincal teams are 
interested in enhancing the detection, containment and recovery processes. Any CSIRPE 
system need to address this tension by striking a balance between these two domains. This 
could be achieved by insuring that the CSIRPE is integrated into the organizational qualtiy 
system but at the same time is developed and maintained by the responders and techincal 
staff.  
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Tenth, there is valid skepticism on how much technical benefits are expected out of 
the deployment of PE systems. Although there are sevearl theoritical projections of the 
expected outcomes, the actual level of impact on system enhancement would only be 
known after getting industrial feedback. Therefore, there is a need to monitor and 
benchmark results of CSIRPE systems in the coming few years.  
6.3 Future Work 
Extensions of this work can be forked into two directions. The first direction 
emerges from the design and findings presented in this work, while the second pertain to 
the general development of the topic of performance evaluation of computer security 
incident response.  
Under the first research direction, there are four main direct extensions of this work, 
namely the implementation considerations, the development of performance metrics, 
integration with the VERIS platform and investigating the enhancement procedures.  
Perhaps, the most stressing work awaiting the study of CSIRPE is implementing 
CSIRPE on real-environments. Such implementation would indicate how the industry 
reacts to CSIRPE measurement in an operational manner. Specifically, there is a need to 
observe which PIs and which performance analysis techniques produce benefits to CSIR 
capabilities. If the framework presented in this project is deployed, the following industrial 
feedback is expected: 
1- The industry will demonstrate how the design parameters are commonly set. 
This leads to refinement of the options available to each parameter, possibly 
eliminating some parameters and adding others.  
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2- Testing the development process will reveal which development phase is 
considered most challenging, which in return will stimulate the attention of 
researchers.  
3- The industry will determine which performance indicators are more valuable to 
the assessment and enhancement of CSIR.  
4- Investigating the actual extent of the variance of performance measurements for 
the purposes of building common benchmarks and formulating best practices. 
The second extension relates to the development of performance metrics. As this 
work is focused on the development of performance indicators, there is a need to 
investigate each of these indicators in terms of deriving performance metrics. The PM 
examples presented in Section 4.3 were provided for elaboration purposes that serve the 
understanding of the PIs. For each PM, there needs to be more specific and formal 
definitions that would enable responders to use it and customize it. This opens a wide area 
for research work, as each PI can be subjected to a dedicated research work in terms of 
deriving correct and useful PMs. 
The third extension relates to the VERIS platform. The current structure and 
flexibility of the VERIS platform opens the door for potential integration of the CSIRPE 
framework to the incident definition and sharing. There are three possibilities for such 
integration. The first, under the block of “Response & Discovery” which consists of five 
sub-blocks: {incident timeline, discovery method, root causes, corrective actions, targeted 
vs. opportunistic}, a sixth sub-block could be added by the name: “response performance”. 
The second possibility is under the block of “Indicators” which focuses mainly on 
indicators of compromise, an additional category could be added under the title of 
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“performance indicator”. The third possibility, under the block of “Impact Assessment” 
which consists of: {loss categorization, loss estimation, estimation currency and impact 
rating} a category could be added by the title: “response effectiveness”.  
The fourth extension targets a common problem in performance systems that is 
commonly known as “closing the loop”. A good performance model is capable of 
producing good assessment and recommendations. However, this would be ineffective 
unless there is a mechanism to ensure that these recommendations are correctly fed-back 
to the system with enforcement policies and progress monitoring tools. In other words, 
mechanisms for quality enhancement based on CSIRPE outcomes need to be carefully 
studied.  
From the general perspective of CSIR performance evaluation, there are several 
research topics that are yet to be explored. First, there is more work needed to integrate the 
preparation and evaluation mechanisms of CSIR with the NIMS [109] and NRF [110] 
frameworks. Although both frameworks integrate cybersecurity incidents, this integration 
seems primitive and sometimes inconsistent with CSIR processes [14]. 
Second, there is a scant of works that explore the notions of complexity and 
unpredictability in CSIR. As this project demonstrated, both notions pose major challenges 
to the discipline of CSIR and IR disciplines in general. The areas of complex systems, non-
deterministic decision making and fuzzy performance systems are examples of disciplines 
that could significantly enrich the understanding of these two notions under CSIR 
environments.  
Third, there is only limited number of works that address the distributed model for 
operating CSIRTs. Once more refined understanding is available on the how the CSIR 
 331 
 
distributive processes are designed and executed, only then the development of 
performance models is feasible. 
Fourth, there is little work done on creating simulation exercises for CSIRTs. The 
current training programs focus on the technical aspect of CSIR, while real environments 
have high interaction between several technical and non-technical teams. The presence of 
simulation exercises will work for the advantage of building performance evaluation 
techniques. Assessment methods and mechanisms could be tested under simulated 
environments providing useful predictive expectations of how these methods would impact 
the functionality of CSIRTs.  
Finally, there seems to be much variance on how the industry implements and uses 
CSIR. In addition, the industry is continually updating its CSIR procedures in response to 
the evolvement of technologies. For instance, response to incidents that involve cloud 
computing is slowly developing its own distinctive response techniques. Such update to 
the operations of CSIRTs would consequently require an update to how evaluation 
techniques are to be used. At some point, there needs to be a study that identify the common 
performance issues across CSIRTs and the distinct performance aspects displayed by the 
various types of CSIRTs.    
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Practical Guidelines 
A.1. Recommended CSIRPE Configuration 
The following table provides suggested steps for how to configure a CSIRPE based 
on the maturity level of the security system [220], especially the CSIR capability. These 
configurations provide a starting point for how a CSIRT could configure its PE model in 
terms of expectations and capacity. However, this needs to be further developed to match 
the objectives of the team and the available capacity.  
Configuration CSIR Environment 
Code Name Basic Medium Advanced 
D.1 CSIRT Type Centralized 
Centralized or 
Distributed 
Customized 
D.2 Evaluator Type CSIRT Internal 
Internal and 
External 
D.3 
Number of 
Incidents Single-incident 
Multiple-incident 
Adjustable-
window 
D.4 
Incident 
Concurrency Sequential 
Sequential 
Concurrent or 
Elastic 
D.5 Analysis Time Post-incident Post-incident 
Continuous or 
Incremental 
D.6 Benchmarking 
None or 
standalone 
Internal External 
D.7 
Measurement 
Type 
Mainly 
Qualitative 
Mixed 
Mainly 
Quantitative 
D.8 CSIR Scope Execution 
Mainly execution 
+ basic design 
Both execution 
and design 
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S.1 
Quality 
Assurance 
None Compliance 
Compliance & 
Auditing 
S.2 
Quality 
Control 
CSIRT 
Mainly CSIRT + 
Quality Unit 
CSIRT + Quality 
Unit 
S.6 
Reference 
Point 
CSIRT or 
CSIRP 
CSIRP CSIRP 
PI.x 
Performance 
Indicators 
Few KPIs KPIs + other PIs 
KPIs and several 
PIs 
N.x 
Analysis 
Methods 
Comparative 
Comparative + 
basic deficiency 
& holistic 
Comparative + 
deficiency + 
holistic + 
predictive 
V.x 
Validation 
Methods 
Operational 
Operational and 
Development 
Operational + 
development + 
heuristic 
Table 45: Recommended CSIRPE configuration based on maturity level 
A.2. Guidelines for Designing Adjustable-Window Framework 
# Step Description 
1 
Assess the need for an 
inclusive PE 
framework 
Does your organization really need a comprehensive 
PE framework? If not, resources will be wasted in 
planning without any valuable return.  
If only periodic reporting is needed consider 
multiple-incident frameworks. If special task force or 
for directed customers consider single-incident 
frameworks.  
2 Re-define your goals 
Create two lists of PE objectives: short-term and 
long-term. The short-term objectives should be used 
to derive PMs for single incidents, while long-term 
goals should be used to derive PMs for multiple-
incidents.  
3 
Increase number of 
descriptive metrics 
Since descriptive metrics will be used in analysis of 
both single and multiple incidents, increase its pool, 
increase the pool of these metrics to enable designing 
a variety of PMs. A reading that seems not useful now 
might be useful later.  
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4 
Create two lists of PMs 
for single-incident 
analysis  
In order to analyze incidents individually, prepare 
two lists of PMs. The first list contains PMs that 
always need to be used, while the second list contains 
optional or special-case PMs. This strikes a balance 
between uniformity of analysis across incidents but 
also allows for flexible analysis  
5 Describe PE setting 
For each incident describe the environment and 
setting in which PM readings were collected and 
analyzed. This is important to make meaningful 
comparison between incidents and to ensure that 
statistical measures are consistent.  
6 
Define context for 
interpretation of PMs 
For multiple-incident PMs specify the proper 
conditions for reading the results and if there is a need 
to analyze multiple readings collectively 
7 
Conduct two-level 
analysis 
Do not mix single-incident and multiple-incident 
analysis. First, analyze the incident individually then 
analyze the incident over the larger spectrum. Record 
results from both steps, and present results as needed  
Table 46: Guidelines for designing an inclusive PE framework 
A.3. Guidelines for Selecting Analysis Reference Point 
The following simple questionnaire is a tool for CSIRT leadership determine which 
analysis reference point to use. Having more answers of “Yes” than “No” hint that it is 
probably better to select the CSIRP as the analysis reference point compared to the CSIRT, 
and the reverse is true.   
# Question Answer 
1 
Is your CSIRP applicable to several locations compared to a 
single geographical location? 
Yes No 
2 
Is the size of your CSIRT composed of three or more 
members? 
Yes No 
3 
Did your organization invest enough financial resources in the 
preparation of its CSIRP? 
Yes No 
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4 
Does the CSIRT has good understanding of the implemented 
security policies and the overall security of the system?  
Yes No 
5 
Does the CSIRP demonstrates a good level of completeness 
and comprehensiveness?  
Yes No 
6 
Is the likelihood of inviting an external CSIRT to handle an 
incident low? 
Yes No 
7 
Is it expected that the team performance will rely on the 
received training compared to their previous expertise? 
Yes No 
Table 47: Assessment questionnaire for selecting analysis reference point strategy 
A.4. Guidelines for Identifying CSIR Performance Aspects 
# Key Term Explanation 
1 
Selection of 
Methodology 
Before identifying the aspects, think which of the 
methodologies best fit the nature of the CSIRT/CSIRP of the 
organization 
2 
Multiple 
Methodologies  
Select at least two methodologies such that the combination 
is both CSIRP and CSIRT centric.  
3 
Parallel 
Analysis 
Perform separate analysis using each methodology. Next, 
find which one should take precedence and combine the 
aspects 
4 Use of Nouns 
Use nouns compared to action verbs when phrasing the 
aspects  
5 Confined List 
The list of aspects should not be too short or too long. The 
number of aspects can be between five and ten aspects. Too 
little or too many aspects is likely to cause difficulties in the 
following steps for performance indicators and metrics 
derivations  
6 
Overall 
Performance 
Remember to define the “overall system performance” as an 
aspect.  
Table 48: Recommendations for Identifying PE Aspects 
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A.5. Templates for Defining Performance Indicators and Metrics 
The following two tables provide templates for formal definition of performance 
indicators and metrics. The templates cover the basic requirements for defining the PIs and 
PMs in addition to other supplementary optional fields.   
Name Term or a brief phrase that identify the PI 
Code [Optional] code to be used if automation is used 
Description A definition of the PI and how it reflects good performance 
Classification Generic vs. Specific (or using another categorization scheme) 
Priority KPI or PI (or another priority scale)  
Goals & Aspects Mapping to the goals and aspects in which this PI represent 
PMs Performance metrics that will be used to measure the PI 
Table 49: Template for Formal Definition of Performance Indicators 
Metric Name Term or a brief phrase that identify the PM 
Code [Optional] code to be used if automation is used 
Description A definition of the PM (e.g. formula) 
Classification 
Performance vs. descriptive metric 
Generic vs. specific  
Measurement 
Method 
Quantitative vs. qualitative 
Measurement Tool 
[Conditions] Conditions for correct collection of measurement 
[Attributes] Factors that impact interpretation 
Range of allowed values 
Accuracy/confidence 
Interpretation How do the PM reading reflect performance? 
PIs Mapping to the Performance Indicators that use this PM 
Table 50: Template for Formal Definition of Performance Metrics 
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A.6. Basic IAV Model Design 
When a CSIRT is interested in using a basic design for the IAV model, then it could 
use the basic skeleton presented in Figure 33. The only necessary components are the 
feedback system, a database for storing incident data and performance results, and a single 
analysis technique. The IAV system can be developed later by the addition of various 
modules as the maturity level of the CSIR capability improves or as needs arise.  
 
Figure 33: Basic Design of the IAV model 
 
 
CSIRPE Design & Planning 
CSIRPE Framework 
Incident Data 
PE 
Database 
(PED) 
 
Performance Results 
Main Analysis 
method 
Optional model 
Optional 
model 
Optional 
model 
Feedback 
System 
Optional 
model 
Optional 
model 
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A.7. Guidelines for Selection of Performance Analysis Methods 
# Guideline Description 
1 Diversification 
Diversify measurement and analysis techniques to broaden 
the performance evaluation. As stated by [11]: “there can be 
no single assessment of accomplishments overall”.  
2 
Avoid Fox 
Paradox 
Avoid the Fox paradox [137]  by making sure to analyze 
system components first and then making an overall PE 
analysis. 
3 Compatibility 
Select analysis techniques that are compatible with the 
selected performance indicators and derived performance 
metrics.  
4 Feasibility 
Select analysis techniques that are feasible to apply taking in 
mind the availability of tools/software, competency of team 
members and expected cost 
5 Future-Centric 
Performance analysis should focus on the future, i.e. what to 
enhance, more than the past, i.e. what went wrong. Solving a 
past problem that does not have any future enhancements 
should be ignored. This is especially relevant as technologies 
advance in quick pace. 
6 Target-Based 
Predefine targets, thresholds, standards or benchmarks 
during the preparation phase. Inspect which analysis 
techniques are suitable to measure performance against these 
predefined targets  
7 Validation 
After selecting both analysis and validation techniques, 
investigate if analysis and validation could be combined 
together in order to save analysis overhead  
Table 51: Guidelines for Selecting Performance Analysis Techniques  
A.8. Scenario II Data 
PM Name Code Brief Description 
Declaration Time DT The timestamp of the incident declaration 
Confirmed Time CT 
The timestamp of when the severity level of an 
incident is confirmed 
Resolution Time IRT The timestamp an incident is declared resolved 
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Incident Severity S 
The initial Incident Severity level upon incident 
declaration 
Actual Incident 
Severity 
AS 
Actual incident severity level as confirmed during or 
post incident handling 
CSIRT Salary CSA Annual Salary of CSIRT core team 
Number of 
Incidents 
ANI Total annual number of incidents (per severity level) 
Table 52: Scenario II: List of Descriptive Metrics 
  Degree 5 Degree 4 Degree 3 Degree 2 Degree 1 Total 
2016 9 18 29 38 58 152 
2015 6 14 25 31 51 127 
2014 4 9 18 31 39 101 
2013 1 7 9 18 42 77 
2012 2 5 16 5 25 53 
Total 22 53 97 123 215  
Table 53: Scenario II: Data for Annual Number of Incidents (ANI)PM 
 
  Average annual responder salary Annual CSIRT Total Salary (CSA) 
2016 107,000 535,000 
2015 103,790 518,950 
2014 100,676 503,382 
2013 97,656 488,280 
2012 94,726 473,632 
Table 54: Scenario II: Incident Response Fixed Costs(USD) [2012-2016] 
 
Hourly Average incident Operating Cost in USD (HAOC) [2012-2016] 
 Degree 5 Degree 4 Degree 3 Degree 2 Degree 1 
Core CSIRT 440 360 315 270 250 
Support Teams 390 340 290 240 180 
Logistic Teams 230 180 165 120 120 
Total 1,060 880 770 630 550 
Table 55: Scenario II: Average Incident Response Operation Costs (USD) 
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Average Financial loss per incident in USD [2012-2016] 
  Degree 5 Degree 4 Degree 3 Degree 2 Degree 1 
Average Incident Loss (AL)  
(after CSIRT Intervention) 
80,000 52,000 30,000 18,000 1,500 
Predicted loss (PL) 
(without CSIRT intervention) 
365,000 273,000 191,000 103,000 56,000 
Average CSIRT Cost 
Effectiveness (CCE) 
285,000 221,000 161,000 85,000 54,500 
Table 56: Scenario II: CSIRT Cost Effectiveness Data 
 
Average Incident Response Activity Time in hours [2012-2016] 
  Degree 5 Degree 4 Degree 3 Degree 2 Degree 1 
Average Time to confirm 
severity level (TCIC) 
6.2 5.8 5.5 4.9 4.2 
Average Response Time 
(ART) 
32 28 27 19 14 
Table 57: Scenario II: Average Incident Response Time 
 
Detection Inaccuracy Cost (Total cost in USD) 
  Degree 5 Degree 4 Degree 3 Degree 2 Degree 1 Total 
2016 0 18,792 46,255 80,066 124,236 269,349 
2015 0 14,616 39,875 65,317 109,242 229,050 
2014 0 9,396 28,710 65,317 83,538 186,961 
2013 0 7,308 14,355 37,926 89,964 149,553 
2012 0 5,220 25,520 10,535 53,550 94,825 
Total 0 55,332 154,715 259,161 460,530   
Table 58: Scenario II: Detection Inaccuracy Cost Performance Metric Data 
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Incident Classification Strategy Cost (ICS-CE) 
 
Total detection 
inaccuracy Cost 
Risk 
cost 
Additional 
detection cost 
Strategy Cost 
Effectiveness 
2016 269,349 494,550 241,680 466,881 
2015 229,050 388,875 201,930 361,755 
2014 186,961 291,675 160,590 265,304 
2013 149,553 165,150 122,430 138,027 
2012 94,825 154,125 84,270 143,570 
Table 59: Scenario II: Incident Classification Strategy Cost Effectiveness PM Data
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